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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores three of Nietzsche in terms of his
conception of nihilism and his attempt to overcome it.
It is argued that Nietzsche views modernity as being
characterized by nihilism and in a state of crisis . . Nietzsche
responds to this crisis by offering both an aetiology of it, and
a vision of a future beyond nihilism. It is Nietzsche's vision
which is the primary concern of this work.
Nietzsche's first attempt to overcome nihilism is found in Thus
Spoke Zarathustra. In this book Nietzsche offers a solution of
individual salvation which is elucidated in terms of a trio of
ideas - the Superman, the will to power and eternal recurrence.
Since nihilism is a social problem, however, this individual
overcoming of it is insufficient. In Beyond Good arid Evil
Nietzsche, realizing this, offers a more inclusive solution which
centres on a political vision of an aristocracy which lies
beyond, and outside of, social morality.
In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche attempts to show that the
creation of such a future does not involve any ahistorical leaps,
that the potential for it is already present, though repressed,
in Western culture.
In sUbjecting Nietzsche' s vision of the future to critical
evaluation it is argued that his visions of individual and
society are both unattractive and unfeasible. The Nietzschean
individual is argued to be less a model of psychological health
and well-being than a case study in alienation. The aristocratic
society which Nietzsche envisages seems sure to lead to a new
crisis.
It is further argued that this lack of a workable and attractive
0>
vision of the future is based in a misinterpretation of the
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present, which, I suggest, is not characterized by a crisis.
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This thesis is an examination of the philosophy of Friedrich
Nietzsche (1844-1900) through a reading of three of his works:
Thus Spoke Zarathustra . (1883-1885), Beyond Good and Evil (1886)
and On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). The focus of this work
is Nietzsche's understanding of modernity as being characterized
by a crisis of nihilism and his attempts to overcome it.
THE ARGUMENT
Chapter one explores Nietzsche's understanding of nihilism. It
is argued that Nietzsche views nihilism as being connected toa
world view which has come to dominate European life and thought,
a world-view he associates with Platonism and Christianity . This
world-view, he argues, is under threat of collapse and this
constitutes a crisis to which Nietzsche responds and which he
attempts to overcome. Nietzsche' s conception of nihilism is
explored as involving a crisis of truth, of value, and of agency
and it is argued that our best understanding of it incorporates
all three.
Chapter two takes the form of a reading of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. It is argued that in this book Nietzsche offers a
broadly aesthetic solution to nihilism in the form of the self-
. -
creating individual. This solution is worked out in terms of
three novel concepts - the Superman, the will to power, and
eternal recurrence. These concepts are notoriously difficult to
grasp and I offer an interpretation of each of them.
For many years this aesthetic solution was taken to be . the whole
story of Nietzsche's attempt to overcome nihilism. This view of
Nietzsche's thought can be traced back, in the English-speaking
world, to the ground-breaking work of WaIter Kaufmann (1974).
Kaufmann, concerned to rehabilitate Nietzsche, to return him to
philosophical respectability after his posthumous association
with, and abuse by, the Nazis, offered a sanitized and apolitical
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Nietzsche. The success of Kaufmann' s work led to · this view
gaining enormous currency, which has not altogether waned.
Taylor (1992a) and Rorty (1989), for instance, still subscribe
to this view, as does Nehamas (1985).
The last decade, however, has seen a resurgence of interest in
the political aspects of Nietzsche' s thought; although pioneered
by Tracy strong in the 1970s, it was not until the 1980s that
there was an important flourishing of political works on
Nietzsche. Foremost among these were works by Detwiler (1990),
Connolly (1988), Ansell-Pearson (1991a, 1991b and 1994) and
Warren (1988). In chapter three I explore the political
dimensions of Nietzsche's solution in a reading of Beyond Good
and Evil. In this work Nietzsche offers a largely physiological
interpretation of human beings, their philosophies and their
moralities and argues for an aristocratic politics which will
free the "strong" for the task of self-creation, but at the
expense of the "weak".
In an exegesis of On the Genealogy of Morals in chapter four it
is argued that Nietzsche views the genealogy he undertakes as a
first step on the way to creating a new future. In this work,
Nietzsche locates the sources of nihilism in ressentiment, bad
conscience and the Ascetic ideal, while at the same time
attempting to show that other, repressed, possibilities exist in
Western culture and these might form the basis for the sort of
future Nietzsche envisages.
In chapter five Nietzsche's vision of the future is sUbjected to
critical scrutiny. Does Nietzsche have a workable vision? Does
he offer a way to overcome nihilism? It is the argument of this
thesis that he does not. I argue that Nietzsche's political
vision is likely to reinstitute, rather than overcome the crisis
of nihilism and that his ideal of the individual is severely
distorted.
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That Nietzsche fails as a visionary does not, however, detract
from his importance as a philosopher. His importance rather
resides in the way in which he sUbjects modern values,
interpretations and ideals to a radical form of questioning.
THE TEXTS
PRIMARY TEXTS
As already stated, this work concentrates on a reading of three
of Nietzsche's books Thus Spoke Zarathustra (parts I-III, 1884;
parts I-IV, 1891) ,Beyond Good and Evil (1886) and On The
Genealogy of Morals (1887). I will read each of these as having
a single, or at least a dominant theme - aesthetic redemption,
political salvation and an aetiology of the crisis respectively.
This of course, is not exactly the case. I do not mean to imply
by this arrangement that the critique of, origins of, and
alternative to, nihilism is what these three books are really
about. These books are all wide-ranging and interpretatively
open-ended. The arrangement is more in the manner of a
convenience but one which I hope will be borne out and justified
by the analysis thereby obtained.
None of Nietzsche's books is devoted to a single topic but
instead each is an interweaving of diverse themes and topics -
ethical, religious, political, aesthetic, scientific, literary,
social, psychological and historical. Given that these many
issues are further enmeshed in a variety of styles, literary
genres and devices, diverse metaphors and symbolizations, the
temptation is great either to give up. completely the task of
understanding Nietzsche, or to offer an artificially contained,
cut-and-dried analysis which does little justice to his
philosophy.
Attempting to do justice to Nietzsche means finding some path
between over-simplification and over-complication: of showing
how the various aspects of his thought fit together in a non-
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reductively coherent way without allowing this to 'di ver t one from
the critical appraisal of his stance on any particular issue.
I have attempted to achieve this by tracing a dominant thread
through these three works.
A defence of this choice of texts needs to meet two objections
which might be summed up in the following questions: "on what
grounds can you justify looking at just a few of Nietzsche's
books when by your own admission all of his books deal with a
multiplicity of issues?" and "why those books rather than any
others?"
In response to the first question I would offer the following
argument. It would seem not only possible but likely that in
attempting a survey of the complete oeuvre depth would be
sacrificed for breadth to an unnecessary and unjustifiable
degree. On the other hand, an in depth look at just one of
Nietzsche's works would be likely to misdescribe his solution to
the problem of nihilism, by ignoring the strands that are
explored in other works.
But, even if one accepts that some such compromise between depth
and breadth is both necessary and unavoidable and that some
selection has to be made the issue of a criterion for selection
needs to be addressed. Firstly, the chosen works are those most
widely regarded as Nietzsche's .most important, and include the
work Nietzsche himself regarded most highly Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. Secondly, they are importantly interconnected:
Nietzsche saw Beyond Good and Evil as a commentary on and further
working through of the ideas of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and On
the Genealogy of Morals as, a further elucidation of themes in
Beyond Good and Evil. Together they give us Nietzsche's vision
of future (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) , present (Beyond Good and
Evil) and past (On the Genealogy of Morals) - though here too,
caution is advisable for past, present and future form a unity
for Nietzsche, and each of the books touches on all three, while
privileging one. Thirdly, these three works neatly straddle the
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divide of what Nietzsche calls his "yes-saying" and his "no-
saying" and allow us to see his affirmation and critique together
and in the light of each other.
It remains to be said that no matter how well-defended, no choice
of texts is neutral, any selection of books depicts a Nietzsche
different from any other selection. The differences between, for
instance, Kaufmann' s rationalist Nietzsche and Jasper's
existentialist one are at least in part attributable to their
emphases on and preferences for different Nietzschean works (an
emphasis and preference influenced no doubt by their own
philosophical backgrounds).
SECONDARY TEXTS
The secondary literature on Nietzsche is enormous, and obviously
some difficult choices have to be made in this regard. I have
concentrated almost solely on those critical works written in
English. Further, I have, by and large and with notable
exceptions, concentrated on the work of the last ten years.
Heidegger and Deleuze are the most important of my omissions.
Each of these has, like Kaufmann , had enormous inf1uence on
Nietzsche scholarship especially in Germany and France,
respectively. However, Heidegger' s metaphysical reading of
Nietzsche is outside the scope of this work and Deleuze's thought
is only tangentially related.
THE APPROACH
I will approach Nietzsche's works through a reading of each in
turn. Although matters of style will be alluded to the focus
will be on the sUbstantive issues that Nietzsche raises. But
this is not to say that Nietzsche's content can be wholly
divorced from his style, nor that issues of style are




In any discussion of Nietzsche's work, the question of his style,
which is quite unlike anything we expect from a philosopher, is
unavoidable.
"Only those readers of Nietzsche who lack eyes and
ears can escape a confrontation with his style. Those
who think him a poet rather than a philosopher do so
because of his styles. Those who treat him as an
analytic philosopher in disguise have patiently to
peel aside his style. And those, again, who treat
Nietzsche as a liminal thinker, a philosopher of the
limits of philosophy have usually given his style(s)
special atterition." (Wood, 1990 p 30)
until recently it has been commonplace to treat Nietzsche as a
paradigmatically aphoristic writer1 • This view of Nietzsche is
again traceable to Kaufmann and there are still some who hold to
it, for example Zeitlin (1994).
But aphorism is just one of Nietzsche's stylistic devices and
none of the books to be investigated in this work is
straightforwardly aphoristic. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is the most
literary of Nietzsche's works and if not quite a novel, does have
a narrative form centring on the development of the protagonist.
On the Genealogy of Morals, on the other hand, is one of
Nietzsche's more straightforwardly philosophical works, three
essays each with an argument; and with an overarching argument
uniting them. Beyond Good and Evil is the most difficult of the
three to classify - nine sections, an aftersong, some epigrams -
it does display a tendency towards the aphoristic, but here too
there is a unity both within and between the sections that cannot
be overlooked without damaging the integrity of the work.
Niet~sche is unlike many other philosophers in that his work
seems to become more rather than less opaque the more one reads
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it. In reading Nietzsche we are constantly made aware of the
active and interpretative nature of reading.
"Nietzsche's books are easier to read but harder to
. . __ understand than those of almost any other thinker. .
. • As soon as one attempts to penetrate beyond the
clever epigrams and well turned insults to grasp their
consequences and to coordinate them, one is troubled.
Other thinkers generally accomplish this coordination
for us, and if we follow their arguments, they will
show us the connection that leads from one claim to
the next. while in Nietzsche's books the
individual sentences seem clear enough and it is the
total design that puzzles us." (Kaufmann, 1974 p 72)
Nietzsche's reliance on imagery and personae; the (apparent?)
contradictions which we are constantly thrown up against in his
work; his use of narrative to frame his argument all serve to
foster this awareness that in reading Nietzsche we are actively
engaged in the process of interpretation. A process with
inherent problems:
"If we were to liken the task of interpretation to
that of reconstructing a pioneer's journey through a
wilderness, we could look at these various passages as
clues . Working with a rough and presumably inaccurate
map of this wilderness territory, we could then mark
each of these clues on our preliminary chart of the
area. Given these points of reference and an initial
idea of the terrain, we could then reconstruct on our
map the route our explorer probably took. Yet such a
reconstruction will always remain tentative: there
may be other clues to which we had no access, the
explorer's route may have been much less direct, our
own ideas about the terrain may be mistaken, or we may
even be wrong about the goal our explorer had in mind.
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Indeed, the terrain may even have changed since that
initial exploration." (Hinman, 1982 p 180)
Magnus, stewart and Mileur (1993) explicate five stylistic
strategies .which_Nietzsche uses to force interpretation while
problematizing it~ The first of these is hyperbole (see also
Nehamas, 1985). Hyperbole serves to make the author visible and
present. Nietzsche makes no pretence at neutrality, but instead
offers interpretations and solutions as his alone.
The second is undecidability. This undecidability is a matter
of both content and tone. with regard to the former they argue
that Nietzsche's works and ideas resist reduction to any single,
coherent interpretation. And with regard to tone, it is never
clear when Nietzscheis being serious and when he is being
ironic.
Third, Nietzsche's works resist paraphrase not just in the sense
that something essential is lost in any paraphrase, but in that
a final interpretation of Nietzsche's thought is impossible in
principle.
The fourth is tokening. Nietzsche through his use of aphorisms
and sections forces the reader to make the connections giving no
authorial guidance, no explication. Nietzsche seems not to argue
in a sustained way but instead, a~ Huni (1991) has argued, we
find the premises for any given conclusion some distance away,
perhaps in another book altogether, perhaps not at all.
Finally, Magnus et al speak of Nietzsche's use of what they call
"self-consuming concepts" which they explain as:
"notions whose very articulation simultaneously
invites and refuses meaning and coherence" . (1993 P
22).
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This kind of reading of Nietzsche would mean that it is pointless
to try to talk about Nietzsche's thought. If the content of his
philosophy is uridecidable and resists paraphrase, · a nd i~ the
concepts he uses are self-consuming, then works such as the
· pr e s en t volume are rendered obsolete. Nietzsche, it would seem
is engaged in a philosophico-literary game, which we can enjoy
and perhaps even participate in but which it would be a mistake
to read as a serious attempt to deal with issues of self,
society, politics and morality.
But this does not fit with the way Nietzsche views
project, he does not seem to view his work as
philosophical game. In Ecce Homo he speaks of his






,,- Have I been understood? . The unmasking of
Christian morality is an event without equal, a real
catastrophe. He who exposes it is a forcemajeur, a
destiny - he breaks the history of mankind into two
parts." (EH 4.8)
These are not the words ofa man who feels that the style of his
thought is its essence. It is rather a demand that the content
of his work be taken seriously in the sort of way that this
thesis attempts to.
If we accept this, two related questions arise: what does
Nietzsche intend to achieve with his styles? and how are we to
read him? The answers to these questions will shape any
portrayal of Nietzsche and his thought.
In answering the first of these questions I would argue that the
stylistic aspect of Nietzsche's work is too pronounced, too
different from that of other philosophers', to be merely
incidental. We can therefore accept that Nietzsche intends his
style to perform some function. I would further argue that
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Nehamas (1985) and Solomon (1988) are substantially correct in
the suggestion that what Nietzscheintends is to find a way to
express his thoughts without falling into the sort of dogmatism
which he attacked; to offer interpretations while accepting that
there are only interpretations. That is Nietzsche utilizes style
as a way out of an' , epistemological dilemma, as a way of:
"presenting positive views that do not, simply by
virtue of being positive, fall back into dogmatism..
They show his perspectivism without saying
anything about it, and to that extent they prevent his
view that there are only interpretations from
undermining itself." (Nehamas, 1985 p 40)
If this is accepted then we can see that there is no
contradiction in ' reading Nietzsche as a philosopher offering
solutions to real problems. We can be open to his style without
treatingit as an end in itself. And we can engage in a critical
examination of the substance of his thought, just as we would
with any other philosopher.
This does not solve another interpretative problem related to
Nietzsche's style, namely, how literally are we to take what he
says? I will approach this question through looking at the
politics of Nietzsche interpretation. There has been a marked
tendency among Nietzsche scholars to treat as metaphorical or at
least imagistic, those aspects of his work which are most
unappealing . This is particularly the case with regard to
Nietzsche's political and ethical thought. For example,
Nietzsche we shall see argues for a politics of domination and
exploitation. But if we treat "domination" and "exploitation"
as metaphors then we do not have to confront the real horrors of
Nietzsche's political vision.
While Nietzsche was still regarded by the philosophical community
as a "crank" and a proto-Nazi, while he was still regarded not
a "real" philosopher, such a project of metaphorization might
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have had if not a philosophical then at least a political
justification. But the situation has changed and fewer .and fewer
philosophers would deny Nietzsche's importance. The political
justification for metaphorization then falls away. This work
will treat Nietzsche's _political and ethical thought by taking
Nietzsche at face-value unless it is obviously absurd to do SOi
in this I follow strong:
"Nietzsche is not, as so many commentators have said,
'obscure'i in fact, I think that he generally means
exactly what he says. If we find him obscure or
mystical, this says something about us, for it is not
until we are able to cast off the pictures that hold
us prisoner to a traditional way of seeing moral,
political, social, and epistemological problems that
we will be able to face directly what Nietzsche says."
(strong,1975 p x)
In facing directly what Nietzsche says, we must begin with the
enormous problem that he faced, that of nihilism. For only by
confronting the "abyss" with him can we appreciate his attempts
to escape it. Only by appreciating the problematic can we
evaluate his proposed solutions.
---------~-----------
NOTES
1. The more interesting discussions of aphorism include
Shapiro (1984) and De1euze (see Patton, 1993a).
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CHAPTER. ONE: ' N I H I L I S M
lilt seems to me more and more that the phd Loaopherj ,
being necessarily a man of tomorrow and the day after
tomorrow, has always found himself and had to find
".- '. - -._- - ---"'-'-"-- - - -_. . -- . . -. _ ~ . , . , ... . -
himself in contradiction to his today: his enemy has
always been the ideal of today." (BGE 212)
Nietzsche's philosophy can, I believe, be read asa critique of
modernity. Modernity is, of course, a hugely complex phenomenon,
a full analysis of which is beyond the scope of this thesis (not
to mention my own capabilities). In using this term I intend to
point to a confluence of three historical developments 1 - one
intellectual, one political and one economic. Intellectually
modernity is shaped by the Enlightenment with its emphasis on
reason and science, and the gradual process of secularization.
Politically modernity ' is marked by the development and
popularization of the ideals associated with the French
Revolution (liberty, equality and fraternity) and .t.h e
institutionalization of (liberal and social) democratic politics.
The economic side of modernity involves the development of the
immense productive capacities and wealth, and the process of
urbanization, associated with the Industrial Revolution and the
growth of the capitalist system.
Although I have characterized Nietzsche's work as a critique of
modernity , Nietzsche is not concerned with a detailed
understanding of this confluence. Instead he sees all these
developments as ramifications, final outworkings, of an
underlying world view which he associates with both Platonic
philosophy and Christianity. Nietzsche believes that these two
strands of our heritage are really very much the same (in the
preface to Beyond Good and Evil he says "Christianity is
Platonism for 'the people' 11) , and that what is central to this
Platonic-Christian world ~iew is the way in which it devalues
this world in favour of a transcendent realm. Modernity is for
Nietzsche the development of' this world view, its rise to
dominance and his critique of it centres on nihilism.
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He views nihilism as both a constant, though hitherto latent,
feature of western culture and a current situation of crisis.
Although Nietzsche uses the term "nihilism" frequently in his
notebooks he does so less in his pUblished works, it is however
an idea frequently- and closely associated with him:
"I shall take Nihilism as the central concept in his
philosophy" (Danto, 1965 p 22);
"this is the very core of Nietzsche's spiritual
existence, and what follows is despair and hope in a
new greatness of man, visions of catastrophe and
glory, the icy brilliance of analytical reason,
fathoming with affected irreverence those depths
hitherto hidden by awe and fear, and, side-by-side
with it, the ecstatic invocations of a ritual healer. 11
(HelIer, 1988 p 3)
Even if Nietzsche does not use the term often in his published
works, he clearly conveys the sense of nihilism with his powerful
imagery of, for instance, lithe death of God" and lithe abyssv".
Pervading Nietzsche's work is a sense that whatever benefits
modernity may have brought, it has also resulted in some sort of
void; where others see progress, Nietzsche sees decline. Also
pervading his work is the sense that this nihilism has reached
a critical point; that this situation of nihilism is unendurable
but can be resolved if hard choices are made.
This first chapter explores what Nietzsche means by nihilism and
why he thinks it is a crisis. The rest of this work is concerned
with Nietzsche' s attempt to resolve the crisis, to overcome
nihilism.
Although there is considerable agreement that Nietzsche is
concerned with nihilism, there is rather less agreement as to
what exactly nihilism consists in. It is clear that Nietzsche
thfnks we confront a crisis, but what sort of crisis? Most
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readings focus on nihilism as a crisis of truth and value but
Warren (1988) has argued that nihilism is best understood as a
crisis of agency. In sections 1.2 and 1.3 I will look at the
issues of truth and value respectively. In section 1.4 I will
investigate-Warren's-reading of nihilism . . I shall argue that our
best understanding of Nietzsche's conception of nihilism would
incorporate and synthesize all of these aspects. Before turning
to this discussion, though, I will, in section 1.1 take a brief
look at one of Nietzsche's most famous passages, a passage which
locates nihilism in the "death of God".
1. 1 THE · DEATH OF GOD
"The madman. - Have you not ·heard of that madman who
lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the
market place, and cried incessantly: 'I seek God! I
seek God!' - As many of those who did not believe in
God were standing around just then, he provoked much
laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose
his way like a child? asked another. Or is he
hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage?
emigrated? - Thus they yelled and laughed.
"The madman jumped into their midst and pierced them
with his eyes. 'Whither is God?' he cried; 'I will
tell you. We have killed him - you and I. All of us
are his murderers. But how did we do this? How could
we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe
away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we
unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it
moving now? Whi ther are we mov i nq? Away from all
suns? Are we not plunging continually? Backward,
sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there still
any up or down? Are we not straying as through an
infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty
space? Has it not become colder? Is not the night
continually closing in on us? Do we not need to light
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lanterns in the morning? Do we hear nothing as yet of
the noise of the gravediggers who are .bur y i ng God? Do
we smell nothing as yet of the divine decomposition?-
Gods, too, decompose. God is dead. God remains dead.
And_wahave_killed him.
" 'How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all
murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that
the world has yet owned has bled to death under our
knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water
is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of
atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent?
Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us?
Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear
worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed;
and whoever is born after us - for the sake of this
deed he will belong to a higher history than all
history hitherto.'
"Here the madman fell silent and looked again at his
listeners; and they, too, were silent and stared at
him in astonishment. At last he threw hi$ lantern on
the ground, and it broke into pieces and went out. 'I
have come too early,' he said then; 'my time is not
yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still
wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of men.
Lightning and thunder require time; the light of the
stars requires time; deeds, though done, still
require time to be seen and heard . . This deed is still
more distant from them than the most distant stars -
and yet they have done it themselves.'
"It has been related further that on the same day the
madman forced his way into several churches and there
struck up his requiem aetern.;:im deo , Led out and
called to account, he is said always to have replied
nothing but: 'What after all are these churches now
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if they are not the tombs and sepulchres of God?'1I (GS
125)
This beautiful and striking passage has many features worthy of
analysis bti£-rshi:ll1 -commemt on just four: the character of the
madman; the response of his audience; the cataclysmic
consequences of the death of God; and, the need for redemption
from this event.
By putting the words of this famous speech into the mouth of a
madman Nietzsche might be supposed to be distancing himself from
the content of the speech. This is not the case though,
Nietzsche clearly identifies himself as not merely an atheist,
but the antichrist. In Ecce Homo he identifies his philosophy
with a war against Christianity, and he ends that book with the
words:
"_ Have I been understood? - Dionysos against the
Crucified • • • 11 (EH 4.9)
The character -of the madman, the buffoon, is in fact one of
Nietzsche's most common IImasks" 3 (we shall see, for instance, in
the next chapter that the character of Zarathustra is often
portrayed as a fool and a failure). The jUdgement of the
character as mad should be treated with suspicion: it is not
Nietzsche's own but clearly that of those who encounter him. The
madness of the character is analogous to that of Hamlet, a
madnes~, that threatens the truly sane, the ones who cannot but
see the truth most clearly while all about them ignore it.
The true horror of the parable lies not in the madman's words but
in the response he provokes. The laughter and jokes of the crowd
are a foretaste of the response that Zarathustra will meet in his
attempts to teach the crowd about the Superman. Their
indifference to the death of God, to the fact of their having
mU~dered him, marks them as shallow and out of touch. And again
,
we might draw analogies with the Court at Elsinore where life and
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merriment continue unimpaired despite the dreadful murder and the
tragedy that must follow.
For Nietzsche, in the guise of the madman, the death of God is
not just a·fact to be shrugged aside but a catastrophic event.
The horizon has been wiped away, the earth unchained from the sun
moving everywhere and nowhere, there is the threat of an
impending cold, dark nothingness. This is the nihilism which
threatens, what he elsewhere terms the "abyss". But it is a
nihilism, he implies, which we have wrought ourselves - God has
not died a peaceful death of quiet old age, he has been murdered
and we are responsible.
And if we are responsible for this cataclysm then we must redeem
ourselves. This notion of redemption is a crucial aspect of
Nietzsche's attempts to overcome nihilism. In this passage the
awesomeness of the deed requires an equally awe-ful redemption -
that we ourselves become gods; later, he will suggest that only
the Superman can justify the death of God.
The suggestion throughout this passage is that the meaning,
indeed the very possibility, of life is threatened by the death
of God. But why should this be so? What exactly has the madman
seen that the crowd, unperturbed, has not? The first suggestion
that we will look at is that the madman has seen the effect of
God's death on truth.
1.2 THE CRISIS OF TRUTH
According to what we might call the . epistemological reading of
nihilism, it might be summed up in the statement "there is no
truth", where that statement would crucially include moral truths
(the most influential epistemological reading of nihilism is that
by Danto, 1965; more sophisticated versions include those by
Connolly, 1988 and Strong, 1975). The loss of a transcendent
realm seems to undermine our truth claims. Although initially..
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plausible, there is, I would argue, little support for such a
reading in Nietzsche's work.
If we were to understand the crisis "t h a t Nietzsche sees
unfolding, the abyss, _ the_nothingness closing in upon man, in
epistemological terms, then we might expect firstly, that
Nietzsche's works would centre on questions of truth and
knowledge and secondly, that he would be largely concerned to
find a way to secure truth and knowledge against the threat of
nihilism.
In fact, we find that neither of these projects is evidenced in
Nietzsche's writing. It could be argued that Nietzsche' s seeming
lack of concern with epistemological questions has been one of
the main reasons for his neglect and rejection by the
philosophical community, especially in the English-speaking
world. This is, for instance, the reasoning Russell uses:
"Nietzsche, though a professor, was a literary rather
than an academic philosopher. He invented no new
technical theories in ontology or epistemology" (1979
p 728).
This is not to deny, contra Russell, that Nietzsche has
importantly suggestive things to say about truth and knowledge4 •
But these do not take up the greater part of his work, they can
hardly be seen as the primary and central aspect of his
philosophy. In turning, albeit very briefly, to what Nietzsche
does say about truth and knowledge, we find the second reason for
rejecting the epistemological reading of nihilism.
The epistemological position that Nietzsche outlines (though he
never develops it into a full theory) is one of perspectivism and
is intimately tied to his notion of interpretation. He gives a
clear account of his position in The Will to Power:
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"Against positivism, which halts at phenomena - 'There
are only facts' - I would say: No, facts is precisely
what there is not, only interpretations . . We cannot"
establish any fact 'in itself': perhaps it is folly
to want. to do .sucha .thing • .
"'Everything is sUbjective,' you say; but even this
is interpretation. The' subject' is not something
given, it is something added and invented and
projected behind what there is. - Finally, is it
necessary to posit an interpreter behind the
interpretation? Even this is invention, hypothesis.
"In so far as the word 'knowledge' has any meaning,
the world is knowable; but it is interpretable
otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless
meanings. - 'Perspectivism.'
lilt is our needs that interpret the world; our drives
and their For and Against. Every drive is a kind of
lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it
would like to compel all the other drives to accept as
a norm." (WP 481)
While it is important to remember that The Will to Power is a
selectionS from Nietzsche's notebooks and is therefore not to be
seen as Nietzsche's final position on any topic (let alone the
key to his thought), what he says in this passage does not
conflict with what he says on the topic in his published works
(as we shall see in the discussion of Beyond Good and Evil in
chapter 3). What is important for our purposes here is that
Nietzsche embraces the notions of perspectives and
interpretations. There is no attempt to try and ground
knowledge, to make it something more certain.
It might be argued that if Nietzsche embraces an epistemology of
perspectives and interpretations then his position is self-
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refuting, in the same way that all relativisms are self-refuting.
Nietzsche offers his own interpretations, his own perspectives;
and it might be argued that he would want these to be accorded
the status of truths. Magnus (1983) and Schrift (1983 and 1990)
have both argued that Nietzsche circumvents ..this charge through
his always careful and explicit offering of his interpretations
and perspectives as interpretations and perspectives. This is
true in so far as it goes but it must also be borne in mind that
Nietzsche never commits himself to an "anything goes" relativism.
He is careful to maintain a notion of objectivity, though based
not in a disinterested review of the facts but in a bringing to
bear of as many perspectives as possible:
"There is only a perspective seeing, only a
perspective 'knowing'; and the more affects we allow
to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different
eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more
complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our
'objectivity,' be." (GM 3.12)
And he also holds that some interpretations are better than
others, though here again the criterion he uses is not an
epistemological one, but an axiological one - interpretations are
to be jUdged according to their "value for life". As Nietzsche
puts it:
"The falseness of a jUdgement is to us not necessarily
an objection to a jUdgement • . . The question is to
what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving,
species-preserving, perhaps even . species-breeding"
(BGE 4).
Ul timately, then epistemology is grounded in axiology. It is the
value of an interpretation, and not its truth, that is accorded
most importance. This brings us on to the second reading of
nihilism, that it signifies a crisis of value.
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1.3 THE CRISIS OF VALUES
If truth plays a central role in the thought of most philosophers
that role is taken in Nietzsche's work by concern for questions
of value. Indeed, we- might -without -exaggeration characterize
Nietzsche as an axiological theorist.
"To . be sure, Nietzsche'sfurther reflections on other
matters had a significant impact upon his thinking
with respect to values and morality. The centrality
and prominence of the latter throughout the whole
course of his intellectual life, however, should be
clear." (Schacht, 1985 p 341)
This is unusual itself in a tradition which has focused almost
exclusively on epistemological questions; but Nietzsche does not
merely make questions of value primary, he also probes values
themselves, bringing them into question. And he attributes to
philosophers a value-creating function. It is more .p l aus i b l e
then to read nihilism as an axiological or existential crisis to
be summed up by the statement "nothing has meaning/value".
crisis that arises
beauty, truth and
Nihilism might be seen to be quite simply the
when we recognize the contingency of our
confront the fact that our conceptions of
goodness have no external and secure basis.
values; when we
But if nihilism consisted solely in the acceptance of this
contingency then it would become a fate~ and exploring the fact
of contingency could not help us overcome it. Nietzsche' s
ruthless vivisection of values could serve no purpose except to
deepen the crisis, cruelly and unnecessarily (see strong 1975).
Rather, I would argue, Nietzsche is concerned to show that the
feeling that "nothing has meaning/value" is in some real sense
illusory. Certainly our values have no transcendental basis but
thIs does not mean they have no basis at all. Nietzsche shows
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that the crisis of nihilism is itself the result of a nihilistic
project founded in the Christian and Platonic world views which
have shaped modernity. ~oth of these traditions -ha v e
consistently devalued this actual world in favour of a
transcendental world; body__in favour of mind; passion and
experience in favour of reason and contemplation. It is not
values as such that nihilism exposes as meaningless but just one
set of values; nihilism issues in crisis because we are unable
to see that there are other possibilities of value - immanent,
bodily, passionate, experiential. Thus Nietzsche's questioning
is not intended sadistically but as a means to show new and
unexplored possibilities. As Magnus says:
"When the highest values become devalued nihilism is
a danger not because there are no other possible
values, but because most of Western humanity knows no
other values than those associated with a dualistic
ascetic ideal." (1983 p 314)
This view that nihilism is a crisis not of valuelessness and
meaninglessness as such, but of the collapse of one set of
meanings is also taken by Schrift (1983). Schrift discusses
nihilism using notes in The Will to Power. In the notes
Nietzsche distinguishes between four types of nihilism. Schrift
calls these "pessimistic" -
"when we have sought a 'meaning' in all events that
is not there" (WP 12A);
"sceptical" - which signals the loss of a unity, an organisation,
which was intended to provide value (WP 12A); "passive", which
occurs with the loss of metaphysics (WP 12A); and, finally,
"active", which is summed up in the following:
"Suppose we realize how the world may no longer be
interpreted in terms of these three categories and
that the world begins to become valueless for us after
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this insight: then we have to ask about the sources of
our faith in these three categories. Let us try if it
is not possible to give up our faith in them. Once we"
have devaluated these three categories, the
demonstration that - t.hey.. cannot be applied to the
universe is no longer any reason for devaluating the
universe." (WP 12B)
The first three of these Nietzsche labels "incomplete": active
nihilism, though, is "complete ll • It is the last type of nihilism
which Nietzsche himself engages in:
"Main proposition. How complete nihilism is the
necessary consequence of the ideals entertained
hitherto.
Incomplete nihilism; its forms: we live in the midst
of it.
Attempts to escape nihilism without revaluating our
values so far: they produce the opposite, make the
problem more acute." (WP 28)
The loss of metaphysics, the death of God, becomes a crisis in
late modernity because in the modern world-view all meaning, all
value, has been situated in the religious interpretation of the
world. Part of the task of active nihilism, therefore, must be
a critique of this world-view.
Nietzsche argues that it is religion and metaphysics which with
their other-world view, their removal of meaning to another and
higher realm set the stage for nihilism by robbing the lived
world of meaning, of any possibility of value.
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche powerfully describes all of
culture as a flight from the basic truth of contingency (and its
neciessity). Art, science, philosophy and religion all seek to
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create meaning in a meaningless world; to set between us and
this unpalatable truth a created world in which we can live and
thrive:
"It is an eternaL phenomenon: the insatiable will
always finds a way to detain its creatures in life and
compel them to 1ive on, by means of an illusion spread
over things. One is chained by the Socratic love of
knowledge and the delusion of being able thereby to
heal the eternal wound of existence; another is
ensnared by art's seductive veil of beauty fluttering
before his eyes: still another by the metaphysical
comfort that beneath the whirl of phenomena eternal
life flows on indestructibly . . . All that we call
culture is made up of these stimulants" (BT 18).
It is this cultural lie which Nietzsche so much admires in man
and in the Ancient Greeks especially. And against this modern
man can only seem weak and soft, a maggot made out of a lion (GM
1.11). However, if the original metaphysical impulse was, for
Nietzsche, a worthy one, its final result in modern society is
to be deplored. Though it was originally an act of ultimate
defiance to create metaphysics, Nietzsche suggests that for
modern man the comparable act would be to reject it to move back
to the bodily world.
Our values freed from any metaphysical underpinnings are open to
question and valuation themselves. It is Nietzsche's belief that
axiology as he conceives it opens a realm of depth-questioning
which has hitherto been ignored and made invisible. This is the
project he speaks about as the revaluation of values which he
sees as a revolution indeed. He is explicit about his
axiological project in terms not only of ethics:
"we need a critique of moral values, the value of these




"a much older, a hundred times more demanding, but by no
means colder eye which has not become a stranger to the
task which - this audacious - book dared to tackle for the
first time: to look at science in the perspective of the
artist, but at art in that of life" (ASC 2);
but also of truth:
"we finally came to a full stop before a still more basic
question. We asked about the value of this will. Suppose
we want truth: why not rather untruth? and uncertainty?
even ignorance?" (BGE 1.1)
The critique of contemporary values, the values which shape the
Platonic-Christian world-view is just one side of Nietzsche's
project. Throughout the work he sees himself as engaged in a
"revaluation of all values". If Schrift is right in seeing
Nietzsche's project as involving active nihilism he is wrong to
see that as an end in itself. Nietzsche seeks a way to overcome
nihilism. Having found the values of modernity to be wanting
Nietzsche searches for other values, values which will enhance
life.
Kaufmann, however, says Nietzsche never intended a revaluation
in this sense:
The revaluation is thus the alleged discovery that our
morality is, by its own standards, poisonously immoral:
that Christian love is the mimicry of impotent hatred;
that most unselfishness is but a particularly vicious form
of selfishness; and that ressentiment is at the core of
our morals.
(Kaufmann, 1974 P 113)
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But if the revaluation of values is merely negative in character,
then we return to the criticism that Nietzsche is merely being
unnecessarily cruel. I would therefore side with Schacht who
reads the revaluation of values as an attempt
"to work out a ·new theory of value which would at once
provide an interpretation and decisive reassessment of
existing moral and evaluative schemes, and also fill
the normative void which their mere \ devaluation'
under critical scrutiny would otherwise leave." (1985
p 343)
The reading of nihi lism as a crisis of value usually supports
some version of an aesthetic reading of Nietzsche. This is the
conclusion Schacht, for instance, reaches. Speaking of the
famous claim in The Birth of Tragedy that "it is only as an
aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally
justified" (BT 5), Schacht says:
"while this was but his first approach to the general
issue of value, posed here only in the broadest terms,
the view he expresses is one which he may have
modified but did not abandon." (1985 p 344)
Megill too interprets Nietzsche as advocating an aesthetic
response to nihilism - that we:
"become the artists of our own existence, untrammelled
by natural constraints and limitations." (Megill, 1985
p 34)
On such a reading the solution to nihilism lies in the way that
we live. We respond to the crisis not with argument and
refutation but by creating of our own lives a work of art which
others may use as an example:
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"The role of the philosopher is to warn and bear
witness and exemplify, but not to invent values or to
produce them out of his consciousness." (Blackham,'
1989 p 33)
Blackham attributes to Nietzsche a problem which must beset any
attempt to read nihilism as solely a question of values, the
attempt to overcome it as an aesthetic self-creation namely, that
such an attempt to overcome nihilism must result in nihilism:
"One can look down into the bottom of an abyss
refusing the possibility of throwing oneself over the
edge, but one cannot explore the possibility by a
tentative jump." (Blackham, 1989 p 41)
But the problem is incorrectly attributed, I
while part of Nietzsche's understanding






"Nietzsche is a social philosopher; the force of his
critique of platonism, Christianity ('Platonism for
the people'), representation and truth is misplaced if
it is considered only a theoretical, contemplative
critique detachable from the way in which the values
designated by those terms have informed life, the
practices of peoples. Philosophy for Nietzsche is
always and everywhere a worldly praxis, a work of
valuation, and hence a work of critique and
transformation." (Bernstein, 1991 p 194)
The crisis is not just one of value but of practice, of agency.
The aesthetic solution is not enough and it is not the only
solution that Nietzsche offers, as will be argued in later
chapters.
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1.4 THE CRISIS OF AGENCY
I
In investigating nihilism as a crisis of agency Warren (1985 and
1988) has added a new depth to our understanding of how this
central concept . functions in ·Nietzsche' s work. . According to
Warren's reading there are two nihilistic crises and further a
more latent nihilism that runs through western culture. The
first crisis "original nihilism" was directly political, a
response to a world in which the lower class in society was so
dominated, exploited and disempowered that effective action was
made impossible. with agency closed to them, their only means
to change their situation was through a re-interpretation of
their values and world-view (the history of this crisis is the
focus of The Genealogy of Morals which is the sUbject of chapter
four of this work). But this could not, of course, solve the
problem of agency as such and as the Christian-Platonic re-
interpretation collapses, the problem is once again exposed.
According to Warren, Nietzsche is concerned with nihilism as a
"psychological symptomIt (1985 p 421) of situations in which human
agency is rendered impossible as a result of a lack of fit
between interpretations and situations. For Nietzsche we
interact with the world through feeling, thought and action. In
nihilism the cognitive side of man is not aligned with the
affective and acting sides (1985 p 421). In the situation of
nihilism experience and interpretation do not, and cannot be made
to, fit together (1985 p 422).
Nietzsche understands history in terms of three epochs - the pre~
moral, the moral (including the present), and the extra-moral
(BGE 32) and the transition between these epochs is
characterised by nihilism (Warren, 1985 pp 422-3). The nihilism
characteristic of the first transition Warren, following
Nietzsche's usage in The Will to Power, labels Itoriginal
nihilism lt and that of the present "European nihilism lt (1985 p
423).
34
Original nihilism is the response of an oppressed class, the
slaves, to a particular social and political situation of
oppression and exploitation. Denial of the conditions of aqency
in .t h i s situation is direct and material - all power lies with
the masters and .. the.. slaves.. do not have the material_means to
change their situation. Nietzsche argues that the slaves use the
only means open to them, they develop an interpretation of the
world that makes their lives bearable -the Platonic-Christian
world view (GM 1). Christianity, of course, does not alleviate
the suffering nor does it offer a political solution to it.
Instead . it offers an interpretative framework in which that
suffering is made meaningful and justified:
"What were the advantages of the Christian moral
hypothesis?
1. It granted man an absolute value, as opposed to
his smallness and accidental occurrence in the
flux of becoming and passing away.
2. It served the advocates of God insofar as it
conceded to the world, in spite of sUffering and
evil, the character of ' perfection - including
'freedom': evil appeared full of meaning.
3. It posited that man had a knowledge of absolute
values and thus adequate knowledge precisely
regarding what is most important.
4. It prevented man from despising himself as man,
from taking sides against life; from despairing
of knowledge: it was a means of preservation.
In sum: morality was the great antidote against
practical and theoretical nihilism.. " (WP 4)
This Christian world view though does not solve the original
problem, it merely represses it (Warren, 1985 p 424). It 'doe s
not offer a means to agency, but instead sanctifies inaction as
"good" (GM 1.13).
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Modern nihilism, on Warren's reading, arises out of the failure
of the Christian-moral interpretation to explain our experiences.
Two different processes lead to this crisis, first the Christian-
moral world-view becomes increasingly incoherent and unbelievable
as a result of the will to truth and rationality which. it itself
upheld (GM 3.27). Second, it becomes increasingly inadequate to
deal with everyday experience, a world no longer characterized
by slavery and sUffering (Warren, 1985 p 428).
"Actually, we have no longer such need of an antidote
to the first nihilism: life in Europe is no longer
that uncertain, capricious, absurd." (WP 114)
Nihilism is therefore, on this reading, to be understood as a
fundamentally socio-political problem with a socio-political
solution.
1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
I would argue that Warren's reading adds a crucial and hitherto
neglected aspect to our understanding of Nietzsche on nihilism.
It also offers a critical edge to our rejection of those who
would see the transcendence of nihilism in aesthetic terms, or
those, like strong (1975) and Martin (1989), who take the view
that nihilism can be transcended through an understanding of
language. For new interpretations and new languages cannot in
and of themselves solve the problem of agency.
This would also explain what might otherwise seem perplexing in
Nietzsche - his whole-hearted acceptance of perspectivism, on the
one hand, but resistance to the relativisation of values, on the
other. For truth per se is not a necessary condition of action,
but value is.
The problem with Warren's analysis is that it underplays the way
in which nihilism is experienced at the level of values, that it
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is here that the crisis is both felt and must be met. As Ansell-
Pearson puts it:
"For Nietzsche, the problem [of modernity] is not just
a social or_political one which can be solved simply
by refining and improving liberal-democratic
institutions and practices. He sees Western
civilisation caught in the grip of debilitating and
demoralising nihilism in which our most fundamental
conceptions of the world are no longer tenable and
believable. Nihilism is thus a condition which
affects the metaphysical and moral languages through
which we fabricate an understanding of the world and
on which we base our acting in the world." (1994 p 7)
In understanding nihilism and the attempt to overcome it in
Nietzsche's work it is necessary, therefore, to understand it as
a crisis of the most fundamental and far-reaching sort. A crisis
with not only socio-political but also linguistic, conceptual and
evaluative ramifications. It isa crisis which requires
fundamental change, if it is to be overcome. This change will
have both individual (aesthetic, self-creative) aspects and
social and political ones and none can be ignored. The next
chapter will focus on Nietzsche's consideration of self-creation
as a means to overcoming nihilism, the following chapter the
socio-political aspects of this overcoming.
NOTES
1. In reading modernity this way I am indebted to Love (1986).
2. Walker (1991) writes of Nietzsche's attempt to overcome
metaphysics, but this does not, I think, capture the full
sense of what Nietzsche is attempting in the way that
nihilism does.
3. Williams . (1978) offers a particularly good discussion of
Nietzsche's use of masks as both a method of communicating
his perspectivism, and art argumentative structure.
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4. Some of the more important recent works on this aspect of
Nietzsche's thought are Nola (1987), Siegfried (1989) and
especially Clark (1990).
5. Nietzsche did conceive of writing a work called The will to
Power and even made notes towards it. The work that exists
under -that-- title however is merely a · compilation of
extracts from his notebooks edited by his sister,
Elisabeth. The book, therefore, has no authorial
legitimacy from Nietzschei though his sister did try to
pass it off as Nietzsche's final . systematization of his
work. Given Elisabeth's politics, and her incomprehension
of Nietzsche's philosophy, it is as well to treat the book
with some suspicion: however, as a collection of







The vision of the futureWhfch · Nietzsche offers in ThuS-Spoke
Zarathustra might be read as an attempt to overcome the nihilism
of the present. He proffers this vision in terms of a trinity
of concepts - the Superman, the will to power and the eternal
recurrence. An interpretation of each of these will be tendered
(2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 respectively) and it will be argued that
together they add up to an aesthetic of redemption, a psychology
of personal redemption through creative assimilation of the past
(2.4). This aesthetic solution to the problem of nihilism will
then be critically evaluated (2.5).
The first question that must be addressed when embarking on a
reading of Thus Spoke Zarathustra is that of what type of book
it is. Nietzsche himself regarded it most highly as a statement
of his philosophy. It is not, however, a philosophical text if
we take "philosophical" to imply sustained argument, a reasoned
defence, or something similar, for the text is declamatory in
style, and it deals in images rather than concepts. Nor is it
a novel, or if it is it is merely a bad one, for though it
details the development of its central character (Higgins 1988,
Lampert 1986), it has a meagre plot and few characters of any
depth.
It might be argued that the most apt rubric under which to
situate it is that of religious text. Martin, for instance,
argues that many aspects of Nietzsche's work situate him as a
religious thinker - the sense of fallenness which dominates his
philosophy, the sense of a crisis precipitating the end of
history, the belief that what is most important to human life is
meaning (1989 p 73). He suggests that Nietzsche's project might
be seen as an attempt to establish a religion without a
metaphysics (1989 p 75).
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However, I think such a reading misses the crucial feature of
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, namely that Nietzsche intends it, at
least in part, as a parody of religion. Ansell-Pearson has
argued that the character of Zarathustra is itself parodic of the
I
prophet:
"He hesitates when he should be firm in his
pronunciations; he renounces authority when people
are prepared to fall down on their knees before him
and unconditionally obey him." (Ansell-Pearson, 1994
p 103)
And he suggests that it is this element of parody, in which
Zarathustra's identity and teaching are constantly called into
question, which prevents the teachings of the text from becoming
dogma (1991a p 166).
Higgins (1988) has argued that the character of Zarathustra is
a parody not only of the prophet (Christ) but also of the
philosopher (Socrates). She goes on to elucidate yet another
aspect of the way the character functions - as a tragic hero:
"Although Zarathustra's objective from the beginning
of the book is to communicate with others, we rarely
see even a glimmer of success." (p 138)
And she argues that this failure 1 is crucial, because it means
that there is no promise of something better, only the choice of
an alternative:
"In the end, Nietzsche offers us a vision of life that
we can take or leave. . he has not packaged his
worldview to ensure that we will find it attractive."
(p 150 my italics)
It is this non-dogmatic aspect that gives us the leeway to treat




the hard-line critic such as Zeitlin (1994) or Megill (1985) both
of whom view the declamatory style of the book as Nietzsche's way
of avoiding the philosophical task of explaining and justifying
his ideas. However, if we take a bro~der view of philosophy as
a problem-solving activity requiring imagination and the use of
all sorts of methods then we can quite easily fit Thus Spoke
Zarathustra into philosophical discourse; for it is concerned
with solving the problem of nihilism.
Our expectation that Zarathustra will offer a solution to the
problem of nihilism is set up in his first encounter with the old
hermit. Having spent ten years alone in the mountains gaining
wisdom Zarathustra returns to society. On the way he encounters
the hermit who has forsaken society in order to love and serve
God. Zarathustra expresses amazement (to himself) that the old
man has not heard of God's death. The context of nihilism is
thus established but the apocalyptic atmosphere surrounding the
message of the madman in The Gay Science is absent; God's death
is simply taken for granted. We anticipate therefore that
Zarathustra will offer in his teachings a new world view.
I would argue that we should read Thus Spoke Zarathustra not as
a failed attempt to explain and justify a world view but as an
attempt to solve the problem of nihilism. Towards this end
Nietzsche uses diverse sources and methods literary,
autobiographical (Hollinrake 1982) and religious - to create
something entirely new, something that "stands altogether alone"
(EH 3.6.6). That Nietzsche offers his solution in an ultimately
non-dogmatic way counts in its favour, for it opens an arena of
debate which others more analytically inclined, more rigorously
argumentative are invited to join.
In turning to a discussion of the three concepts at the heart of
Thus Spoke Zarathustra - the Superman, will to power and eternal
recurrence - it is as well to bear in mind Ansell-Pearson's
reminder:
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"Despite some major studies by philosophers of the
work in recent years, there still exists no consensus
as to the meaning and significance of the principal
"w. _
teachings of the book." (1994 p 101)
There are those who go so far as to deny that these teachings
have any worthwhile philosophical content. Solomon and Higgins
for instance say of these three concepts that they "do not bear
even slight scholarly scrutiny" (1988 p vii). It is hoped that
what follows will demonstrate the opposite to be true.
2 .1 THE SUPERMAN
It has been argued (Ansell-Pearson 1991a, Magnus 1983, Higgins
1988) that the Superman3 is a polysemous notion, irreducible to
a single definite content. This may well be the case but it
should not prevent us however from attempting to say something
concrete about it, to offer some sort of interpretation.
Much of the current literature on the Superman is concerned with
whether the Superman is Zarathustra himself (Lampert 1986) or
merely one of Zarathustra's teachings (Ansell-Pearson 1991a).
I would argue that this line of argumentation is misconceived -
that the Superman plays both roles. In taking this line my




According to Conway Zarathustra should be read as a teacher of
virtue. He points out that the problem confronting any teacher
of virtue is that he has to find a way to change not just
people's behaviour but their character, a task that is next to
impossible. The teacher of virtue must therefore maintain an
ironic stance to his project; he cannot afford to take it too
seriously since he is likely to fail. In the first two parts of
this book, Conway argues, Zarathustra does take himself seriously
as a teacher of virtue (that is as the teacher of the Superman)
and meets with failure. In the second half of the book, though,
Zarathustra finds a way to teach virtue ironically - thro"6gh f
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exemplification. Zarathustra no longer teaches the Superman,
instead he becomes it; and it no longer matters if others accept
the ideal or even notice the teaching.
-1
Where I differ from Conway is in believing that these two modes
of teaching pedagogical versus exemplificatory are in
conflict, or at least they offer two different ideals of the
Superman, each of which has to be explored and evaluated.
The Superman is Zarathustra's first teaching. At the first town
he comes to on his descent from the mountains he finds a crowd
gathered in the market-place to watch a tight-rope walker and he
attempts to teach them the Superman as a replacement for God and
as the redeemer of western history and nihilism. At first the
Superman seems to be an evolutionary ideal:
"I teach you the Superman. Man is something that
should be overcome. What have you done to overcome
him?
"All creatures hitherto have created something beyond
themselves and do you want to be the ebb of this great
tide, and return to the animals rather than overcome
man?
"What is the ape to men? A laughing-stock or a
painful embarrassment. And just so shall man be to
the Superman: a laughing-stock or a painful
embarrassment." (Z prologue 3)
But then the tone of the teaching changes and the ideal becomes
a redemptive one, an alternative to God, and a creation of human
will:




"The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your
will say: The Superman shall be the meaning of the
earth!
"I entreat you, my brothers, remain true to the earth,
and do not believe those who speak to you of
superterrestrial hopes! They are poisoners, whether
they know it or not.
"They are despisers of life, atrophying and self-
poisoned men, of whom the earth is weary: so let them
be gone!" (Z prologue 3)
As a replacement ideal to God, an alternate redeemer, the
Superman finds its birth in the rejection of the valuations of
the Platonic-Christian world-view, and in nihilism:
"In truth, man is a polluted river. One must be a
sea, to receive a polluted river and not be defiled.
"Behold, I teach you the Superman: he is this sea, in
him your great contempt can go under.
What is the greatest thing you can experience? It is
the hour of the great contempt. The hour in which
even your happiness grows loathsome to you, and your
reason and your ~irtue also." (Z prologue 3)
Getting no response to his teaching Zarathustra continues with
his road for the attainment of the ideal of the Superman (Z
prologue 4), in a parody of the Beatitudes in which Christ's
"blessed ares" become Zarathustra's "I loves". Throughout the
passage Zarathustra praises that which leads to the overcoming
of man, to the Superman. This passage is crucial to our
understanding of the teaching of the Superman and much neglected.
For although it apparently teaches the Superman as a world-
historical character, a future but distant possibility,
.!
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Zarathustra also hints at the Superman as a realizable
possibility for the individual. He begins by comparing man to
a bridge between animal and Superman, and implies that the
Superman is somet.h.i.nqd.i s t.ant; to which-the present ,ana-eVen ma":i1~i ~' -' -:: :"':1'- "-:
must be sacrificed:
"1 love those who do not first seek beyond the stars
for reasons to go down and to be sacrifices: but who
sacrifice themselves to the earth, that the earth may
one day belong to the Superman.
"1 love him who lives for knowledge and who wants
knowledge that one day the Superman may live. And
thus he wills his own downfall.
"1 love him who works and invents that he may build a
house for the Superman and prepare earth, animals, and
plants for him: for thus he wills his own downfall."
(Z prologue 4)
But more than once in the following lines he allows that man can
move across the bridge, become the Superman:
"1 love him who keeps back no drop of spirit for
himself, but wants to be the spirit of his virtue
entirely: thus he steps as spirit over the bridge."
(Z prologue 4)
"1 love him whose soul is deep even in its ability to
be wounded, and whom even a little thing can destroy:
thus he is glad to go over the bridge." (Z prologue 4)
This would imply that the sacrifice of man to the Superman is the
act of becoming individually Supermen. That the perishing,
downfall, down-going are not prior to but the same as the going-
across, the becoming. Larnpert argues that Zarathustra does not
exhort the crowd, or even his followers to become Supermen (1986
f
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P 20). Now while it is true that Zarathustra never once says to
his audience "become the Superman", the above evidence shows that
he offers them the possibility of so becoming.
-.. - --I
The crowd however is uninterested in the Superman and mocks
Zarathustra and his teaching. In a last vain attempt to get
their attention he teaches the Ultimate Man, an amalgam of all
that Nietzsche sees as worst in modern man. The Ultimate Man is
the self-satisfied seeker after happiness and comfort, the man
wi th no goals, no desires and no ambition; who looks only to the
moment and its petty pleasures. He is the jeerer of the parable
of the madman - the atheist who does not recognise the problem
of nihilism.
"'We have discovered happiness,' say the Ultimate Men
and blink." (Z prologue 5)
The key to any understanding of the Superman, I would argue, is
how it answers the question: "what does the Superman replace?
to what is it an alternative?" If that question is answered
"God" then the Superman will be interpreted as something distant
and not immediately achievable. If, however, the question is
answered "the Ultimate Man" then the ideal is not a distant
future possibility but merely a post-nihilist one. The problem
is that the text seems to support both readings.
The pedagogical teachings themselves are as we have seen
ambivalent on this issue. The exemplificatory teaching however
points unambiguously to the second. Moreover, the second reading
has the advantage of incorporating the first. In the previous
chapter it was argued that the underlying cause of nihilism is
the Platonic-Christian world~view with its removal of value to
another, transcendent, realm. The Superman is associated with
the body, the earth - that is with the opposing set of values.
If we understand the Superman as a post-nihilist alternative to





it can be read as an ideal which replaces God through a process
of individual revaluation.
To support this argument I will turn to another lengthy
discussion of the Superman which seems to support the opposition:
"God is a supposition; but I want your supposing to
reach no further than your creating will.
"Could you create a god? - So be silent about all
gods! But you could surely create the Superman.
"Perhaps not you yourselves, my brothers! But you
could transform yourselves into forefathers and
ancestors of the Superman: let this be your finest
creating!" (Z 2.2)
Here again we see the Superman invoked in opposition to God, as
a distant ideal to work towards rather than something each of us
can aspire to become. However, the whole argument of the passage
is brought into ironic relief by the fact that Nietzsche does
regard gods to'be human creations. Furthermore, the "argument"
Zarathustra offers against the existence of God:
"[I]f there were gods, how could I endure not to be a
god! Therefore there are no gods." (Z 2.2)
might be easily turned against the Superman so conceived. Just
as what makes God a real possibility is the possibility of my
being God, so what makes the Superman a real possibility is the
possibility of my being the Superman.
The Superman, however, has to be understood together with the
task of value-creation with which it is associated. And here
too, the teachings equivocate between the world-historical and
the individual. The crucial passage in this regard, because it
seems to militate against anything but a world-histori6al f
:) :.'~
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interpretation, is "Of the Thousand and One Goals" (1.15).
Because I take this passage to be so important I will quote at
length:
"Zarathustra has seen many lands and many peoples:
thus he has discovered the good and evil of many
peoples. Zarathustra has found no greater power on
earth than good and evil.
"No people could live without evaluating;. but if it
wishes to maintain itself it must not evaluate as its
neighbour evaluates.
"A table of values hangs over every people. Behold,
it is the table of its overcomings; behold, it is the
voice of its will to power.
"What it accounts hard it calls praiseworthy; what it
accounts indispensable and hard it calls good; and
that which relieves the greatest need, the rare, the
hardest of all - it glorifies as holy.
"Whatever causes it to rule and conquer and glitter,
to the dread and envy of its neighbour, that it
accounts sUblimest, the paramount, the evaluation and
meaning of all things.
"Truly, men have given themselves all their good and
evil. Truly, they did not take it, they did not find
it, it did not descend to them as a voice from heaven.
"Man first implanted values into things to maintain
himself - he created the meaning of things, a human ~
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meaning! Therefore he calls himself: 'Man', that is:
the evaluator.
"Evaluation is creation: hear it, you creative men!
Valuating is itself the value and jewel of all valued
things.
"Only through evaluation is there value: and without
evaluation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear
it, you creative men!
"A change in values - that means a change in the
creators of values. He who has to be a creator always
has to destroy.
"Peoples were the creators at first; only later were
individuals creators. Indeed, the individual himself
is still the latest creation.
"Once the peoples hung a table of values over
themselves. The love that wants to rule and the love
that wants to obey created together such tables as
these.
"Joy in the herd is older than joy in the Ego: and as
long as the good conscience is called herd, only the
bad conscience says: I.
"Truly, the cunning, loveless Ego, that seeks its
advantage in the advantage of many - that is not the
origin of the herd, but the herd's destruction.
"Truly, the power of this praising and blaming is a
monster. Tell me, who will subdue it for me,
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brothers? Tell me, who will fasten fetters upon the
thousand necks of this beast?
"Hitherto there-have -15e n--:althousand goals,for -there
have been a thousand peoples. Only fetters are still
lacking for these thousand necks, the one goal is
still lacking.
"Yet tell me, my brothers: if a goal for humanity is
still lacking, is there not still lacking - humanity
itself." (Z 1.15)
Apart from the central role this passage accords to values and
the act of evaluation, there are two features of this passage
which require comment. The first is the claim that it is now
individuals rather than peoples who are the creators of value,
the second is the claim that what is required is a single goal
for all people . The first of these would support the view that
Nietzsche offers a post-nihilist vision, the latter would seem
to support the opposing view of a distant and world-historical
vision. These two claims are not however in conflict - what
Nietzsche seems to be arguing for is a world-historical vision
based in the valuations of a single individual. The question
then is which individual - Zarathustra (as the Superman) or the
Superman as a world-historical figure. The answer I believe is
neither. Instead, I would argue, Nietzsche accords that
paramount role to himself4 •
Nietzsche speaks throughout his work of the need for a
revaluation of values and in Ecce Homo he speaks consistently of
himself as a world-historical moment or figure. How are we to
understand this megalomanic aspect of Nietzsche's thought? We
have already shown in the introduction to this chapter that in
the character of Zarathustra Nietzsche sets himself up in
opposition to both Socrates and Christ; these two individuals
are together the source of the modern world-view. Strong says:
50
f
"Small wonder then that Nietzsche should have fought
so fiercely - I am tempted to say valiantly - with
both Socrates and Christ. They broke the moral bonds
of their times and eff~ctively for~ed a reorientation
of future history int~~ir own and perhaps idolatrous
images. Nietzsche is fascinated wi th their
achievement and, without doubt, wishes for similar
success for himself." (1975 p 111)
If we add Nietzsche to the equation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra
instead of merely sUbsuming him into the main character we not
only gain a richer conception of the text but we are able to
separate out Zarathustra's self-creative overcoming from
Nietzsche's broader project. Zarathustra represents not all of
Nietzsche's solution to the problem of nihilism but one aspect
of it and although there are hints of a political solution in
Zarathustra, these are only worked out in Beyond Good and Evil.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche offers a different
manifestation of the Superman - solitary (Zarathustra is alone
at the end of both part three, the original ending and part four)
and aesthetic - a quiet creator of values. He is the embodiment
of the claim that:
"\ The greatest events they are not our
noisiest but our stillest hours." (Z 2.18)
What then are the Characteristics of the Superman that
Zarathustra becomes?
According to Strong they are play (see also Schrift 1983),
laughter and dance. In his discussion of these three
characteristics he points out that the German "spielen" denotes
not only games but also gambling. Both of these, he argues, have
rUles, or necessities but these are not experienced as
constraints but rather as conditions for playing; in both it is





neither has a moral content - there is no room for blame, one
simply accepts the outcome, nor does intention and responsibility
count (1975 pp 278-81). Laughter, he argues, opposes reverence
and the desire for permanence; . it tralls£orms suffering Lnt.o joy;
and it overcomes the past by forgetl.ing it (1975 pp 281-2).
Danc€, though a highly complex activity which has to be learned
becomes, when we have mastered it, an instinctual and natural,
not to mention joyful, expression of freedom and self (1975 pp
282-3). We might add that all of these are centred on the body.
He concludes:
"These concepts - playing, laughing, dancing - are
highly metaphorical and condensed in resonance. It
must be understood, though, that while Nietzsche
intends them as metaphors . . . he also intends them
as descriptive of a particular orientation toward the
world." (1975 p 283)
Of these three laughter and dancing are the ones that Zarathustra
teaches. To the Higher Men whom he has gathered around him in
part four he says:
"'You Higher Men, the worst about you is: none of you
has learned to dance as a man ought to dance - to
dance beyond yourselves! What does it matter that you
are failures!
'How much is still possible! so learn to laugh beyond
yourselves! Lift up your hearts, you fine dancers,
high! higher! and do not forget to laugh well!
'This laugher's crown, this rose-wreath crown: to
you, my brothers, do I throw this crown! I have
canonized laughter; you Higher Men, learn to
laugh!'" (Z 4.13.20)
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Schacht offers rather a fuller picture of the Superman and argues
that his qualities are:
"Overflowing vitali ty and great hea~th; · powerful
affects and the ability to control and direct them;
high spirituality and refinement of sensibility and
manners; independence of mind and action; the
capacity to befriend and to respect and disdain and
deal justly with others as they warrant; intellectual
honesty and astuteness; the strength to be undaunted
by sUffering and disillusionment; persistence in
self-overcoming; the resources to undertake and
follow through on the most demanding of tasks; and
the ability to love and esteem, and above all to
create" (1985 p 340).
And he goes on to suggest that:
"If there is any attainable form of human life that
requires no independent justification to be found
worthy of affirmation, and that may be considered to
'redeem' mankind more generally .as well, Nietzsche
makes a strong case for taking it to be something of
this sort." (1985 p 340)
The key to the Superman is above all creation. The creation of
self, the creation of values:
"with this notion he advocates neither an ahistorical
return to the wild, prowling man of the blond beast,
nor an equally ahistorical and simplistic side-
stepping of man to some ideal model of man. Rather,
the emphasis is on . a creative, playful labour of
self-overcoming, by which man is able to transfigure
all that has made him what he is so far, in order to
attain a standpoint beyond good and evil and become
what he is." (Ansell-Pearson, 1991a p 160)
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If we accept such a reading of the Superman then we no longer
feel with MacIntyre that:
in the pages of a
than in serious
"The Ubermensch belong [ s ]
philosophical bestiary rather
discussion." (MacIntyre, 1985 p 22)
We may, however, feel that the Superman is a vague ideal, which
can be accorded whatever characteristics we choose . Higgins
agrees and argues that this vagueness is intentional:
"The overman is a kind of place-holder for the aim of
human aspiration toward greatness. The particular
form of such aspiration varies from individual life to
individual life. The overman's lack of defining
characteristics makes it possible for this image to
accommodate the full range of great striving as it
appears in all individual cases." (1988 p 143)
To reach a fuller conception of the Superman, though, it is
necessary to understand its companion conceptions, the will to
power and the eternal recurrence. Only ·t h e n are we in a position
to evaluate it.
2.2 THE WILL TO POWER
Thus far we have built up an interpretation of the Superman, in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra at least, as the creative individual. The
means to creation is a process of self-overcoming and its driving
force is the will to power.
Of the three teachings of Thus Spoke Zarathustra the will to
power is the most important if for no other reason than it is the
one concept he continues to endorse explicitly in his later
works, whereas after Zarathustra we do not hear of the Superman
and eternal recurrence again. Solomon is at best two-thirds




"The topics most often celebrated - the Ubermensch,
the will to power, eternal recurrence - in fact play
an almost negligible role in the pUblished
philosophical works ." (1988 p 8)
The will to power as it is conceptualised in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra is intimately connected to the Superman understood
both as a pedagogical teaching and as an exemplification. It is
also identified with Zarathustra himself, lending credence to the
interpretation that Zarathustra is one manifestation of the
Superman.
The will to power is gradually introduced in the first part,
which centres on the topic of virtue. This part culminates in
Zarathustra's discovery of the will to power as his own virtue
and the concept moves to centre stage in the second part (to be
somewhat displaced in the third by the doctrine of the eternal
recurrence).
Since the will to power is connected to the teachings on virtue
and the process of self-creation and the creation of value
through self-overcoming we will have · to look at the crucial
passages in section one which lead up to the climax. The first
teaching of part one (that is, after the prologue) is "Of the
Three Metamorphoses".
"Of the Three Metamorphoses" is a parable of spiritual
development in which the spirit begins as a burden-seeking camel,
becomes first a freedom-loving lion, which battles with and
ultimately destroys the dragon morality, and then finally becomes
a child, innocent and creative.
Ansell-Pearson characterises the various stages as follows: the
camel "is the civilizing, humanizing process represented by the
morality of custom"; the lion is "the supra-ethical sovereign
individual"; the child is "the conscious innocence of becoming"
(Ansell-Pearson, 1991a p 162). But Lampert (1986) has poin~ed
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out that, in fact, only two metamorphoses are recorded in this
parable. He surmises therefore that the first metamorphosis must
be prior to this - that the spirit must first of all become a
camel. This interpretation is borne out by the opening sentence:
"I name you three metamorphoses of the spirit: how
the spirit shall become a camel, and the camel a lion,
and the lion at last a child." (Z 1.1)
Not everyone is a burden-seeking camel, and only those that are,
that pass an initial test of character, have the potential to
become anything else, to become disciples of Zarathustra, or we
might add (though Lampert would dispute it) to become the
Superman.
Part one is dedicated to a critique of traditional conceptions
of virtue and religion (and also of the state which he sees as
being the modern, post-Christian incarnation of religion). These
are portrayed as negative in impulse, based in denial of the body
and the world, with no positive affirmative content. They are,
as was argued in chapter one, contributors to and causes of
contemporary nihilism.
Interspersed with this critique is a more positive conception of
virtue. In "Of Joys and Passions" Zarathustra speaks of virtue
as being based in the character of the individual:
"My brother, if you have a virtue and it is your own
virtue, you have it in common with no one.
"To be sure, you want to call it by a name and caress
it; you want to pull its ears and amuse yourself with
it.
"And behold! Now you have its name in common with
people and have become of the people and the herd with
your virtue!" Z 1.5 (p 63) ~
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And he points to the cUltivation of virtue out of passion, rather
than as a denial of it:
"Once you had passions and called them evil. But now
you have only your virtues: they grew from out your
passions.
"You laid your highest aim in the heart of these
passions: then they became your virtues and joys." (Z
1.5)
He elucidates a conception of the individual as a site of war and
competition between passions rather than the harmonious unity





how each of your virtues desires
it wants your entire spirit, that





"Every virtue is jealous of the others, and jealousy
is a terrible thing. Even virtues can be destroyed
through jealousy." (Z 1.5)
But for Zarathustra, virtue is not an end in itself:
"Man is something that must be overcome: and for that
reason you must love your virtues - for you will
perish by them." (Z 1.5)
Part one reaches its climax in the final teaching "Of the
Bestowing Virtue", in which Zarathustra names his own rul i nq
virtue as the will to power (Ansell-Pearson 1991a; Lampert 1986).
For Nietzsche the highest virtue is the "gift-giving" virtue, "in
it one acquires things in order to act and give, and one acts and
gives from a sense of superabundance." (Hunt, 1991 p 93) This
is a benevolence of egoism rather than altruism and is, according J
:~ :)~ .
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to Hunt (1991) Nietzsche's replacement for the role usually
played in ethical theories by justice. Justice demands that it
is a characteristic of the recipient which places a necessity on
the giver to give (1991 p 93). 'he gift-giving virtue refers
only to the character of the giver and involves no necessity
(1991 p 94). Hunt argues that this sits better with some of our
ethical experience, such as ordinary generosity, than the
deontological and utilitarian perspectives (1991 p 94); but he
expresses qualms about it if it is to be seen as the ruling
virtue - for it leaves no place for rights, those who do not kill
or murder me are not respecting my rights, but giving me a gift;
there is no space left for the idea that human beings have status
as ends not means (1991 p 95). Nietzsche allows for justice only
between equals, for the higher to be benevolent to the lower is
not justice but a gift (1991 P 97).
"Truly, it is a new good and evil! Truly, a new
roaring in the depths and the voice of a new fountain!
"It is power, this new virtue; it is a rUling idea,
and around it a subtle soul: a golden sun, and around
it the serpent of knowledge." (Z 1.22.1)
In part two the will to power is taught as the basis of life, a
continual process of movement in which any stasis is resisted and
in which values, and virtues, are accepted only to be overcome
(Z 2.12).
I will take as the starting point of my discussion of the will
to power, Kaufmann's reading of it. Kaufmann takes the will to
power to be Nietzsche's most important concept:
"Properly understood, Nietzsche's conception of power
may represent one of the few great philosophic ideas
of all time." (1974 p xvi)
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He offers a purely psychological reading of the will to power
which he ties to sUblimation and rationality. He reads
Nietzsche's basic thesis to be that all action is motivated by
the will to power, understood as the will to overcome oneself.
And because it is the common factor in all human action, the will
to power also functions as a refutation of relativism.
According to this interpretation the will to power is a
"dialectical monism" which manifests itself as both impulse and
reason. Through a historical progression the greater will to
power (reason) sublimates the lesser (impulse), creating out of
the chaos of instinct an order, a style.
"In this life, Nietzsche thinks, some artists and
philosophers come closest to this state of being,
insofar as they may be able to give style to their
characters, to organize the chaos of their passions,
and to create a world of beauty here and now."
(Kaufmann, 1974 p 255)
Danto takes a similar view-point:
"[H]e held the basically sane if perhaps dull view
that the passions and drives of men be disciplined and
guided by reason, that our lives be Apollinian and
Dionysiac at once, in that balance of force and form
which, after all, had been recommended from the
beginning of moral philosophy. Language aside, then,
Nietzsche hardly deviated from the tradition which
goes back at least to Socrates." (Danto, 1965 p 149)
What both Kaufmann' sand Danto' s interpretations tend to overlook
is the way in which Nietzsche sees the self as a multiplicity
rather than a unity5 . I would therefore argue that Detwiler
gives a more plausible reading:
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"Self-overcoming is conceivable as the overcoming of
one or more passions by a more dominant one, or
perhaps as a dominant passions's increase in power and
ascent to a higher level. . In either cas~tself­
overcoming would appear on the level of consciousness
as the reason that reflects one organization of the
passions overcoming the reason that reflects some
earlier organization (or perhaps overcoming the
unreason that reflects some earlier lack of
organization). Reason is, in other words, a function
of perspective, with every new organization of the
passions engendering new perspectives and fresh
interpretations of experience." (1990 p 159)
The ordering of psychic chaos on Detwiler's reading is a matter
not of "rational self-scrutiny" but of a "subliminal form of
creative activity that entails forgetting" (1990 p 162). It is
a perpetual and cyclical process involving both creation and
destruction; the process of self-overcoming is continuous and
its possibilities endless.
As Hunt reads it, according to Zarathustra 1.5 (his most extended
discussion of the topic) virtues are transformed passions,
passions made active in the pursuit of a (high) goal (1991 pp 70-
1). This conception of virtue is closely tied to his conception
of will to power, which has two strands - the will to power as
manipulation and control, and the will to power as spontaneous
activity (1991 p 72). Hunt reads these as part of the same
conception - will to power as interpretation (1991 p 73-4) and
gives an example of how this works with regard to virtue:
"When virtue is created, the sUbject-matter which
acquires a new meaning is the passion - that of the
fanatic or the vengeful person, for example. The
agency which projects and imposes the purpose is
apparently some part of the individual human being
that is able to envision ideals and make them ~
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effective, thus imposing on the passion the character
of a function. This constitutes its "overcoming" the
passion. What perishes in the process is, in the
first instance, the passion with which it began. By
being directed toward one's highest goal, the passion
of the fanatic, for instance, ceases to have the
meaning it formerly had and becomes something quite
different. What it was has been destroyed and
supplanted by something else. But since our
passions are inextricable parts of our personal
identity, we ourselves perish in the formation of our
virtues i something that was essential to our old
selves is annihilated in favour of something .new. In
changing our character we view ourselves as plastic
material which is to be given up to the creation of
something new" (Hunt, 1991 p 74).
Nietzsche's theory of virtue differs from those of others in not
presupposing or even advocating the unity of virtues, but
presuming an enmity between them (1991 p 81). Hunt thinks this
may be because the virtues aim at competing goals and are in
competition for resources (1991 p 82) and further each goal aims
to be the highest, the most consuming (1991 pp 83-4).
But contra Kaufmann, the will to power is not just a matter of
imposing order on chaos, creating a unified character, that is
it does not only function as a psychological thesis in
Nietzsche's work. It also functions as both a source of values
(Blackham 1989) and a standard for their evaluation (Z 1.15).
One of the critics who views the will to power as an evaluative
standard is stern. He reads it as the standard of moral
judgement in a "God-less Theology", as a moral doctrine which
emphasises the enhancement of the self as the only end (1978 p





"his readiness to undertake whatever are to him the
most strenuous and least comforting moral and
existential tasks, regardless of their accepted moral
value." (1978 p 89).
This interpretation, too, does not accord with Nietzsche's
writings; forr' the "morality of strenuousness" is the morality
of the camel not of the child.
A rather better discussion of the evaluative aspect of the will
to power is Schacht's (1985). He argues that it solves
Nietzsche's dilemma of wanting to evaluate life and forms of life
while rejecting any external standard. We can evaluate life in
terms of the will to power because will to power is its
fundamental character. Using the will to power Nietzsche is able
to proffer critiques of religious values, moral values
(especially selflessness and pity), psychological values
(pleasure, pain, happiness, power), art, truth and even human
beings themselves. And in each case the usual valuation is stood
on its head. The will to power as a standard of evaluation is
crucial to the overcoming of nihilism in its axiological or
existential moment and as a standard of evaluation is both
naturalistic and aesthetic.
"Nietzsche's naturalistic construal of the fundamental
nature of value thus turns out to have a strongly
'artistic' cast because the 'will to power' in terms
of which he understands life and the world - and thus
also value as they determine it - is a fundamentally
artistic affair." (Schacht, 1985 p 402)
For what is natural is self-overcoming, self-creation and this
is tied to the enhancement of life (Schacht, 1985 p 402).
A further crucial element of the will to power, especially given




this problem not just of interpreting and evaluating of creating
a self, but of creating a self that can act.
Unsurprisingly it is Warren ~ho investigates this link. He
1
argues that:
"Will to power, then, consists in three possibility
conditions of willing self-reflective motives,
experience, and interpretation. Willing permits the
self-interpretation of agency. And when one gains
such a self-interpretation, then one's world attains
value. On the basis of these equations Nietzsche
understands power, or 'will', to be the 'natural'
ground of value . and hence the only ground upon
which nihilism might be diagnosed and conquered."
(1985 p 434)
In "Of Redemption" (Z 2.20) Zarathustra locates the source of
sUffering and the inability to move forward, create values,
overcome oneself, in people's relation to the past. People see
themselves as prisoners of an unchangeable past and continually
look backwards. In this backward-looking mode the will takes the
form of "the spirit of revenge" which expresses itself in a
search for punishment and quietism. Zarathustra seeks redemption
in a reclamation of, and reconciliation with, the past through
an act of creative will which liberates us from the past by
willing backwards - "'But I willed it thus!'" (Z 2.20) - and
thereby frees us to look forwards, to will the future.
strong (1975) argues that the will to power might through
genealogy be able to produce a past which will not result in
nihilism (this would be analogous to psychoanalysis) but there
is no necessity that the will to power will deal with the past
in a satisfactory way (1975 p 235). This is why we shall see in
the next section Nietzsche needs the further notion of the




2.3 THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE
The eternal recurrence, it will be argued, far from being an odd-
ball notion, is fhe crux of the vision of the aesthetic self-
creative overcoming of nihilism. If the Superman is the creative
individual and the will to power both the source and standard of
his values, it is the eternal recurrence which explains how the
Superman is able to transcend the past and create.
The doctrine of eternal recurrence is introduced in "Of the
Vision and the Riddle" (Z 3.2) which is addressed to the sailors
on the boat on which Zarathustra leaves the Blissful Islands.
The vision is "the vision of the most solitary man" (Z 3.2.1) and
Zarathustra tells it in the form of a story. He says that while
out walking one twilight up a mountain path, he felt upon him,
"half dwarf, half mole", the Spirit of Gravity all the while
mocking him and then falling silent. Finally, Zarathustra is
driven to exclaiming: '" Dwarf! You! Or I! '" (Z 3.2.1). The
dwarf jumps from his shoulder and squats in front of him - "But
a gateway stood just where we had halted." (Z 3.2.1) Zarathustra
speaks to the dwarf and in so doing outlines his theory of the
. eternal recurrence:
" 'Behold this gateway, dwarf! it has · two
aspects. Two paths come together here: no one has
ever reached their end.
"'This long lane behind us: it goes on for an
eternity: And that long lane ahead of us - that is
another eternity.
"'They are in opposition to one another, these paths;
they abut on one another: and it is here at this
gateway that they come together. The name of the
gateway is written above it: "Moment".
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u' But if one were to follow them further and ever
further and further: do you think, dwarf, that these




straight lies,' murmured the dwarf
'all truth is crooked, time itself is
'''Spirit of Gravity!' I said angrily, 'do not treat
this too lightly! Or I shall leave you squatting
where you are, Lamefoot - and I have carried you high!
U'Behold this moment!' I went on. 'From this gateway
Moment a long, eternal lane runs back: an eternity
lies behind us.
11 'Must not all things that can run have already run
along this lane? Must not all things that can happen
have already happened, been done, run past?
lI'And if all things have been here before: what do
you think of this moment, dwarf? Must not this
gateway, too, have been here - before?
"'And are not all things bound fast together in such
a way that this moment draws after it all future
things? Therefore - draws itself too?
"'For all things that can run must also run once again
forward along this long lane.
"'And this slow spider that creeps along in the
moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and I and you at
this gateway whispering together, whispering of




'" - and must we not return and run down that other
lane out before us, down that long, terrible lane -
must we not return eternally?'" (Z 3.2.2)
1
Zarathustra says he heard a dog howling and the vision was gone,
the dog was beside a young shepherd convulsing on the ground, a
black snake hanging out of his mouth. Zarathustra tries to tug
the snake from his mouth but cannot move it and calls to the
shepherd to bite the snake's head off. He does so and jumps up,
but no longer a man "surrounded with light, laughing!" (Z 3.2.2
P 180)
The riddle Zarathustra asks the men to solve is:
"Who is the shepherd into whose mouth the snake thus
crawled? Who is the man into whose throat all that is
heaviest, blackest will thus crawl?" (Z 3.2.2)
The answer to this question which comes much later after
Zarathustra has returned home, is that the shepherd is
Zarathustra himself.
Thus far Zarathustra has only taught self-overcoming but in "The
Convalescent" (3.13) he experiences it. Zarathustra is struck
by his most abysmal thought - disgust at man. He falls ill and
remains ill for a week while his animals tend him. When he
recovers he tells what he has experienced - that he was attacked
by the black snake which crept into his throat and he had to bite
its head off to save himself. He has been struck by the
realization with which he has then had to come to terms that "the
little man" whom he preaches against will also recur eternally.
His animals recognize him as the teacher of the eternal
recurrence, that that is his destiny.
One way in which the eternal recurrence has been read, and one
which Nietzsche toys with in his notebooks, is that the eternal
',~ :.,-
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recurrence is a cosmological thesis - an actual doctrine about
the world.
Zeitlin, for instance, says
"if one carefully examines the several contexts in
which Nietzsche either describes or alludes to the
'recurrence,' it seems indisputable that he believed
literally that every moment is repeated eternally and,
therefore, that every moment is an eternity." (1994 p
29)
and
"the corollary of the 'recurrence' is the lack of a
principle of direction, chaos." (1994 p 29)
Heller, too, offers this sort of reading, arguing that for
Nietzsche the eternal recurrence is to be read as
lithe world's only chance to become wholly articulate.
For articulation presupposes a measure of duration for
what is to be articulated, and the Eternal Recurrence,
Nietzsche wrote, is the closest approximation to Being
of a world that otherwise knows only what is
transitory." (1988 p 184)
But Heller points out the mistake behind this reasoning:
liThe endless repetition of a senseless life is assumed
to yield an immensity of spiritual significance, as if
one could arrive at an overwhelmingly positive sum by
fanatically mUltiplying zero." (1988 p 185)
The cosmological interpretation of the eternal recurrence does
not accord, though, with the way it functions in the text of Thus
Spoke Zarathustra. Moreover if the eternal recurrence iSi t o
J :. '~ .!
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function as the key to creativity, to becoming the Superman, to
an attitude of joy, dance and laughter it is impossible to see
how taken literally it could do so. Such a literal understanding
of eternal recurrence must surely wdrk to worsen nihilism rather
than offering a way to overcome it6 •
This for instance is the conclusion that Macquarrie reaches:
"[T]he roots of Nietzsche's doctrine are essentially
existentialist. The symbol of the eternal return may
be understood as the expression of the finitude of
existence. God is dead, and man has taken over; but '
in spite of the promise of the Superman, there can be
no escape from the endless reshufflings of the finite.
If freedom, autonomy, and hope appear in
Nietzsche's understanding of history, they are finally
overcome by tragedy and amor fati." (1973 p 228)
Kundera in a similar way draws from this "mad myth" (1985 p 3)
an existential lesson that in this world without eternal
recurrence everything is so ephemeral that moral jUdgement is
made impossible; the non-recurrence is itself a mitigating
factor, "everything is pardoned in' advance" (1985 p 4); in this
consists the "unbearable lightness of being". For without
another life choice is impossible, as we have no basis for
comparison.
Clark, on the other hand, argues that the fact of eternal
recurrence would function to exclude moral judgement:
"[A]ffirming eternal recurrence seems to require the
overcoming of moral condemnation we do not have
to affirm Hitler unconditionally, or for his own sake.
On the other hand, Nietzsche's ideal surely requires
us to affirm him, and much else we find abhorrent, in
some important sense, and I think that sense is one
that excludes moral condemnation." (1990 p 285)
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This offers an interesting contrast with another influential
reading of the eternal recurrence: that it functions as a moral
imperative, a counter-part to Kant. The main proponent of this
thesis is Gilles Deleuze (1983) 1_ though Simmel offers a similar
reading. Whereas the cosmological reading of the eternal
recurrence has some textual support, albeit in The Will to Power,
this moralised reading of it has none.
According to Deleuze' s reading the eternal recurrence can be
restated in the form of a categorical imperative "do only that
which you could will to do eternally" and as a categorical it
also acts as a filter - only active forces can return.
Ansell-Pearson looks at Deleuze's reading of the eternal return
as a counterpoint to the categorical imperative. He focuses on
two particular difficulties with this reading. Firstly, it makes
the eternal return too reflective:
"How can the thought of eternal return not make us
reflect deeply on life in a way which would prevent us
from acting purely spontaneously?" (1994 p 114)
secondly, Deleuze argues that the eternal return acts as a filter
through which only active forces return. Here Ansell-Pearson
points to the fact that active forces need reactive forces and
are in any case likely to generate them. It also ignores
Zarathustra's recognition that the small men will return (1994
p 115).
The crucial problem with the cosmological and moral readings of
the eternal recurrence though is that they ignore the way in
which the concept functions in the text of Thus Spoke
Zarathustra. At the end of part two the key to self-creation is
shown to be backward willing - and in part three it is shown that
it is the eternal recurrence that makes backward willing
possible. The eternal recurrence is thus the crucial notion in
the aesthetic solution to the problem of nihilism. It is through
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the experience of the eternal recurrence that Zarathustra finally
becomes what he is - one manifestation of the Superman. What
seems to be the most important effect of the eternal recurrence
is the attitude towards life that it i~vokes, an attitude of amor
fati which further allows for a spontaneous and innocent creation
of self and values. I would argue therefore that the primary
import of the eternal recurrence is psychological.
Nehamas, though he says we cannot rule out the cosmological
interpretation, emphasizes the psychological:
"The eternal recurrence is not a theory of the world
but a view of the self." (1985 p 150)
He offers three reconstructions of the thesis of the eternal
recurrence:
"My life will recur in exactly identical fashion. . .
. My life may recur in exactly identical fashion ...
• If my life were to recur, then it could recur only
in identical fashion." (1985 p 153)
It is the third which Nehamas believes comes closest to
Nietzsche's intentions. He ties this to Nietzsche's belief that
"A thing is the sum of its effects", that one's being who one is
depends on all one's features, that none is accidental. And the
eternal recurrence challenges us to affirm ourselves totally;
for to want any feature of our lives to be different is to want
to be an altogether different person.
Nehamas highlights two difficulties with Nietzsche's thesis thus
interpreted, both of which result, he says, from Nietzsche's
modelling his ideal person on the ideal literary character.
First, it is not at all self-evident, or perhaps even plausible,
that a person cannot change certain features and remain the same
person; though it is logically necessary that a character is
just the sum of the statements about it and to change anyone is
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to change the character, this logical necessity may not carry
over to people. Second, it ignores the moral dimension of
personhood; the ideal fully justified character may be a
complete blackguard but a fUII~ justified person could not.
While I find Nehamas' interpretation illuminating and his
criticisms cogent, he does I believe miss a crucial aspect of the
doctrine - the problem is how to overcome the past and to this
extent it does not matter if in fact it is a logical necessity
that all features of my past have to be present to make me who
I am. Rather the point is that I have a history made up of
contingent facts, some of those facts are likely to be such that
I am caught up in a relation of resentment and revenge towards
them, and it is this relation that the eternal recurrence is
intended to transcend.
"The linear character of time (and by implication our
inability to alter the meanest aspects of our own past
lives) is the basis of our resentment." (Martin, 1989
p 130)
Nietzsche's suggestion seems to be that the experience of eternal
recurrence engenders an attitude of amor fati towards them. I
cannot change those facts but I can accept them and accept them
in a strong way which allows me to see these facts not as things
that happened to me but things which I willed, and which I
therefore no longer experience as a problem. It is as though
through the experience of eternal recurrence I become the
architect of my past rather than its victim.
The actual mechanisms of this are never explained and there is
something slightly alchemical to it, as Bernstein says:
"[T]he will cannot will backward any more genuinely
with the aid of recurrence than without it. The past
cannot be willed but only accepted, detested, or
forgotten, and there is perhaps little to be gained by
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dignifying one's helplessness by an illusion of power
indistinguishable from mere sUbmission." (1987 p 64)
What is clear though is that Nietzsche do~s intend the eternal
recurrence to perform this function of appropriating the past;
an aspect which is missed by many commentators, e.g. Schacht
(1985), who read the doctrine as just an affirmation of life and
the world.
In reading the eternal recurrence as the key to backward willing
I am following Ansell-Pearson. He argues that in the experience
of eternal recurrence we experience an existential conception of
time:
"In undergoing the experience of eternal return we
experience for the first time the passing away and
infinite movement of time in an existential manner.
We no longer simply experience time in terms of a
straightforward seriality of past, present, and
future, .but experience the dimensions of time as
fundamentally interconnected, and in terms of the
dramatic happening of the 'moment'. In willing the
eternal return of the moment we are willing the law of
life itself and recognising that life is the unity of
opposites, of pleasure and pain, of joy and sUffering,
of good and evil." (Ansell-Pearson, 1994 p 111)
He argues that the doctrine teaches us to embrace the past
because it has made us what we are.
"The test of return teaches a new will by teaching the
individual to will creatively the existence which
hitherto it has led only blindly and unknowingly."
(Ansell-Pearson, 1994 p 111)
The eternal recurrence, therefore teaches the affirmation of life
rather than some sort of redemption from it (1994 P 112). The
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choice is given to accept or deny responsibility for the past,
for what we are; and so while the past remains unchanged our
attitude towards it is altered (1994 p 112).
"The task of becoming what one is, is far from being
a superhuman task (it only appears so to the slothful
self or to the individual who wishes everyone to be
the same as in a slave morality), for we are not being
invited to assume the role of God or a supreme judge
who has a total view on the world and their existence
in it. The question is whether we are able to view
our life, including its accidents, mistakes, blunders,
and so on, as a fate, thus becoming what we are, and
cultivating a will to self-responsibility." (Ansell-
Pearson, 1991a p 197)7
The attitude that the experience of eternal recurrence, and a
successful appropriation of the past, engenders is one of
affirmation. But this should not be confused with blind
acceptance.
"Amor fati is not fatalism. The fatalist believes
himself to be as a leaf in the wind: the forces of
nature, of history, of chance, are simply too great to
be affected or combatted. Resignation yields rest and
comfort. Amor fati induces struggle with these
forces. Fate is not merely what happens to one, but
what happens as a result of one's active involvement
with life. The love of fate is the love of this
involvement and of its outcome. One cherishes the
opportunity to do battle with fortuna." (Thiele, 1990
p 199)
However, it is as well to bear in mind Warren's (1988) caution
that the effect of the thought of the eternal return may be
empowerment or the furtherance of nihilism. For example in a
situation like that of original nihilism, which is a direct
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result of political oppression in which agency is denied the real
possibility of expression, no amount of affirmation of
historicity is going to make action possible.
2.4 THE AESTHETIC ALTERNATIVE TO NIHILISM
The notions of the Superman, the will to power and eternal
recurrence when taken together offer a picture of individual
redemption, an aesthetic overcoming of nihilism through self-
creation.
"Not only does Nietzsche say that art makes life
bearable and worthwhile but that human life itself is
a work of art, a human creative act of constructing
and deconstructing in an endless play of the
imagination. There is no original point to begin with
nor a final point to arrive at. There is only the
process of an ongoing discourse." (Degenaar, 1985 pp
46-7)
The Superman as exemplified by Zarathustra is an individual
characterized by a joyful embracing of the this-worldly, an
individual actively engaged in the process of self-creation.
This process is potentially endless, a continual self-overcoming,
that is to say a process driven by the will to power freed from
any vengeful relation to the past, through the experience of the
eternal recurrence.
Understood thus we can see that the various aspects of this
vision are complementary rather than contradictory. Commentators
who have read the eternal recurrence as a literal doctrine of the
return of the past have tended to see it as incompatible with the
more linear notions of the Superman and the will to power. But
if we read the eternal recurrence in a more hypothetical way then
this is no longer a problem.
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The aesthetic ideal offered in the tale of Zarathustra's
development is clearly intended as an opposing ideal to that of
the Platonic-Christian world view. If the latter has given rise
to contemporary nihilism, then it seems to be Nietzsche's
contention that an opposite sort of ideal would be needed to
overcome that nihilism.
In "Of Old and New Law-Tables" (3.12) we are offered a summary
of these two opposing ideals. The crucial aspects of the
Platonic-Christian world view are the concern with man as a
social being, a man characterised by pity and benevolence. The
Platonic-Christian world-view, or the moral view of the world,
emphasises the need to repress or suppress passion, to bring it
under the moderating influence of reason. And further holds out
the promise that if this is successfully done then a reward will
be forthcoming in the form of another life, not bodily but
spiritual, an eternal life which will redeem this present one.
The ideal of Zarathustra is of an embracing of the this-worldly
with its flux and change, a recognition of the role of the
bodily, the passions, in the development of the self. The will
to power is thus seen as an opposition to repression, rather it
is (as Kaufmann first saw) a form of sublimation. The eternal
recurrence teaches the individual redemption of the past in this
life rather than an other-worldly redemption of it.
All three concepts - the Superman, the will to power and the
eternal recurrence - function as both parodies and critiques of
the religious-moral world view. Together they teach that life's
meaning and value must be sought inside rather than outside of
it (Gemes 1992).
Conway characterises Nietzsche's war against nihilism as taking
the form of "local rebellions" on the part of individuals (1989
p 219) and says:
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"Nietzsche's entire corpus constitutes a local
rebellion against nihilism and often succeeds in
inspiring his readers to create themselves anew."
(1989 p 220)
And these~ndividual acts of rebellion may act as an inspiration
to others to engage in similarly creative acts for themselves.
This is certainly the way that the overcoming of nihilism is
attained in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, though as I shall argue in
the next chapter it is not the full story. This is a point made
by Platt as well, Platt argues that in the full corpus of
Nietzsche's work we are offered three exemplars of virtue -
Dionysus, Zarathustra and Nietzsche himself and that Nietzsche
is unlike Zarathustra in that he is not a-political and a-social
(1988).
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In chapter one it was argued that for Nietzsche nihilism
presented a catastrophe of enormous dimensions. In Thus Spoke
Zarathustra Nietzsche, despite hints to the contrary, offers a
personal overcoming of nihilism. He offers only a broadly
aesthetic resolution of this problem.
Carroll points out that the ideal of the Superman cannot fully
resolve the issue of nihilism for his self-creation arises out
of a process of self-questioning which makes nihilism a constant
possibility since he is left in a position
"in which there are no criteria left for ordering the
world, or ranking alternative modes of action.
However, an undertow of driving, Dionysian instincts
is strong enough to carry him through this intellect-
mediated void." (1974 p 95)
Even if we accept that some individuals do find a way to overcome
nihilism there are two strands of criticism of this aesthetic
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solution - the first is that it lacks a moral element, the second
that it lacks a social element.
The first lack can be wholly explained in terms of the second.
Morality only arises when people are in society. Zarathustra is
an individual alone, outside of society and as such can live a
life without need of moral values.
The solipsism of Zarathustra's solution is, however, a problem
in two ways. Firstly, it is impractical and secondly it is not
clear that it is in anyway a real option. The solipsistic aspect
of Nietzsche's thought has been criticised by thinkers as diverse
as de Beauvoir:
"If it is true that every project emanates from
sUbjectivity, it is also true that this sUbjective
movement establishes by itself a surpassing of
sUbjectivity. Man can find a justification of his own
existence only in the existence of other men. Now, he
needs such a justification there is no escaping it..
. I concern others and they concern me. There we
have an irreducible truth. The me-iotiher-s relationship
is as indissoluble as the sUbject-object
relationship." (1963 p 72)
and MacIntyre:
"To cut oneself off from shared activity in which one
has initially to learn obediently as an apprentice
learns, to isolate oneself from the communities which
find their point and purpose in such activities, will
be to debar oneself from finding good outside of
oneself. It will be to condemn oneself to that moral
solipsism which constitutes Nietzschean greatness."
(1985 p 258)
MacIntyre further argues that:
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"[T]he Nietzschean 'great man' represents
individualism's final attempt to escape from its own
consequences. And the Nietzschean stance turns out
not to be a mode of escape from or an alternative to i
the conceptual scheme of liberal individualist
modernity, but rather one more representative moment
in its internal unfolding." (1985 p 259)8
Zarathustra's solution to the problem of nihilism is one for the
few.
"This is a life beyond good and evil, which has no
need of moral problems, where one does what one is,
means what one says, where character is destiny. But
this is not a claim by Nietzsche that anyone can do
anything one wants to, or that morality is simply
pablum for the weak. Men who live in eternal return
are entitled to live beyond morality. Not anyone can
at any time do this, however: one cannot claim to
live beyond morality just because one wants to. The
transfiguration required is slow and difficult and
requires much effort." (strong, 1975 p 292)
It is this which leads us to the ultimate problem not just with
Thus Spoke Zarathustra but with the whole of Nietzsche's thought.
For while Zarathustra attains the status of the Superman by
rejecting society (just as the hermit did) Nietzsche recognises
that any full solution to the problem of nihilism will involve
a social and political strategy. The hints of this in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra are brought into clear focus in his next work Beyond
Good and Evil where the possibility of the few attaining




1. Graybeal (1990) shows how often this failure is connected
to feminine characters in the book:
i
"The great feminine figures reappear throughout the
book, · to undermine and unsettle any pretense
Zarathustra makes of coming up with a program, a plan,
a new symbolic structure which would only issue again
in nihilism. They throw him into confusion, and
remind him of the silence underlying his wordplay, and
of the laughter surrounding it." (1990 P 76)
2. We should not imagine, though, that it is all irony, all
parody - as Detwiler points out:
"When Nietzsche turns to his preferred future, it is
always with a certain urgency. He does not
simply describe; he proclaims and extols and
eulogizes. If there is an element of parody in some
of this, there is also seriousness." (1990 p 99)
Williams (1978) also points to the seriousness that lies
behind Nietzsche's masks.
3. There is a certain amount of disagreement as to how to
translate the German Ubermensch. 'Superman' is the most
established translation, and I think the best since the
prefix 'super' carries the same connotations as the German
'tiber', in a way that 'over' (as in the later translation
'overman' does not). It does not seem to me that
Nietzsche's Superman is in serious danger of being confused
with Clark Kent.
4. For a reading of the Superman as a distant, though
attainable, world-historical ideal see Jovanovski (1989).
5. Parkes (1989) is particularly insightful on this aspect of
Nietzsche's thought, drawing as he does on depth-psychology
for support of this view.
6. Nor can we understand it at the level of myth. Wurzer
attempts such a reading of the eternal recurrence and
concludes that:
"The central problem of the silent myth is exposed
through the tensions which arise from the interaction
of theory and image, thought and myth.
Ultimately, Nietzsche seems unable to attain a
precision of thought or a vivid and powerful
experience of myth." (1983 p 264)
7. See also Bruder (1983).
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8. Compare this with Carroll, who calls the Superman a
"grotesque parody of the humanist ideal, a sign of how
close to the end of that culture the west had moved."
(1993 p 166)
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CHAPTER THREE: THE POLITICS OF
SELF-CREATION
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche says of Beyond Good and Evil that it is
the beginning of his "No-saying, No-doing", that it is "in all
essentials a critique of modernity" (EH 3.7). Yet the subtitle
of the book -is "Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future" and in a
letter written to Jacob Burckhardt at the time of the books
pUblication he says "it says the same things as my Zarathustra,
but differently, very differently". I believe we can reconcile
these apparently contradictory statements. In both Zarathustra
and Beyond Good and Evil we find a vision of the future and a
critique of the present but whereas in the former book the vision
takes precedence,~in the latter critique predominates.
Although in Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzschehints at a world-
historical overcoming of nihilism, his final solution is asocial,
an individual overcoming through creation. One of the reasons
that this sort of solution is unsatisfactory is that it tends to
imply that nihilism is a sickness which afflicts the individual,
whereas Nietzsche believes that it is a social disease afflicting
all of modernity. A true overcoming of nihilism, then, will have
to involve a social and political element, and in Beyond Good and
Evil Nietzsche attempts to address this issue.
This chapter will begin in section 3.1 by looking at Nietzsche's
critique of modernity. In section 3.2 we will investigate the
ideal of the self-creative individual now conceptualised as a new
,-1.:' --
type of philosopher. section 3.3 will discuss the politics of
Beyond Good and Evil, with critical comment. in section 3.4.
First, though, some comments on the style of the work.
-,
As I stated in the Introdu~tion Beyond Good and Evil is one of
Nietzsche's more aphoristi~,"works. That this book is also one
of the less discussed o~ ,~ie~zsche's work~ is perhap; tied to
this - the aphoristic works of the middle period suffer similar
critical neglect.
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Nehamas in a discussion of Beyond Good and Evil calls it "a work
of dazzling obscurity" (1988 p 46) and says:
"In a very elementary sense, we still do not know how
to read this book. We simply do not understand its
structure, its narrative line. Indeed, we do not even
know whether it has any narrative line at all." (1988
p 46)
But he argues that it is a mistake to read the book as an
aphoristic work and suggests that commentators have done so at
least partly to avoid this problem. But though Nehamas does not
believe it to be aphoristic nor does he think it is a traditional
philosophical treatise:
"Though Beyond Good and Evil contains a number of
arguments, some of which may even be good, its primary
goal still is not to establish specific philosophic
positions. Read as a series of arguments aimed at
such positions, too much of the work seems not to
argue well, or at all, our text becomes a very poor
philosophic work - in fact, a failure. It becomes
actually unreadable." (1988 p 47)
Nehamas rather suggests that we read the book as "a long and
sustained monologue" in which
"Nietzsche . . . introduces topics only to drop them<", _-=-
and pick them up later; what is in qne place alluded
to in an aside .becomes a central issue elsewhere;
discussions are interrupted in order to examine in
detail some casually introduced tangential point .
.,
Such connections are' dialectical in the most original
sense of the terl1l';'~ . they are, that .is,
• ~ . I
conversational." (1988 :pp 50-1)
He notes that a monologue
82
"finds the principle of its coherence not so much in
the questions it does answer, but in the coherence of
the narrator who must be supposed to be engaged in'
it." (1988 P 51)
I find this understanding of the style and structure of Beyond
Good and Evil illuminating and useful, though it does not account
for all features of the work (the epigrams of Part Four and the
Aftersong, for instance, neither of which is a common feature of
conversation). Like the aphoristic characterization of the work
it emphasizes the lack of an overarching line of argument while
adding an element of coherence to it.
It is not sufficient though that we view the coherence of the
work as lying in the character of the narrator. To gain a
sympathetic hearing any monologue (or any other form of text or
discourse, for that matter) must invoke some other criteria of
structure and coherence. No speaker however linguistically
gifted, witty and insightful can expect to hold our attention
long unless we can answer, to our own satisfaction at least, the
question "What is he talking about?". As long as we cannot
answer this question, as long as the work remains "dazzlingly
obscure", we must conclude not necessarily that the work is a
failed monologue but that the monologic characterization of
Beyond Good and Evil is not satisfactory.
I propose that we accept that Beyond Good and Evil does not fit
any particUlar genre, that it is in many ,ways an idiosyn~fqtic
work which we are unsure how to read but that we should not allow
this uncertainty to paralyse our attempts to engage and engage
critically with the text and the ideas it expresses. I attempt
to offer in this chapter an ipterpretation of some aspects of the
text1 in the full recognit~~nof the tentative and provisional
nature of any such inter~retation preferring this to the
" .
continued avoidance and neglect ~f the work.
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As Nietzsche claimed, Beyond Good and Evil is in many ways a
different presentation of ideas and themes in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra but far from being simply a reiteration' (or
recurrence) of those ideas and themes it serves to both enrich
our understanding of them and also to develop them further. This
is not to imply that Beyond Good and Evil is a more important
work than Thus Spoke Zarathustra, or that it is in any way
better. In fact I believe just the contrary, Beyond Good and
Evil is far from being Nietzsche' s best work and in some
important respects it marks a failure.
One way in which I believe this work fails is that despite
Nietzsche's best and avowed intentions the work often borders on,
and sometimes becomes, dogmatic. In the preface Nietzsche
outlines his opposition to dogmatism, starting with the
suggestive image "SUpposing truth to be a woman". But whereas
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche used the parodic and ironic
elements of the narrative to great success in avoiding dogmatism,
he seems unable to find a similar distance from his ideas in this
text.
3.1 THE CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY
In chapter one I suggested that we can understand modernity as
the nexus of three developments: intellectually, the
Enlightenment emphasis on reason; politically, the gradual
institutionalization of liberal and social democratic politics;
and economically, the Industrial Revolution and the .shift ~Q a. . ~ -
capitalist system. In his reading of modernity, however,
Nietzsche has almost nothing to say about the economic factor and
he views both the Enlightenment and democratic politics, not as
new and autonomous developments, but as reflections and,
refinements of a much ol~e'r underlying world view which he
associates with the post~s~6ratic conception of philo~ophy, on
. ' , .
the one hand, and Christfanity, on the other. It is this world
view, and the brand of morality which accompanies and supports
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it, that Nietzsche holds responsible for nihilism and which he
seeks to undermine, and eventually overcome.
Nietzsche's dissection and critique of this underlying world view
and its ramifications dominates five of the nine parts of Beyond
Good and Evil, and is extraordinarily wide-ranging. Rather than
try to account for everything Nietzsche says in this difficult
work, I will concentrate on the central themes of philosophy,
religion and morality. Nietzsche offers no knock-down arguments
against these but instead through a psychological (stern 1978;
Blackham 1989) and physiological reinterpretation of these
phenomena he casts suspicion upon our conceptions of them. In
each case he suggests that claims to neutrality and truth are
merely masks for the expression of the will to power.
Nietzsche's critique of philosophy occupies parts One, "On the
Prejudices of the Philosophers" and Six, "We Scholars". Through
an argument which is both global and local Nietzsche draws a
picture of philosophy not as a disinterested and wholly rational
quest for knowledge 'or a reflection of the truth but as an
interpretative activi ty. The argument moves in three stages from
the global, through an understanding of . interpretation, to a
series of local attacks on various philosophical (and other)
ooncept.s .
,~' .'--
Nietzsche begins by asking an apparently absurd question but




"Granted we want truth: why not rather untruth? And
uncertainty? Even ignorance?" (BGE 1)
He suggests that:
1 . :
"with all the value 1 that' may adhere to the true, the
genuine, the selfless, it could be possible that a
higher and more fundamental value for all life might
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have to be ascribed to appearance, to the will to
deception, to selfishness and to appetite. It might
even be possible that what constitutes the value of'
those good and honoured things resides precisely in
their being artfully related, knotted and crocheted to
these wicked, apparently antithetical things, perhaps
even in their being essentially identical with them."
(BGE 2)
What Nietzsche proposes is a psychological and physiological
explanation of philosophizing. He argues that conscious
thinking, even philosophical thinking is ultimately instinctual,
expressing basic instinctual valuations, physiological
requirements.
"Behind all logic too and its apparent autonomy there
stand evaluations, in plainer terms physiological
demands for the preservation of a certain species of
life." (BGE 3)
Philosophy then is not the neutral, objective, disinterested and
purely rational project which it portrays itself to be. It is
a way of life, a way of being in the world, one expression of the
will to power. And this being so, the question is not whether
a philosophy is right or wrong, true or false, but whether it is
useful for life.
"The falseness of a jUdgement is to us not necessarily~_~
an objection to a jUdgement: it is here that our new
language perhaps sounds strangest . . The question is to
what extent it is . life-advancing, life-preserving,
species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding;
I
and our fundamentai ' tendency is to assert that the
~ ". l»
falsest jUdgements '(t o 'wh i ch synthetic judqement.s a
priori belong) are th~ :m~st ' indispensabl e to us, that
without granting as true the fictions of logic,
without measuring reality against the purely invented
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world of the unconditional and self-identical, without
a continual falsification of the world by means of
numbers, mankind could not 11ve - that to renounce'
false judgements would be to renounce life, would be
to deny life. To recognise untruth as a condition of
life; that, to be sure, means to resist customary
value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a
philosophy which ventures to do so places itself, by
that act alone, beyond good and evil." (BGE 4)
To understand a philosophy is to understand the philosopher
behind it:
"It has gradually become clear to me what every great
philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the
part of its author and a kind of involuntary and
unconscious memoir" (BGE 6).
A philosophy, according to Nietzsche, is the outcome of the
interplay of the drives and instincts of an individual. Far from
being something separate,an adjudicator between the drives of
an individual, reason is a tool used by all the drives in their
power-struggle, or perhaps it is the power-struggle itself:
"For every drive is tyrannical: and it-is as such
that it tries to philosophize." (BGE 6)
And Philosophy, far from reflecting, or reflecting on, the .~Q~ld
creates its own world:
"It always creates. the world in its own image, it
cannot do otherwise; philosophy is this tyrannical
"
drive itself, the ~o~i spiritual will to power, to
~ " ~ ~
'creation of the worl~" to causa prima." (BGE 9).
'1 "
, '.,: ~ .j
Philosophy then is an expression of the will to power, the
creation of interpretations, which, Nietzsche implies, either
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dull life and result in nihilism or enhance life. The latter
part of Part One is devoted to local attacks on the concepts
philosophers use. Again Nietzsche casts suspicion on the'idea
that these concepts reflect reality, that they are something more
than interpretations . Among the concepts he investigates are the
notion of the "I", of the self as an indivisible uriity (BGE 16-
17); the will (especially the free will) (BGE 16, 18-19); and,
causality (BGE 21-22).
All our concepts, he suggests (BGE 20) are physiological value-
jUdgements according to which we divide the world in terms which
are most necessary for our life. These jUdgements become
embedded as concepts in our languages. There is no necessary
universality here and such universality as appears has to do with
shared linguistic roots. In this way, Nietzsche neatly overturns
the empiricist notion that we, in some sense, read our concepts
or ideas off the world, while also offering an alternative to the
Kantian conception of basic universal categories of reason.
In keeping with his view of philosophy as interpretation,
Nietzsche offers his own interpretation of ourselves and the
world as will to power but, self-aware and self-reflexive as
always, then adds a rider:
"Granted this too is only interpretation - and you
will be eager enough to raise this objection? - well,
so much the better. -" (BGE 2i)
•.",-.--
In Part One, then, Nietzsche unmasks what he takes to be
philosophy's pretensions. Philosophy does not reflect the truth,
he argues, but creates interpretations. These interpretations
are an expression of the will to power and in so far as they
reflect anything, it is ~he lpsychOlogy and physiology of their
authors. In Part six he'r~lt,erates this when he again attacks
' ''1 .. -
the ideal of the philosopher as epistemologist (BGE 204) and he
seeks to contrast the true Philosopher (of whom we will say more
in 3.2) with the scholar (under which rubric he includes even
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Rant) whom he characterizes as an "ignoble species", respectable
and uncreative (BGE 206). The scholar is objective to an extreme
(even where he looks at himself) withholding jUdgement, having
no depth of emotion, he is merely a mirror (BGE 207). He is
above all a sceptic, in which he mirrors the age. And for
Nietzsche scepticism is to be understood as a paralysis of the
will, a sickness (BGE 208).
Hull summarizes Nietzsche's critique of philosophy thus:
"Fear, anxiety, weakness, hatred, the influences of
'elevated' feelings and sentiments, laziness,
stupidity and above all a desire for a world that
conforms to , what philosophers have decided to be
morally wortriy - these are what Nietzsche identifies
as causes of ' the construction and propagation of
epistemological and metaphysical systems." (Hull, 1990
p 379)
What sets apart the Philosopher from the scholar is that the
latter denies his will to power, or is incapable of exercising
it. The former, however, recognizes and embraces the will to
power, consciously creating interpretations.
In Part Three, "The Religious Nature" Nietzsche €tirns his focus
onto the religious ideal of the saint. This ideal, with the
ideal of the philosopher as a disinterested and rational quester
for knowledge, is of primary importance in that it stands a$ ~he. . ~-
opposing ideal to that which Nietzsche wishes to develop. Again
he proceeds through a psychological dissection of this ideal
showing it, too, to be a manifestation of the will to power,
albeit a neurotic one (BGE 47). The religious ideal is
".
characterized by abstinence . and denial and it is in the strength
~ ... .
of will with which he sac:rifices his bodily needs ~hat the
saint's power lies. _, : .
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In view of his characterization of himself as the antichrist, and
in the light of his own atheism it is important to note that
Nietzsche allows to religion a certain social utility ~ it
teaches the strong to rule (through mastery of the drives) and
the weak to obey (BGE 61). The Nietzschean utopia (or dystopia)
might well include religion but a religion which has ceded its
autonomy, to become the tool of the Superman in the guise of
philosopher-legislator (BGE 61).
Though Nietzsche keeps the ideals of the philosopher and the
saint separate in Beyond Good and Evil (despite having hinted in
the preface that they are . essentially the same in his equation
of Platonism and Christianity) he amalgamates them in On the
Genealogy of Morals into a single ideal - the Ascetic Ideal.
Through his dissection of these two ideals, of philosophy and
religion, the philosopher and the saint, Nietzsche views himself
as unmasking and laying bare a deeper reality behind surface
pretensions. Philosophy and religion, he claims, despite their
proclaimed aspiration to truth, are nothing more than
interpretative expressions of the will to power, outgrowths of
the individual physiological and psychological drives.
Nietzsche is critical of religion and philosophy not because they
are interpretations, expressions of the will to power, but
because of their deception about this fact. This criticism
cannot be very wounding, of course, because the will to power
originates with Nietzsche himself, it is his interpretation.
Prior to Nietzsche philosophers and saints could claim a defence
. - ~-
of ignorance. post-Nietzsche they can claim simply to offer
different and equal, or better, interpretations. If the post-
Nietzschean philosopher or saint takes this line of defence she
already weakens her case however, for she no longer lays claim
\
to truth. On the other hand~ without an external criterion for
~ '. ~ I
jUdging interpretations Ni~tzsche has not won his case.
Nietzsche recognizing this does offer such an external criterion
- the standard of value for life (BGE 4). Nietzsche hopes to
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persuade us that the philosophical and religious interpretations
· of the world associated with the Platonic-Christian world-view
fail this test. More importantly, he hopes to persuade us'that
the morality that informs them both fails this test.
His critique of morality in Part Five "On the Natural History of
Morals" is, like his discussion of the religious and
philosophical ideals, a first working out of themes he will
develop in greater detail in On the Genealogy of Morals. It is
here that he first offers the distinction between slave and
master moralities; and his analysis of these has two strands,
which I call the psychological and the political.
The psychological critique points to the origins of moral
evaluations and argues that these are far from pure - timidity,
fear, prudence, revenge are all picked out as sources of
morality. The political critique points to the results of slave
morality and Nietzsche is concerned to show the way in which the
morality of the Platonic-Christian world view leads to nihilism
and the crippling of the strong and creative.
In the psychological critique, Nietzsche argues that a moral
theory tells us not about morality but about the psychology (and
physiology) of its author (BGE 187). This applies as much to
whole cultures as to individual philosophers (BGE 194). In
particular morality is merely a matter of prudence, the attempt
by an individual to control those parts of himself whose
domination he fears (BGE 198).
.~. _-
The political critique of morality focuses on the social results
of moral valuation and in particular of Christian (or slave)
morality. Slave morality begins with the Jewish revaluation of
values, the inversion of th~ ~alues of the noble caste (BGE 195).
And it has at its basis the ,i'ristinct of obedience and constraint.
Nietzsche does allow that~th~se have positive effects: "
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" [A] 11 there is or has been on earth of freedom,
subtlety, boldness, dance and masterly certainty,
whether in thinking itself, or in ruling, or in'
speaking and persuasion, in the arts as in morals, has
evolved only by virtue of the 'tyranny of such
arbitrary laws'; and, in all seriousness, there is no
small probability that precisely this is 'nature' and
'natural' - and not that laisser aller!" (BGE 188)
and also:
"The essential thing 'in heaven and upon earth' seems,
to say it again, to be a protracted obedience in one
direction: from out of that there always emerges and
has always emerged in the long run something for the
sake of which it is worthwhile to live on 'e a r t h , for
example virtue, art, music, dance, reason,
spirituality - something transfiguring, refined, mad
and divine." (BGE 188)
But on the whole Nietzsche argues that they have crippled man,
suppressed any creative impulse. Obedience has come to be seen
as a good in itself rather than a means to something greater.
And so entrenched has obedience become, Nietzsche argues, that
any act of command has to be justified to the self and others in
terms of greater obedience - to God, to the law, to man, etc.
(BGE 199). Those few who can command without such self-
deception, Napoleon is the example he gives, are labelled ,s i c k
" "~ .--
and dangerous. For social morality, "the morality of the herd",
jUdges actions purely in terms of how much they .contribute to the
preservation of the community, with the result that only the
unexceptional is condoned:
,.
"[E]verything that . r a i aes the individual above the
" '
herd and makes hds , neighbour quail is henceforth
called evil; the fair, modest, obedient, self-
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effacing disposition, the mean and average in desires,
acquires moral names and honours. 11 (BGE 201)
This IImorality of timidityll is an attempt both in the self and
in society at large to be rid of everything dangerous, everything
fearful (BGE 201). The democratic society - the "autonomous
herd", Ls : its cUlminating achi.evenerrt . Where proponents of
democracy laud this as progress, Nietzsche can see only decay
. ( BGE 202); whatever may have been gained for the many Nietzsche
can only see what has been lost for the few, the strong, since
it is out of what is dangerous and fearful in man that Nietzsche
sees greatness arising and he argues that if that were to be lost
so too would all hope for mankind (BGE 202).
In Part Seven, "Our Virtues", Nietzsche dissects, inter alia, the
morality of benevol ence .a nd pity. pity he argues is just a cover
for self-contempt (BGE 222). The desire to stop sUffering he
associateswith .nihilism for all greatness, all creation, he
believes, arises out of sUffering. Instead, he argues, sUffering
should be increased, we should be looking to experience
suffering, not to avoid it.
11 That tension of the soul in misfortune which
cultivates its strength, its terror at the sight of
great destruction, its inventiveness and bravery in
undergoing, enduring, interpreting, exploiting
misfortune, and whatever of depth, mystery, mask,
spirit, cunning and greatness has been bestowed upon . ~. --~ . -
it - has it not . been bestowed through sUffering,
through the discipline of great sUffering? In man,
creature and creator are united: in man there is
matter, fragment, excess, clay, mUd, madness, chaos;,
but in man there ' is.. also creator, sculptor, the
hardness of the hamine~'>the divine spectator and the
. ' 7 ' ; •
seventh day - do you .understand this antithesis? And
that your pity is for the 'creature in man', for that
which has to be formed, broken, forged,torn, burned,
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annealed, refined - that which has to suffer and
should suffer?" (BGE 225)
Likewise the fear of cruelty ignores the way in which culture is
itself a product of cruelty, to oneself as well as others (BGE
229) • Nietzsche, therefore, argues against the ethics of
benevolence both in terms of its motives (fear and timidity) and
its results (nihilism).
Nietzsche also attacks the notion of disinterestedness in
morality. All action, he argues, is essentially interested (BGE
220). He argues that to demand unselfishness of all, as a moral
imperative, ignores the crucial question of rank, universalizes
rashly and illegitimately; while for some selflessness might be
a virtue for others it would be a waste, a betrayal of virtue.
In this case as in all cases it is a matter of the particular
individuals concerned.
"Every unegoistic morality which takes itself as
unconditional and addresses itself to everybody is not
merely a sin against taste: it is an instigation to
sins of omission, one seduction more under the mask of
philanthropy and a seduction and injury for
precisely the higher, rarer, privileged. Moralities
must first of all be forced to bow before order of
rank" (BGE 221).
In sections 217 and 219 Nietzsche talks of the vengefulness that
- ,;(:' ---
underlies much of conventional morality. This is a theme he will
take up and explore in depth in The Genealogy of Morals. Moral
jUdgement, too, is a form of revenge on Nietzsche's reading. A
rage against those who have ~ore reveals itself in a standard by




And he again reiterates the non-universalizability of the moral:
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"Not one of all these ponderous herd animals with
their uneasy conscience (who undertake to advocate the
cause of egoism as the cause of general welfare - )'
wants to know or scent that the 'general welfare' is
not an ideal, or a goal, or a concept that can be
grasped at all, but only an emetic - that what is
right for one cannot by any means be right for
another, that the demand for one morality for all is
detrimental to precisely the higher men, in short that
there exists an order of rank between man and man,
consequently also between morality and morality." (BGE
228)
since most of what Nietzsche says about morality here is taken
up and developed in On the Genealogy of Morals I shall have more
of a critical nature to say on this topic in the next chapter.
There are however two aspects of Nietzsche's discussion which I
want to draw attention to at this stage - the reductive element
to Nietzsche's thought on morality,and the Lamarckian2
underpinnings. There is a strongly reductive strain running
right through Beyond Good and Evil with Nietzsche consistently
arguing the case that not only morality, but concepts,
philosophical and religious systems and the very ideals they set
up are explicable not merely in psychological but in
physiological terms. Underpinning this is Nietzsche' s Lamarckian
belief in the heritability of character. More and more Nietzsche
comes to see the world in terms of two types - the strong and the
weak, and more and more he comes to view those two typ~~_::.as
physiologically based and even determined3 • This we shall see
in 3.3 plays an important role in shaping Nietzsche's politics.
The ideals of philosophy ,a nd religion, the ideals of the
Platonic-Christian world'vi~~, Nietzsche attempts to persuade us
are expressions of the physiologically weak; the ideal of the
strong and healthy would be'q~itedifferent. It is to t~is ideal
as developed in Beyond Good and Evil that we now turn.
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3. 2 THE ATTEMPTERS
As in Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche offers an ideal in Beyond
Good and Evil of the sovereign self-creative individual. In this
later work, however, this ideal is viewed not in terms of the
aesthetic-religious Zarathustra but in terms of a new type of
philosopher. In fact in the course of Beyond Good and Evil
Nietzsche expresses admiration or approval for three groups - the
"free spirits" with whom he associates himself, the "attempters"
and the "Noble". It is not clear that these express a single
ideal at all. The first two he discusses in Part Two "The Free
Spirit", the last in Part Nine "What is Noble?"
The free spirit is associated with a radical form of freedom
involving the breaking of all bonds.
First, there is the dogmatic approach to truth. As was
demonstrated in the previous section, Nietzsche believes that our
concepts, our language, falsify the world, create it in an image
which we require. If fabrication and falsehood are in this way
necessary we should embrace them. Truth and the will to truth
Nietzsche argues are only later products of falsehood and the
will to untruth, dependent upon and refining them. And so, he
maintains, we should take the truth lightly, cheerfully, treating
it with humour rather than getting caught in its thrall,
defending it, martyring ourselves for it.
"After all, you know well enough that it cannot matter -
"",',--
in the least whether precisely you are in the right,
just as no philosopher hitherto has been in the right,
and that a more praiseworthy veracity may lie in every
little question-mark placed after your favourite words
. \
and favourite theories (and occasionally after
yourselves) than in 'a l J;· yo ur solemn gesticulations and
. : \ -
smart answers befor~~courts and accusers! Better to
step aside! Flee away and conceal yourselves! And
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have your masks and subtlety, so that you may be
misunderstood!" (BGE 25)
The second bond is that of people . Only the companionship of his
peers is acceptable to the independent person and these
relationships only in so far as they spur him on. Those
friendships which are merely comfortable are to be treated with
humour or left behind. They cannot be serious and should never
be taken seriously (BGE 27).
The third bond is morality.
force of the unintentional,
claims of disinterestedness
and morality (BGE 33).
As a consequence of recognizing the
unconscious, we should be wary of
and selflessness in matters of art
"JI...: .- -
Other bonds include language (each language Nietzsche believes
has its own tempo, a reflection of the physiology of the people)
in particular, regarding Nietzsche's own work this may be seen
to point to his stylistic attempts to overcome what he sees as
the ponderousness, solemnity, slowness of German (BGE 28);
history, which is, of course, merely an interpretation (BGE 38);
and, youth, with its characteristic quick and unconditional
judgements and its lack, and overlooking, of subtleties (BGE 31).
Given all the breaking of bonds that independence requires, it
is unsurprising that Nietzsche believes that it is only for the
strong. Anyone who would be independent can test his strength
with the following tests Nietzsche claims:
"Not to cleave to another person, though he be the one
you love most - every person is a prison, also a nook
and corner. Not to cle~ve to a fatherland, though it
be the most sUffer1.n9 ,,·and in need of help - it is
already easier to sever>your heart from a victorious
'.~ . .
fatherland. Not to- cleave to a feeling of pity,
though it be for higher men into whose rare torment
and helplessness chance allowed us to look. Not to
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cleave to a science, though it lures one with ,t he most
precious discoveries seemingly reserved precisely for
us. Not to cleave to one's own detachment, to t.hat,"
voluptuous remoteness and strangeness of the bird
which flies higher and higher so as to see more and
more beneath it - the danger which threatens the
flier. Not to cleave to our own virtues and become as
a whole the victim of some part of us, of our
'hospitality' for example, which is the danger of
dangers for rich and noble souls who expend themselves
prodigally, almost indifferently, and take the virtue
of liberality to the point where it becomes a vice.
One must know how to conserve oneself: the sternest
test of independence." (BGE 41)
As in Thus Spoke Zarathustra then Nietzsche expresses an ideal
of continual self-overcoming but here it is associated with a new
type of philosopher which Nietzsche envisions for the future and
which he dubs "the attempters" (BGE 43). These seem to differ
from the free spirits not only quantitatively:
"[T]hey too will be free, very free spirits, these
philosophers of the future - just as surely as they
will not be merely free spirits, but something more,
higher, greater and thoroughly different that does not
want to be misunderstood or taken for what it is not."
(BGE 44)
,;c:.- -
They too will be lovers of truth but not of dogma. Their truths
will be their own, not for everyone (or anyone but they), and
they will guard them selfishly and jealously, no longer caught





"'My jUdgement is my' -j udqe merrt e another cannot easily
acquire a right to it'" (BGE 43)
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For it is this judgement, Nietzsche claims, and not the
disinterested and rational pursuit of knowledge, which is
philosophy:
"[T]hephilosopher demands of himself a jUdgement, a
Yes or No, not in regard to the sciences but in regard
to life and the value of life" (BGE 205)
The philosopher's task is not reasoned reflection but the
creation of values and interpretations:
"[T]hey reach for the future with creative hand,and
everything that is or has been becomes for them a
means, an instrument, a hammer. Their 'knowing' is
creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will
to truth is - will to power." (BGE 211)
Nietzsche offers this new ideal of the philosopher as value-
legislator in opposition to the religious ideal with the
sUffering and denial which it demands. Nietzsche speaks of it
as:
"I T] he opposite ideal . the ideal of . the most
exuberant, most -living and most world-affirming man,
who has not only learned to get on and treat with all
that was and is but who wants to have it again as it
was and is to all eternity, insatiably calling out da
capo not only to himself but to the whole piece and .~
. .""..--
play, and not only to a play but fundamentally to him
who needs precisely this play - . and who makes it
necessary: because he needs himself again and again -
and makes himself necessary - What? And would this
,
not be - circulus vit~o'sus deus?" (BGE 56)
~ ~
~ " : .
The ideal also stands in opposition to morality and contemporary
conceptions of virtue. The virtues of the free spirit are
different and just as the common man misunderstands his own
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virtues so too does he misunderstand the" immoralist" who appears
to him as being without duty, through his breaking with the
conventions of morality, or the morality of conventions.' In
contrast to this Nietzsche sees himself (and others like him) as
bound by a perhaps higher and certainly stricter duty (BGE 226).
The virtue which Nietzsche sees as most characteristic, most
definitive, of the "free spirit" is honesty, this honesty which
will stop at nothing:
"Our honesty, we free spirits - let us see to it that
our honesty does not become our vanity, our pomp and
finery, our limitation, our stupidity! Every virtue
tends towards stupidity, every stupidity towards
virtue; 'stupid to the point of saintliness' they say
in Russia - let us see to it that through honesty we
do not finally become saints and bores! Is life not
a hundred times too short to be - bored in it? One
would have to believe in eternal life to
227)
••• 11 (BGE
Nietzsche sees it as the task of the new philosophers to again
revalue values, freeing moral thought from false dichotomies and
antitheses and recognizing the non-eternal, non-universal nature
of values (BGE 203).
In his discussion of this work Nehamas (1988) argues that
Nietzsche presents himself as a prophet of the new philosophers
"the philosophers of the future" but he also describes them_in
• <~.•--
considerable detail and asks whether Nietzsche is merely a
prophet or whether he is not himself one of the .new philosophers.
He suggests that:
itA philosophy of the ~uture need not be a philosophy
that is composed in' t/l~:future. It can also well be
a PhilosO~hY that c6ri~e~ns ~he future." (p 58) -
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What separates genuine philosophers from the rest is that they
are concerned with the future rather than the past or present.
Such philosophers of the future have existed in the past anQ the
narrator of Beyond Good and Evil is himself such a philosopher.
That Nietzsche subtitles the book "Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future" Nehamas suggests has to be understood by reading
"prelude" in the musical sense in that
"[I]t sounds the major themes and motifs of philosophy
of that kind." (p 59)
Nehamas' reading has much to support it. Certainly Nietzsche's
philosophy is future-directed, directed I have been arguing to
a vision of something beyond nihilism. Certainly also Nietzsche
wishes us to associate him with the attempters rather than the
philosophical scholars or under-labourers. Nor can it be denied
that the features that he associates .with the philosophers of the
future are features characteristic of his own work - the anti-
dogmatic approach to truth, the honesty, the experimentation, the
affirmation of life, the centrality of value-judgement.
If we accept this reading then Beyond Good and Evil becomes a
direct parallel of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in that it, too, could
be seen as having both a pedagogical and an exemplificatory
teaching of the ideal of self-creation and value-creation.
Nietzsche might be seen as explicitly teaching that ideal while
at the same time exemplifying a variation of it.
..",. --
But I would argue that we should give equal weight, as Nehamas
does not, to Nietzsche's talk of himself as he~ald and precursor
(BGE 44) to "these coming philosophers" (BGE 43). Nor can I find
any support for the claim that Nietzsche sees such philosophers
of the future having writt~~ :i n the past nor does Nehamas provide
such support. What Neh~mas · does do is conflate "genuine
phi losophers" wi th "phiil.osophers of the future" . Genuine
philosophers are those who create values and certainly Nietzsche
acknowledges that such philosophers have existed before now -
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pre-eminently Plato. But even Nehamasis forced to concede that
the philosophers of the future differ from the genuine
philosophers of the past in terms of their perspectivism,'etc.
We seem to gain little then by not assuming that Nietzsche does
mean to speak of the philosophers of the future as those who will
live in the future.
I would therefore tend to agree with Fuchs (1988) that Nietzsche
draws two different distinctions: a qualitative one, between
original and derivative philosophers and a chronological one.
And that chronologically Nietzsche places himself between the
philosophers of the past and those of the future .
. The Noble, of whom more will be said in the next section, seems
to be the physiological type from whence both free spirits and
the philosophers of the future come. The Noble is characterized
by "courage, insight, sympathy, solitude" (BGE 284) and also by
laughter (BGE 294) and the task of breeding its highest specimen,
the genius, preoccupies Nietzsche and shapes his politics.
3.3 THE POLITICS
It is in the final two parts of Beyond Good and Evil that
Nietzsche outlines his vision of a "great politics" in which he
makes apparent the links between the development of the strong
and sovereign individual, now seen to be a particular (strong)
physiological type, and a politics of domination. Part 8,
"Peoples and Fatherlands" is a dissectio~ of the phenome~2~:.of
nationalism and certain types of national character (especially
German, English, French and Jewish). Nietzsche offers a vision
of a pan-Europeanism which incorporates the best (and worst) of
all the ethnic characters.
His pan-Europeanism andhls politics in general !ests on
Lamarckian assumptions about: the heritability of character traits
and on the assumption that character is based in physiology. In
these regards we encounter Nietzsche at his most naturalistic.
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The pan-European man is truly European, his ancestry diverse, and
includes, importantly for those who would still view Nietzsche
as an anti-Semite, the Jewish heritage (BGE 250). Nietzsche
views nationalism as atavistic, an old need into which people
lapse rather than a reasoned and modern outlook. Indeed,
modernity itself he argues pushes inexorably towards the
overcoming of "nationalism, the birth of the European outlook.
"Whether that which now distinguishes the European be
called 'civilization' or 'humanization' or 'progress';
whether one calls it simply, without implying any
praise or blame, the democratic movement in Europe:
behind all the moral and political foregrounds
indicated by such formulas a great physiological
process is taking place and gathering greater and ever
greater impetus - the process of the assimilation of
all Europeans, their growing detachment from the
conditions under which races dependent on climate and
class originate, their increasing independence of any
definite milieu which, through making the same demands
for centuries, would like to inscribe itself on soul
and body - that "i s to say, the slow emergence of an
essentially supra-national and nomadic type of man
which, physiologically speaking, possesses as its
typical distinction a maximum of the art and power of
adaptation." (BGE242)
Nietzsche recognizes that the pan-Europeanism will involve the
" ""~ ."--
int~nsification of those features of modernity which he most
dislikes, in particular it will favour the breeding of the herd
animal, but he believes it also contains within it the seeds of
the truly great man:
"[T]he democratLaatLon: of Europe will lead to the
", "
production of a type : prepared for slavery in the
subtlest sense: in individual and exceptional cases
the strong man will be found to turn out stronger and
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richer than has perhaps ever happened before - thanks
to the unprejudiced nature of his schooling, thanks to
the tremendous mUltiplicity of practice, art and ma~k.·
What I mean to say is that the democratization of
Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement
for the breeding of tyrants - in every sense of that
word, including the most spiritual." (BGE 242)
Lest we misunderstand his claim . by emphasising the "spiritual"
and ignoring the "in every sense of the word", Nietzsche in Part
Nine, "What is Noble", explicitly ties the development of higher
culture to the Noble character and to an aristocratic
organization of society. For Nietzsche class is both a necessary
feature of society, and the precondition and source of all higher
culture.
"Every elevation of the type 'man' has hitherto been
the work of an aristocratic society - and so it will
always be: a society which believes in a long scale
of orders of rank and differences of worth between man
and man and needs slavery in some sense or other."
(BGE 257)
All class division depends, Nietzsche believes, first of all on
the conquering, and domination, of a weaker, more peaceful people
by a stronger people (BGE 257), that is to say that class is
based in physiology. Equality Nietzsche believes is no basis for
society:
.~ ' . '--
"[L]ife itself is essentially appropriation, injury,
overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression,
severity, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation
"
and ,at the least ahd, ,~lldest, exploitation - but why
should one always hav~ tq employ precisely those words
which have from of cHd:b'een- stamped with a slande~ous
intention? Even that body within which, as was
previously assumed, individuals treat ~ne another as
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equals - this happens in every healthy aristocracy
must, if it is a living and not a decaying body,
itself do all that to other bodies which the.
individuals within it refrain from doing to one
another: it will have to be the will to power
incarnate, it will want to grow, expand, draw to
itself, gain ascendancy - not out of any morality or
immorality, but because it lives, and because life is
will to power." (BGE 259)
Nietzsche recognizes that his claims . offend our morality but
argues that they are consonant with noble morality:
"A morality of the rulers is, however, most alien and
painful to contemporary taste in the severity of its
principle that one has duti~s only towards one's
equals; that towards beings of a lower rank, towards
everything alien, one may act as one wishes or 'as the
heart dictates' and in any case 'beyond good and evil'
-: it is here that pity and the like can have a
place. The capacity for and the duty of protracted
grati tude and protracted revenge - both only among
one's equals sUbtlety in requital, a refined
conception · of friendship, a certain need to have
enemies ( as conduit systems, as it were, for t.he
emotions of envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance
fundamentally so as to be able to be a good friend)1I
(BGE 260).
..~. _ -
In recognizing his own worth, Nietzsche claim~, the noble also
recognizes that others are subordinate to it and that only
obligations to equals, only the rights of equals, are to be
recognized (BGE 265).
.~ '
Nietzsche, it must be nqted', is not advocating a simple a-
historical return to the aristocracies of the past. What
differentiates the Noble of the future from that of the past is
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that while the latter is himself a social and cultural construct,
the former is an individual. The rise of the individual is again
treated naturalistically. He claims that a species is shaped by
the struggle against adverse conditions counting as virtues those
qualities which help it survive. Should the unfavourable
conditions end, variety becomes the order of the day:
"Variation, whether as deviation (into the higher,
rarer, more refined) or as degeneration and
monstrosity, is suddenly on the scene in the greatest
splendour and abundance, the individual dares to be
individual and stand out." (BGE 262)
In particular, the old morality is seen as unneeded, its
constraints broken:
"The dangerous and uncanny .point is reached where the
grander, more manifold, more comprehensive life lives
beyond the old morality; the \ individual' stands
there, reduced to his own law-giving, to his own arts
and stratagems for self-preservation, self-
enhancement, self-redemption. Nothing but new whys
and wherewithal Is , no longer any common formulas,
misunderstanding in alliance with disrespect, decay,
corruption and the highest desires horribly tangled
together, the genius of the race overflowing out of
every cornucopia of good and bad, spring and autumn
falling fatally together, full of novel charms and _
. 4..: : --
veils such as pertain to youthful, still unexhausted,
still unwearied corruption. Danger is again present,
the mother of morality, great danger, only this time
it comes from the in~ividual, from neighbour and
friend, from the str~et, from one's own child, from
~ :-'
one's own heart, fro~tthe most personal and seeret;
recesses of wish and : will: what will the moral
philosophers who come up in this age now have to
preach?" (BGE 262)
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This last has an almost democratic ring but Nietzsche's
Lamarckism breaks through again in BGE 264: every person, he
says, inherits the characteristics (especially the most prominent
ones) of his ancestors; his character is thus set. Education
may cover, hide, these characteristics but it cannot eradicate
them.
"This constitutes the problem of race. If one knows
something about the parents, it is permissible to draw
a conclusion about the child: any sort of untoward
intemperance, any sort of narrow enviousness, a clumsy
obstinate self-assertiveness these three things
together have at all times constituted the
characteristics of the plebeian type - qualities of
this sort must be transferred to the child as surely
as bad blood; and the best education and culture will
succeed only in deceiving with regard to such an
inheritance." (BGE 264)
In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche reveals the dark underbelly of
the Zarathustrian solution. The Superman is revealed to be a
physiological type (though not another evolutionary stage). The
role of politics becomes the task of shaping society so as to
breed and sustain this sort of abundantly strong, healthy and
creative individual.
The political vision of Beyond Good and Evil remains at a high
level of abstraction and generalization; and it might ~ be
.~ --
objected that it does not sound all that bad. It is as well,
therefore, to spell out some of the implications of Nietzsche's
proposed social organization.
First, though, it should' b~,"stated that whatever use the Nazis
made of Nietzsche's work~ his vision runs in many ways counter
to their ideals. Nietzsch~ has no vision of a pure mas~er race,
instead, he argues for a pan-Europeanism involving the mixing of
the different ethnic groups comprising Europe and including the
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Jewish people. Nietzsche's vision runs counter not only to the
anti-semitism of the Nazis but to all nationalisms.
What Nietzsche does argue for is a stratified society with a
division of labour. This would not be in itself a necessarily
bad thing; but Nietzsche also speaks of this society using such
terminology as "domination", "slavery", "tyrants". Even
supposing that we could read these terms as in some way
figurative (and it is not obvious that we can), the crux of
Nietzsche's social vision is that it lacks any social morality.
For example, Nietzsche says in BGE 260 "one has duties only
towards one's equals" and IlIltowards beings of a lower rank
. one may act as one wishes". Admittedly, Nietzsche tempers the
latter with the note that "it is here that pity and the like can
have a place", but what would society be like if the dominant
group had no obligations to the lower class? Hunt (1991)
addresses this issue and remarks that in such a society the lower
class is rendered without rights. In such a political system I
could not expect of others that they refrain from killing,
raping, harming me. If the nobility of such a society did not
engage in such activities it would not be out of any respect for
my person but only a sign of their benevolence or indifference,
something for which I should have to be grateful. Further, if
they did engage in such actions the only recourse open to me
would be reciprocation.
I suspect that Nietzsche believed that in his aristocratic
<~:. --
society the nobility would be so taken up with their own self-
creation that they would ignore the lower c Lasses rather than'
harm them. However, by placing his new society beyond the bounds
of socia~ morality, Nietzsche can in no way ensure that such
disastrous consequences wo~;~ not follow.
The playful tone and iron~c: distance of Thus Spoke Zarathustra
is lost as Nietzsche, carried away by his own excess, seems
unable to conceive of any explanation of man and society that is
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not physiological and he gradually moves towards a sort of
physiological fatalism. The Politics of Beyond Good and Evil is
something like a zero-sum game in which two incompatible types -
the weak and the strong, the master and the slave, the herd and
the individual - with their incompatible needs and values compete
for absolute power. The weak are doomed, Nietzsche tells us, so
let us sacrifice them for the few.
3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
It has been shown that in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche's
critique of modernity takes a psychological and physiological
turn. This is continued in his vision of the future. Now the
physiological underpinnings of Nietzsche's understanding of
individual greatness, of the basis of self-creation are made
evident, and character becomes a matter of racial inheritance.
Underpinning all of Nietzsche's social thought is the master-
slave duality, the belief in two broad categories of human beings
shaped by their physiologies and psychologies. Carroll argues
that these categories are not moralistic, that there is no
condemnation of the slave in the duality:
"He retains moral categories, rejecting only the
highly charged, moralistic 'good' and 'evil'. He
explicates his preferred distinction between good and
bad individuals as non-condemnatory of the latter. A
'bad person' is merely devoid of what Nietzsche
personally considers to be noble or virtuous _
''''".--
qualities; he is not morally evil." (1974 p 91)
This is true enough, but what Carroll ignores is that the lack
of noble qualities removes people from the horizon of Nietzsche's
concern. With his physiological reading of the quality of
character slavery becomes ya fate. The reconceived role of
politics is the creation \ of: the .conditions for the de~elopment
and sustenance of the sovereign individual. And the politics he
develops is an aristocratic one, as Ansell-Pearson puts it:
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"Nietzsche does regard the' exploitation' (Ausbeutung)
of weaker powers by stronger ones as a necessary and
essential aspect of an aristocratic social structure ..
On one level, he seems to be suggesting that injury
and overpowering of others are unconscious effects of
a strong will to power; on another, the level of his
overt political thinking, he makes the radical
suggestion that in order for there to be a perpetual
self-overcoming of 'man', which guarantees the
creation of new and rare human types, the state, or
the 'social structure' , has to be built on
relationships of command and obedience." (1994 p 50)
Nietzsche reads politics only in terms of culture (high culture).
And its utility has to be assessed in those terms. The question
for Nietzsche is "what role does politics have to play in
overcoming nihilism?". His answer is that it must be put to the
service of the creation of sovereign individual, now conceived
as the philosopher.
"The way out is a daring gamble: great politics.
Only this might lead to conditions permitting a
cultural rebirth. Like most other things for
Nietzsche, due to its genealogical structure, great
politics begins by making things worse, before it
might make them different." (strong, 1975 p 210)
What strong ignores is that even if the gamble pays off, in
Nietzsche's terms, things will be not only different but probably
worse for those at the bottom of the social heap.
Of course, we can reject the reductive and Lamarckian aspects of
Nietzsche's thought. Wh~t we cannot do,though, if we wish to
understand Nietzsche's prop~~ed solution to nihilism is ignore,
1'. .'
or downplay, this strand o~ '1ti~ t.houqht; (as does Kauf'mann , 1974).
In Chapter Five I will discuss this in more detail but first I
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shall turn to a discussion of On the Genealogy of Morals showing
its role in Nietzsche's project.
NOTES
1. I thus leave many topics undiscussed, including Nietzsche's
considerable remarks on feminism, his discussion of
historiography and so on.
2. Lamarck (1744-1829) formulated the first comprehensive
theory of evolution. The most important aspect of his
thought, · f or our purposes, was his belief that acquired
characteristics were heritable and that these then became
a permanent and ineradicable feature of . the line of
descent; modern science suggests that this cannot be the
case.
3. It may be though that I am taking Nietzsche too literally.
However, Pasley (1978) tries to treat Nietzsche's
vocabulary around health as metaphorical but concludes that
Nietzsche becomes progressively more literal in his usage:
"[T]his image has certainly taken an obsessive hold of
him; it has become a controller of his thinking;
further than that, it is presented with so much
insistent physiological detail that it clamours to be
understood literally." (p 143)
[See also Letteri (1990) who argues that the
terminology of health features as evaluative but also
as literal.]
On a similar point see Reed (1978) who argues that
Nietzsche's animal imagery is based in the very literal










It has thus fa~ been argued that Nietzsche's central concern is
the problem of nihilism and the attempt to overcome it (chapter
I), and that Nietzsche's solution is primarily an individual one
(chapter 2) but that he links this broadly aesthetic solution to
a politics of domination and exploitation (chapter 3). In both
cases the moral element is lacking and in both Nietzsche
explicitly repudiates it.
In the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche takes the argument a step
further by showing the links between the morality of the
Platonic-Christian world-view and nihilism showing why he
believes that transcending nihilism must involve transcending
morality. He attempts to convince us that the creativity of the
Superman and morality are inimical. And he tries to persuade us
through a genealogical argument. Before we look at his arguments
we must first therefore address the question of method.
Nietzsche offers the following rationale for this method:
"Let us articulate this new demand: we need a
critique of moral values, the value of these values
themselves must be first called in question - and for
that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and
circumstances in which they grew, under which they
evolved and changed (morality as a consequence, as
symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as
misunderstanding; but also morality as cause, as
remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison), a
knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even
been devised." (GM preface 6)
So the first task of genealogy is to show how and why we came to
value the things we do. In so doing the genealogy shows values
to be not absolute and universal but historical, cultural.
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"[G]enealogy displays as the product of a contingent
history concepts and propositions that we very likely
take as fixed and given. Such an enterprise can show
t
that something we iregard as unchanging is, in fact,
quite accidental ... In this way, genealogy can make
us aware of alternatives and possibilities in places
where we thought there were none. 11 (Scott-Kakures,
1993 p 347)
The genealogy in this way functions not only to explain how our
values give rise to nihilism but to uncover other possibilities
and potentialities which though repressed still exist and might
serve as the basis for liberation.
But is this genealogy itself an objective discovery about the
origins and history of our values? Strong seems to read the
genealogy in this way. He reads genealogy to be:
"[T]he investigation of the logic of a particular line
of development of any coherent structure" (1975 p 28)
and he suggests that we can best understand genealogy by its
contrasts with dialectics. Whereas the latter sees history as
powered by an "automatic logic" in which the past is successfully
overcome and left behind, for the genealogist the past leaves
traces, shapes the present. Genealogy is a way of understanding
the past which may be, at least initiallY, destructive:
"If one finds out that much of the personality system
one has painfully elaborated is simply an elaborate
justification for a set of unresolved problems, the
realization is likely to precipitate a crisis. That
which has been the bounds of one's life vanishes in
the realization that there is no force to the barriers
one has struggled so long to erect in self-definition;
the self-consciousness produced by genealogical
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analysis weakens the unquestioned bases that were
necessary to a particular form of life." (1975 p 49)
(
But, it is hoped, genealogy might ultimately serve as a pointer
to other, better, forms of life.
What strong seems to be suggesting is that genealogy does in fact
lead to an understanding of the facts about our values. But such
a reading seems to contradict one of Nietzsche' s most basic
theses - his perspectivism. Nietzsche everywhere denies the
possibility of finding the facts of the matter, of offering
anything more than interpretations.
If this is so then it must also be the case that genealogy itself
is interpretative; that what the genealogy offers is not the
origins and the history of our values but one interpretation of
those origins and that- history. Is genealogy, then, just a
story?
Martin, for one, thinks so. He argues that in The Genealogy of
Morals Nietzsche
"is not even beginning to attempt an historically
accurate picture of the ancient situation. Rather, he
is doing history "in the service of life" by creating
what can be called "mythic-paradigms" designed to
herrneneutically illuminate our understanding of the
present." (1989 p 19)
White, too, argues that we should maintain an ironic distance
from the story of the genealogy, we should not treat it as a
history of lost origins. White characterises the first essay as
"a mythical pre-history" (1988 p 686) and a "parable" (1988 p
687) and he argues that we should interpret it not literally but
as "psychohistorical" or "psychodramatic" (1988 p 687).
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And yet Nietzsche himself seems to think he is doing something
more than offering a narrative that we can take or leave. There
is none of the irony that accompanies the story of Zarathustra
for instance. Instead we are presented with a wealth of
historical and etymological detail. As Lang puts it:
"Nietzsche . . . argues in The Genealogy of Morals for
a perspectival conception of knowledge from what seems
itself to be the disinterested and universalist stance
of the expository point-of-view that he is attacking."
(1990 p 17)
So the genealogy offers an interpretation of the origin and
history of our values which at least has pretensions to be
something more than just an interpretation. What does the "more"
consist in? One conception of the "more" is that genealogy is
not merely an interpretation of the past but an appropriation or
reappropriation of it.
Ansell-Pearson and Warren both take this line. But the most
useful work on this area is Bergoffen's. She proposes that we
read the genealogy as analogous to the eternal recurrence.
"With the doctrine of the eternal recurrence,
Nietzsche proposes a philosophy of history whereby the
temporal and eternal are linked by an act of will, not
reason, and where an absorption of the entire past
into oneself allows for an integrated willing of, and
creative transcendence toward, the future." (1983 p
130)
She reads The Genealogy as an exemplification and clarification
of this approach to history. Its purpose is not just to recount
what has been remembered but to recall what has been forgotten
and further asks what motivates the forgetting (1983 pp 131-2).
Genealogy and eternal recurrence are linked through .t.h e notion
of repression, of that which has been forgotten but not lost and
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which may erupt in violence. The genealogy attempts to
investigate and explain these eruptions, the eternal recurrence
wills the return of the repressed in such a way that it no longer
t
\
needs violent ~xpression (Bergoffen, 1983 p 133).
The genealogy, she argues, frees origin from purpose and makes
the reinterpretation and reappropriation of the past through
eternal recurrence possible (1983 p 134).
"The demand of the eternal recurrence: that I
demonstrate the power of my freedom by willing the
return of the past, only makes sense if the past, as
past, is somehow retrievable and if it is, as past,
somehow amenable to my power. The problematics of
this demand are resolvable, it we accept two critical
revelations of the genealogical method: one, that
purpose is not already determined in the past; and
two, a correlate of one, that the absence of
ontological teleology establishes the existence of an
ontological pluralism which can be unified diversely
in accordance with human desire." (Bergoffen, 1983 p
134)
I think Bergoffen's drawing of a connection between genealogy and
eternal recurrence is most fruitful. I would however read it
slightly differently. I would argue that while it is true that
eternal recurrence and genealogy both seek to reappropriate the
past and particularly that which is repressed, what distinguishes
them is their sphere of concern. The eternal recurrence
functions, I believe, primarily at the level of individual
psychology: through it the individual appropriates his or her
own past. The eternal recurrence is thus, despite Nietzsche's
attempts in his notebooks to give it wider application, part of
the sUbjective solution to nihilism exemplified by Zarathustra.
Genealogy on the other hand, seeks to appropriate and reinterpret
social history - in Nietzsche's case, the history of western
values and the origins of nihilism. It is thus part of the
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broader attempt to establish a social solution to the problem of
n i.hi.Lism" •
i
It was suggested in ~ chapter two that Nietzsche never
satisfactorily explains how the experience of eternal recurrence
transforms and appropriates the past. A similar sense of alchemy
might attach to genealogy; but as Redding points out:
liThe idea of redeeming the past by reinterpreting it
can sound as if a mad magical power is being
attributed to words and ideas. [But] If the
Enlightenment looks like it is leading to disaster
and, on the basis of a certain 'redeeming'
interpretation the course of its subsequent history is
effected for the better, this has not been on account
of magical powers of that interpretation. It will
simply indicate that it was all along healthy enough
to transform itself in this way. 11 (Redding, 1993 p
220)
Does Nietzsche intend the genealogy only to be a way of answering
the question of how and why we value the things we do or does it
have a further critical function? Does genealogy, in other
words, evaluate values?
Schacht (1985) argues that the genealogy is not intended to be
critical. He believes that genealogy is a descriptive task that
precedes the evaluative task, which itself precedes the final
task of revaluating values.
Moreover, if we read what Nietzsche says about origins and
purposes, and read 'value' for 'purpose' we can see that, for
Nietzsche the origins of a value must tell us little about its
actual value:
"[T]he cause of the orlgln of a thing and its eventual
utility, its actual employment and place in a system
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of purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists,
having somehow come into being, is again and again
reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed,
and redirected by some power s~perior to it; all
events in the organic world are a sUbduing, a becoming
master, and all sUbduing and becoming master involves
a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which
any previous "meaning" and "purpose" are necessarily
obscured and even obliterated. [P]urposes and
utilities are only signs that a will to power has
become master of something less powerful and imposed
upon it the character of a function; and the entire
history of a 'thing,' an organ, a custom can in this
way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new
interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not
even have to be related to one another but, on the
contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one
another in a purely chance fashion. The 'evolution'
of a thing, a custom, an organ is thus by no means its
progressus toward a goal, even less a logical
progressus by the shortest route and with the smallest
expenditure of force . . . The form is fluid, but the
'meaning' even more so." (GM 2.12)
If purpose is not determined by ori.qan , then Nietzsche is
unlikely to think that value is and yet there are still those who
read Nietzsche as arguing that the value of our values is somehow
fixed by the circumstances of their genesis. For example,
Redding says:
"Nietzsche's primary concern is with the value of
certain values and he tries to articulate this value
in terms of a story of their development, a story
which gives expression to the baseness which he sees
as characterizing the values themselves." (1993 p 215)
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If Nietzsche were offering such a critique then stern (in Magee-
and stern 1987 p 238) and others would be correct in claiming
that the genealogy is an extended case .of the genetic fallacy.
~
~
I would argue that this is not the case, however. There are two
aspects to Nietzsche's critique of values: firstly, he
undermines the claims of universality and absolutism which
underpin the Western value system by showing that there are
different modes of valuation and that these are quite contingent;
he also undermines the idea that good and evil are opposites,
instead offering an interpretation that sees them in some sense
as a unity (Nehamas, 1985). This is not a genetic argument
though.
Secondly, Nietzsche does take a critical and oppositional stance
towards certain values, for instance, those of slave morality.
But his negative evaluation of these values is not based on their
being slave values, not based that is in their origin. Rather,
he evaluates those values in terms of whether or not they enhance
life, and he argues that while once slave values, the ascetic
ideal and so on made life possible their end result is nihilism
and the diminishment of life; and that 'even where they make life
possible they do so by diminishing life itself in favour of an
ideal of life beyond this world. Thus while Nietzsche criticises
and evaluates values and morality in the course of his genealogy
he does so in terms of a criterion which is in some sense
external to the genealogy and which he also uses in other
contexts.
Since genealogy, too, is subject to the same evaluative criteria
(Schrift, 1990) we can also see why Nietzsche can lay claim to
his interpretation being better than alternative interpretations
- by revealing the repressed values it makes possible new and
better ways of interpreting and evaluating the world, ways not
associated with nihilism.
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In the rest of this chapter I will offer a reading of each of the
three essays that make up On the Genealogy of Morals: '''Good and
Evil," "Good and Bad"' (4.1); '"Guilt," "Bad Conscience," and
the Like' (4.2); and 'What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?'
(4.,3) showing how in each Nietzsche locates a particular source
of nihilism - ressentiment, bad conscience and the ascetic ideal
respectively. In so doing Nietzsche also shows the historical
and contingent bases of these and the grounds for liberation from
them in other ways of experiencing and interpreting the world
which have gradually been repressed.
4.1 RESSENTIHENT
In Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche argued that all moral systems
were of either of two types (or a mix of both). In the first
essay of On the Genealogy of Morals he offers his interpretation
of the origins of these two value systems - master morality
characterized by the judgements "good and bad", and slave
morality with its judgements "good and evil".
etymological excavation. Noting
(European and Indo-European)
to "aristocratic" and "noble" and
He begins the genealogy with an
the connection, in various
languages, of the word "good"
of "bad" to "common" he draws the generalization that:
"[A] concept denoting political superiority always
resolves itself into a concept denoting superiority of
soul" (GM 1.6)
And from this evidence he argues that jUdgements of "goodness"
originate as self-affirmations of the nobles in a society,
denoting characteristics which mark them off from the rest. The
jUdgements which resolve into "badness" originate as secondary,
merely as a way of naming the other.
those unl ike
that is to say,
"[F]rom the masters' perspective,
themselves are merely bad humans;
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humans who do not come up to the mark. This is
similar to the way bad eggs are low in the scales of
egghood. T~ere is nothing morally bad in being a bad
I
~ . .
egg or, in ~thi s usage, a bad human. It 1S Just the
way one is. Too bad, then, for the bad. They hardly
can be blamed for what they are; but they are bad."
(Danto, 1965 p 159)
These original aristocratic societies Nietzsche further divides
into two groups based on whether the rUling elite is worldly or
priestly. The essential difference between the value systems
that . each develops being that whereas the worldly aristocrat
marks himself by what he is, has or does - "the powerful", "the
rich", "the truthful", "the blond", "the man of war", "the
godlike" - the priest marks himself according to his restraint,
by what he abstains from doing - what he doesn't eat, who he
doesn't have sex with. Or put in another way, the secular noble
embraces the world, the priest sees it as dangerous. From the
beginning the priest has been associated with a turning away from
the world and with nihilism:
"[T]he desire for a unio mystica with God is the
desire of the Buddhist for nothingness, Nirvana - and
no more!" (GM 1.6)
And yet, Nietzsche admits:
"I I]t was on the soil of this essentially dangerous
form of human existence, the priestly form, that man
first became an interesting animal, that only here did
the human soul in a higher sense acquire depth and
become evil - and these are the two basic respects in
which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts!"
(GM 1.6)
At this point the argument of The Genealogy becomes sticky in a
way that commentators ignore. Most readings of slave morality
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take it to be the opposing set of values set up by the underclass
in the original aristocratic societies. But this is not how
Nietzsche first argues the case. Instead he identifies the
\
worldly aristocracy with Rome and the prrestly aristocracy with
Judea and locates the decisive moment in Western (and world)
history in the clash of these two societies.
The decisive military victory of the Romans in this conflict is
overshadowed by the moral victory of the Jews, who extract their
revenge not at the physical but at the spiritual level - through
a revaluation of values. A new value system is created, that of
good and evil, through a simple and consistent inversion of the
Roman (i.e. noble) valuation.
"with the Jews there begins the slave revol t in
morali ty: that revolt which has a history of two
thousand years behind it and which we no longer see
because it - has been victorious." (GM 1.7)
Slave morality as thus explicated is not a universal phenomenon,
nor a creation of the underclass, but a value system created by
one aristocracy in its defeat by another. Prior to this point
there is no slave morality nor any master morality, merely the
noble valuations of various societies. The master-slave
dichotomy arises not within society but out of conflict between
societies.
Slave morality is nothing more nor less than Christianity which
on Nietzsche's reading is not a repudiation of revenge (a turning
of the other cheek), not an expression of pure love, but an
expression of (impotent) hatred and vengefulness:
"One should not imagine it grew up as the denial of
that thirst for revenge, as the opposit~ of Jewish
hatred! No, the reverse is true! That love grew out
of it as its crown, as its triumphant crown spreading
itself farther and farther into the purest brightness
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and sunlight, driven as it were into the domain of
light and the heights in pursuit of the goals of that
hatred - victory, spoil, and seduction; - by the same
\
impulse that drove the roots of that hatred deeper and
deeper and more and more covetously into all that was
profound and evil. 1l (GM 1.8)
Our modern western values, then, have their genesis in
ressentiment. And the creative act in this morality is a No, to
the Yes of the masters.
But then Nietzsche begins to vacillate. He identifies the noble
with the master and thereby implies that slave morality is a more
universal phenomenon. At the base of this vacillation we find
Nietzsche's Lamarckism. He offers a racial understanding of
class. There are two types of races - noble and slave; the
former defeat the latter physically, the latter exact spiritual
revenge. It seems we are dealing with universals, that the
conflict of Rome and Judea is just one exemplar of military
conquest and spiritual revenge. The characteristics that are to
be found in slave morality are already present in the priestly
aristocracy - in particular an aversion to the world, the body
and action.
In what follows Nietzsche outlines the differences between the
two systems of valuation, the crucial difference being:
"This inversion of the value-positing eye - this need
to direct one's view outward instead of back to
oneself - is of the essence of ressentiment: in order
to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile
external world: it needs, physiologically speaking,
external stimuli in order to act at all - its action
is fundamentally reaction.
"The - reverse is the case with the noble mode of
valuation: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks
123
its opposite only so as to affirm itself more
gratefully and triumphantly - its negative concept .
. . is only a subsequently-invented pole, contrasting
image in relation to its positive basic concept" (GM
1. 10) .
In the moral system of good and bad, the "bad" is an
afterthought, whereas in slave morality it is "good" which is the
later concept, "evil" being primary. And of course, the concept
"good" is not unchanged - the "good" of noble morality is the
"evil" of slave morality, reinterpreted, seen through the eyes
of ressentiment.
But the labelling of the noble as "evil" does not appear to be
merely a matter of perspective, it has a basis in the noble's own
actions. For while in dealing with his equals the noble is kept
in check by
"custom, respect, usage, gratitude, and even more by
mutual suspicion and jealousy" (GM 1.11)
and these equal relations are characterised by
"consideration, self-control, delicacy,
pride, and friendship" (GM 1.11)
loyalty,
in dealing with the Other they show quite a different side of
themselves:
"There they savor a freedom from all social
constraints, they compensate themselves in the
wilderness for the tension engendered by protracted
confinement and enclosure within the peace of society,
the go back to the innocent conscience of the beast of
prey, as triumphant monsters who perhaps emerge from
a disgusting procession of murder, arson, rape, and
torture, exhilarated and undisturbed of soul, as if it
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were no more than a student's prank, convinced they
have provided the poets with a lot more material for
song and praise. One cannot fail to see at the bottom
of all these noble races the beast of prey, the
splendid blond beast prowling about avidly in search
of spoil and victory; this hidden core needs to erupt
from time to time, the animal has to get out again and
go back to the wilderness" (GM 1.11).
This then is the evil enemy of the slaves:
"This 'boldness' of noble races, mad, absurd, and
sudden in its expression, the incalculability, even
incredibility of their undertakings their
indifference to and contempt for security, body, life,
comfort, their hair-raising cheerfulness and profound
joy in all destruction, in all the voluptuousness of
victory and cruelty - all this came together, in the
minds of those who suffered from it, in the image of
the 'barbarian,' the 'evil enemy'" (GM 1.11).
The question for Nietzsche is whether the taming or domestication
of this beast is a good thing or not. Generally it would be
regarded as good, that is the purpose of cUlture, the basis of
civilization, which is itself held to be a good thing.
Nietzsche, though, turns this evaluation on its head.
"These 'instruments of culture' are a disgrace to man
and rather an accusation and counterargument against
'culture' in general! One may be quite justified in
continuing to fear the blond beast at the core of the
noble races and in being on one's guard against it:
but who would not a hundred times sooner fear where
one can also admire than not fear but be permanently
condemned to the repellent sight of the ill-
constituted, dwarfed, atrophied, and poisoned?" (GM
1.11 )
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The loss of the noble is, Nietzsche argues, one source of
nihilism:
"[T]ogether with the fear of. man we have also lost our
love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him,
even the will to him. The sight of man now makes us
weary - what is nihilism today if it is not that? - We
are weary of man." (GM 1.12)
What we note, throughout, is that Nietzsche in no way offers a
one-sided appraisal of the noble, or indeed of the slave. Both
offer mankind something important; both have positive and
negative elements. We do not have to accept the noble at his own
evaluation of "good", but nor do we have to accept the slave's
evaluation of him as evil. On the other hand, Nietzsche is
clearer and more straightforward in his rejection of the slave's
evaluation of himself as "good", a sUbject to which he returns
in section 13.
continuing the imagery of animals, Nietzsche offers a parable:
"That lambs dislike great birds of prey does not seem
strange: only it gives no ground for reproaching
these birds of prey for bearing off little lambs. And
if the lambs say among themselves: 'These birds of
prey are evil; and whoever is least like a bird of
prey, but rather its opposite, a lamb - would he not
be good?' there is no reason to find fault with this
institution of an ideal, except perhaps that birds of
prey might view it a little ironically and say: 'we
don't dislike them at all, these good little lambs, we
even love them: nothing is more tasty than a tender
lamb. ,,, (GM 1 .13 )
In explicating this parable Nietzsche touches on many crucial
topics and it is, therefore, worthwhile to quote him at length.
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"To demand of strength that it should not express
itself as strength, that it should not be a desire to
overcome, a desire to throw down, a desire to master,
a thirst for enemies and resistances and triumphs, is
just as absurd as to demand of weakness that it should
express itself as strength. A quantum of force is
equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect - more,
it is nothing other than precisely this very driving,
willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of
language (and of the fundamental errors of reason that
are petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives
all effects as conditioned by something that causes
effects, by a "subject," can it appear otherwise...
[P]opular morality also separates strength from
expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral
sUbstratum behind the strong man, which was free to
express strength or not to do so. But there is no
such substratum; there is no "being" behind doing,
effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction
added to the deed - the deed is everything.... [N]o
wonder if the submerged, darkly glowering emotions of
vengefulness and hatred exploit this belief for their
own ends and in fact maintain no belief more ardently
than the belief that the strong man is free to be weak
and the bird of prey to be a lamb - for thus they gain
the right to make the bird of prey accountable for
being a bird of prey." (GM 1.13)
What Nietzsche objects to in the slave's evaluation of himself
as "good" is not that it is wrong but that it is diShonest,
relying on self-deception. If the weak wish to call themselves
"good" there is nothing wrong with that but to further claim that
they are not weak, but strong, that they could be otherwise but
choose not to be, is deeply dishonest.
Nietzsche goes on to suggest that all slave ideals take this form
of dishonesty using the imagery of the "workshop where ideals are
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manufactured" (GM 1.14). Here, the slaves turn their weakness
into religion with the crowning touch being their
reinterpretation of their own desire for revenge into the
"justice" of the last jUdgement and the coming of the kingdom of
God (GM 1.14) and with it the eternal sUffering of the "evil" in
hell (GM 1.15). Here there are notes reminiscent of Marx with
religion serving to justify passivity; the difference is that
for Marx religion is not a creation of the underclass and works
against their interests, while for Nietzsche it is precisely a
creation of the underclass and serves them.
Visker (1990 P 446) argues that Nietzsche leaves unexplained why
the master succumbs to the slave and the slave system of
valuation and he argues that this surely points to some
"slavishness" in the master himself. However, what Visker
ignores is this dominant role of religion in shaping thought and
values, a role which Nietzsche explores in depth in the third
essay2.
The last two thousand years, therefore, mark the history of a
struggle between two competing systems of evaluation. Although
Christianity has become dominant:
" .. there are still places where the struggle is as
yet undecided. One might even say that it has risen
ever higher and thus become more and more profound and
spiritual: so that today there is perhaps no more
decisive mark of a 'higher nature,' a more spiritual
nature, than that of being divided in this sense and
a genuine battleground of these opposed values." (GM
1.16)
Nietzsche ends this first essay with the hope that the battle has
not yet been completely won:
"Must the ancient fire not some day flare up much more
terribly, after much longer preparation? More: must
128
one not desire it with all one's might? even will it?
even promote it? " (GM 1. 17 )
I have tried to emphasise in my reading of this first essay that
Nietzsche does not merely glorify the nobles and denigrate the
slaves. There are those, however, who disagree. Zeitlin for
instance accuses Nietzsche of rejecting "slave" values without
reason (1994 p 68) and argues that Nietzsche can see nothing of
value in the slave revaluation:
" .. whereas Freud recognizes that when accompanied
by Eros repression brings with it certain redeeming
social qualities, Nietzsche appears to have nothing
but contempt for what he calls the \ herd-values , of
co-operation and altruism." (1994 p 92)
zeitlin implies that Nietzsche's aim is
" . restoring the noble, masterful type of man in
whom the natural impulses are free" (1994 p 93).
This seems to me to be a straight-forward misreading of the
essay. Nietzsche is careful to show both the strengths and
weakness of both modes of valuation and to show what each has
added to the development of Western man. What he argues for in
the end is not an outright rejection of slave morality and a
return to the past but for a new type of man - the Superman, the
sovereign individual.
This is not to deny that Nietzsche regards the noble or master
(and his way of valuing) more highly than the slave. Nehamas is
surely nearer the mark when he says:
"[T]hough Nietzsche accepts the mode of valuation that
characterizes the nobles of On the Genealogy of
Morals, these nobles still do not constitute a
particular type of person he wants directly to praise.
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.Ra t he r , we can take them as one manifestation, under
specific historical circumstances, of a general
personality type which Nietzsche outlines and of which
they are .an example." (Nehamas, 1985 p 206)
~
But I think that even this oversimplifies and I would be more
inclined to agree with Ansell-Pearson that Nietzsche is not
simply for master morality and against slave morality but is
rather looking towards the creation of something new and better
out of a synthesis of the two, a way of valuing and acting which
will incorporate both the depth of the slave and the
instinctuality of the master (1991a pp 132-3).
A number of different critics have argued that we should not read
the master and slave literally as historical depictions but
rather more figuratively. strong, for instance, argues that
slave and master are to be understood as ideal types rather than
descriptions of reality and that they define character types
rather than behaviours (1975 pp 238-9). What is essential in
distinguishing the two, according to strong, is the direction of
their willing - the master expresses his will outwardly, the
slave directs it inward (1975 p 240).
Connolly, on the other hand, argues that what Nietzsche depicts
is a dramatization of a struggle internal to each of us:
"The presentation of the slave morality allows
Nietzsche to dramatize a struggle going on in
everyone. Humans are incomplete outside of social
form, yet any social form requires a measure of
cruelty to complete humans according to its
specifications. Moreover, to live we must suffer
pain, injury, insults, losses, sickness and death, so
we yearn to identify some higher purpose or goal to
which our SUffering contributes. Human beings resent
the transiency and SUffering which define the human
condition. This condition can be tolerated best if
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humans can find some agent who is responsible for
sUffering, an agent who can become the repository of
resentment." (1988 P 153)
I
And White takes a similar view with his psychological reading:
" [ I ] f we read the story of
this psychohistorical level
comprehend them as the
identity." (1988 p 688)
the Master and Slave on
it is relatively easy to
fragments of a single
The master, White suggests, is pure activity, unmediated
autonomy; the slave pure passivity and sUffering, ruled by
ressentiment (1988 pp 688-9). For White the question the
genealogy raises is:
"'How can the individual affirm himself as an
autonomous individual, given a society that has
steadily suppressed all active forces, and thus
established willessness, or self-denial, as the
dominant moment of contemporary life?'" (1988 p 689)
Such readings seem to me to be incorrect, though not wholly so.
Throughout both the first and second essays of the genealogy
Nietzsche attempts to show that spiritual/moral concepts have
their origins in material and physical circumstances. Likewise,
in this first essay he argues that what was once a real struggle
between two types of people has become internalized and thereby
spiritualized. At the end of The Genealogy, that is in modern
people, we find that the struggle between master and slave is
indeed, as Connolly and White suppose, a psychological battle
within individuals; but we should not read this all the way
back. Indeed if Nietzsche did intend the work to be a
"psychohistory" there would be little point in his suggesting
that the battle between the two modes of valuat~on has now and
gradually over the last two millennia become internalized (GM
1.16) .
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This would suggest that Nietzsche intends with his genealogy to
portray actual occurrences. Whether he is successful or not is
another matter. Maclntyre accuses Nietzsche of misrepresenting
noble (heroic) societies:
"Nietzsche had to mythologize the distant past in
order to sustain his vision. What Nietzsche portrays
is aristocratic self-assertion; what Homer and the
sagas show are forms of assertion proper to and
required by a certain role. The self becomes what it
is in heroic societies only through its role; it is
a social creation, not an individual one." (1985 p
129)
This is not altogether justified for in both Thus Spoke
Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche acknowledges that
society was originally the basis of valuation but argues that the
final result of western history is the individual who can create
his own values.
Another accusation of misrepresentation comes from Gaita:
11[H] is brilliant descriptions of the pathology of what
he called a 'slave morality' can only be appreciated
for what it is, namely a description of the pathology
of certain Christian virtues, if we recognize what he
did not, namely, that corruptions of, for example,
remorse, are indeed corruptions of it. 1I (1991 P 92)
Whatever the weaknesses of the story Nietzsche offers in this
first essay, in it he offers us a powerful analysis of a useful
concept - "ressentiment". Ressentiment is a matter of allocating
blame for one's sUffering and is occasioned when an affect does
not lead to action. The active person does not suffer
-
ressentiment, does not carry the past with him as a problem
(strong, 1975 p 246). The man of ressentiment, not at peace with
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the past cannot make peace with the present either and can only
assimilate the new in terms of the old (strong, 1975 pp 246-7).
It leads to a moralising interpretation which wants to hold
something responsible for the sUffering. And it is, Nietzsche
would argue, the basis of the Platonic-Christian world-view:
"Religion abolishes all possibility of
resentment, but it scarcely abolishes all possibility
of ressentiment, since in fact it depends upon it for
its existence: for what does religion do except to
teach us that the sUffering we endure we also deserve:
religion redirects ressentiment, as Nietzsche puts it,
by making the patient the very agent he seeks,
informing us that we have brought it on ourselves."
(Danto, 1988 p 23)
Overcoming slave morality then is a matter of overcoming the
ressentiment from which it springs. The implication of this is
that in dealing with the past successfully through the
experience of the eternal recurrence or through genealogy - we
will overcome the moral interpretation of the world by overcoming
ressentiment and the need to allocate blame.
4.2 BAD CONSCIENCE
If the most important concept of the first essay is ressentiment
that of the second essay is bad conscience and the primary
relationship in this essay is not between master and slave but
between creditor and debtor.
One of the difficulties we face in understanding this second
essay is that Nietzsche offers no chronological link between this
essay and the first. strong and Ansell-Pearson who have both
tried to situate it chronologically have given diametrically
opposed interpretations.
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strong reads the second essay as talking of a later period than
the first. He reads ressentiment as the first stage of the bad
conscience, it is the stag~ in which the oppressed class blame
l
the world for their suffering, seeking to overcome their enemies,
which they do because of their numbers (1975 p 248). After this
victory, the old instincts are turned inwards and there is a
shift from ressentiment to bad conscience, in which man blames
himself for his suffering (1975 p 249).
But according to Ansell-Pearson bad conscience precedes
ressentiment and is a sort of "pre-moral guilt". It is man's
first repression of his instinct and aggression which ultimately
makes the slave revolt in morality possible (1994 p 137).
If forced to choose I would tend to agree with Ansell-Pearson
wi th regard to chronology here: Nietzsche does talk of the
creditor-debtor relation as the "oldest" relationship. He also
speaks throughout the essay of the workings of the morality of
mores, which preceded the Platonic-Christian moral view. But I
would rather argue that both Ansell-Pearson and strong are wrong
in their assumption that the two crucial concepts of ressentiment
and bad conscience are related to each other in a linear or other
non-complex way. I would argue that the fact that Nietzsche does
not himself explore the connection between the two indicates that
he sees a diversity at the origins of our moral concepts and the
experiences which give rise to them.
A second difficulty in understanding the second essay is that it
lacks the clear narrative that shapes the first. It is a wide-
ranging essay in which many issues are discussed - justice, the
origins of state and society, the origins of religion, besides
the concepts of bad conscience and guilt mentioned in its title.
The second essay, unlike the first and third leaves the reader
with a sense of being unsure of what it is real~y about. And as
with so many of Nietzsche's "difficult" texts this second essay
suffers relative critical neglect.
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According to Ansell-Pearson the essay outlines the development
of man as a political and moral being, underlying which is a
conception of culture a~ discipline (1991a pp 133-4). And he
l
argues that it j
"[O]ffers two accounts of the formation of man as a
moral and political animal, one in terms of what he
calls the 'morality of custom' . . . and the other in
terms of the bad conscience" (1991a p 134) . .
It is through the morality of custom that man is turned into a
political animal, a creature with a memory, who can make
promises, take on and meet obligations etc. (1991a p 137). The
means employed to perform this task are often cruel, but:
"It is on account of the cUltivation of his memory by
the use of such methods that the human being learns
the significance of its obligations to society. These
obligations to perform social duties are made in the
form of the individual making promises in return for
which society offers it protection and security. It
is in the context of this exchange between the
individual and society that Nietzsche locates man's
power of reasoning and capacity for rational thought."
(Ansell-Pearson, 1991a pp 137-8)
In this way Nietzsche turns modern political thought on its head
"For what that tradition, including Rousseau, takes
for granted - free will, conscience, and other so-
called innate 'moral' capacities - are shown to be the
product of a historical process of socialization."
(Ansell-Pearson, 1991a p 138)
This second essay begins with the notion of promising and memory.
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"To breed an animal with the right to make promises -
is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set
itself in the case of man~ is it not the real problem
l·
regarding man?" (GM 2. 1) ~
This task entails the overcoming of forgetfulness which, for
Nietzsche, is not a passive thing:
"[I]t is rather an active and in the strictest sense
positive faculty of repression" (GM 2.1).
In :fact it is the basis of psychological health and well-being.
Once again we encounter the theme of successfully dealing with
the past; forgetting is one way of accomplishing this. But the
case of promises requires memory which is not only active, like
forgetfulness, but an act of will. So much is presupposed by
promising, Nietzsche says.
"This precisely is the long story of how
responsibility originated. The task of breeding an
animal with the right to make promises evidently
embraces and presupposes as a preparatory task that
one first makes men to a certain degree necessary,
uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently
calculable. The tremendous labor of that which I have
called "morality of mores" ... - the labor performed
by man upon himself during the greater part of the
existence of the human race, his entire prehistoric
labor, finds in this its meaning, its great
justification, notwithstanding the severity, tyranny,
stupidity, and idiocy involved in it: with the aid of
morality of mores and the social straitjacket, man was
actually made calculable.
"If we place ourselves at the end of this tremendous
process, where the tree at last brings forth fruit,
where society and the morality of custom at last
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reveal what they have simply been the means to: then
we discover that the ripest fruit is the sovereign
individual, like only to himself, liberated again from
morality bf custom, autonomous and supramoral, in
short, the man who has his own independent, protracted
will and the right to make promises . . . The 'free'
man, the possessor of a protracted and unbreakable
will, also possesses his measure of value: looking
out upon others from himself he is bound to honor his
peers, the strong and reliable (those with the right
to make promises) . The proud awareness of the
extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the
consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over
oneself and over fate, has in this case penetrated to
the profoundest depths and become instinct, the
dominating instinct, supposing he feels the need to
give it a name? The answer is beyond doubt: this
sovereign man calls it his conscience." (GM 2.2)
The first stage in this whole process is, of course, memory. How
did memory come about? Through cruelty and sUffering, is
Nietzsche's reply.
"Man could never do without blood, torture, and
sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory
for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges
(sacrifices of the first-born among them), the most
repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the
cruellest rites of all religious cults (and all
religions are at the deepest level systems of
cruelties) - all this has its origin in the instinct
that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to
mnemonics." (GM 2.3)
This is the history of conscience; but what of bad conscience?
Nietzsche suggests that etymology may again hold the clue .
pointing to the link (in German, at least) between the word for
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guilt and that for debts. Punishment, Nietzsche argues, arises
out of the debtor-creditor relationship. Punishment originally
functioned not out of notiqns of accountability, but as a way of
~
repaying debts. Again, we~can note that Nietzsche locates the
genesis of a moral notion in more basic material conditions and
relations.
The creditor-debtor relation crucially involves a promise and
therefore memory. Where the debtor failed to repay his creditor
he offered in substitution:
" .. something else that he 'possessed,' something
he had control over; for example, his body, his wife,
his freedom, or even his life. Above all,
however, the creditor could infI ict every kind of
indignity and torture upon the body of the debtor" (GM
2.5)
he could extract quite literally "his pound of flesh". What this
amounts to is that the creditor takes his repayment in the form
of pleasure:
"[T]he pleasure of being allowed to vent his power
freely upon one who is powerless, the voluptuous
pleasure 'de faire le mal pour le plaisir de le
faire,' the enjoyment of violation." (GM 2.5)
Nietzsche's argument is that the cruelty suffered by the debtor
must be enjoyed by the creditor or repayment is not affected.
Right from the start the notion of guilt is associated with
sUffering:
"To see others suffer does one good, to make others
suffer even more. . . . without cruelty ~here is no
festival ... and in punishment there is so much that
is festive!-" (GM 2.6)
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It is, Nietzsche argues, the relation of debtor and creditor,
"the oldest and most primitive personal relationship" (GM 2.8),
which gives rise to the, ideas of guilt and responsibility and
I
also Nietzsche claims t~ justice (which he portrays as a noble
virtue having nothing to do with later Christian conceptions of
justice as revenge):
"'everything has its price; all things can be paid
for' - the oldest and naivest moral canon of justice,
the beginning of all 'good naturedness, r all
'fairness,' all 'good will,' all 'objectivity' on
earth. Justice on this elementary level · is the good
will among parties of approximately equal power to
come to terms with one another, to reach an
'understanding' by means of a settlement - and to
compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement
among themselves.-" (GM 2.8)
Nietzsche argues that the community stands in relation to its
members as creditor to debtor, membership of a community offers
benefits and the breaking of this pledge is an act of aggression
(GM 2.9).
The more powerful the community, the less dangerous the threat
posed by any individual, the less harm anyone person can wreak
on the whole; and the more merciful, therefore, the community
can be towards the lawbreaker - even protecting him against the
wrath of those he has injured. The power of a community can be
measured, Nietzsche continues, by its attitude towards its
lawbreakers, the amount of mercy in its penal code.
"It is not unthinkable that a society might attain
such a consciousness of power that it could allow
itself the noblest luxury possible to it - letting
those who harm it go unpunished . . . it ends, as does
every good thing on earth, by overcoming itself. This
self-overcoming of justice: one knows the beautiful
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name it has given itself - mercy; it goes without
saying that mercy remains the privilege of the most
powerful man, or better, Ih i s - beyond the law." (GM
I
2.10) ~
But punishment is not a means of instilling or awakening the
transgressor's guilt or bad conscience. Nietzsche argues, if
anything, punishment hardens people against guilt and so
punishment has served as a means of preventing guilt rather than
awakening it. Indeed, Nietzsche says, the criminal cannot but
be .aware that it is not his acts as such which the judi.c i e I
system repudiates but his ends, and those who put the same
actions to the service of acceptable ends go unpunished. We must
seek the source of bad conscience elsewhere, then.
In section 16, Nietzsche offers his own hypothesis:
"I regard the bad conscience as the serious illness
that man was bound to contract under the stress of the
most fundamental change he ever experienced - that
change which occurred when he found himself finally
enclosed within the walls of society and of peace."
(GM 2.16)
Nietzsche likens the stress of this change to that of the first
animals to leave the sea for land. In both situations old
instincts no longer apply and these are turned inwards.
"All instincts that do not discharge themselves
outwardly turn inward - this is what I call the
internalization of man: thus it was that man first
developed what was later called his 'soul.'" (GM 2.16)
In particular, man's wildness had to be tamed, his freedom
curtailed and this turned inwards on him:
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"Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking,
in change, in destruction - all this turned against
the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin
I
of the 'bad conscience.' ~
"The man who, from lack of external enemies and
rekistances and forcibly confined to the oppressive
narrowness and punctiliousness of custom, impatiently
lacerated, persecuted, gnawed at, assaulted, and
maltreated himself; this animal that rubbed itself
raw against the bars of its cage as one tried to
'tame' it; this deprived creature, racked with
homesickness for the wild, who had to turn himself
into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and
dangerous wilderness - this fool, this yearning and
desperate prisoner became the inventor of the 'bad
conscience.' But thus began the gravest and
uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet
recovered, man's sUffering of man, of himself - the
result of a forcible sundering from his animal past,
as it were a leap and plunge into new surroundings and
conditions of existence, a declaration of war against
the old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and
terribleness had rested hitherto." (GM 2.16)
This also however constitutes the heart of man's potential:
" [T] he existence on earth of an animal soul turned
against itself, taking sides against itself, was
something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic,
contradictory, and pregnant wi th a future that the
aspect of the earth was essentially altered. . . . he
gives rise to an interest, a tension, a hope, almost
a certainty, as if with him something were. . announcing
and preparing itself, as if man were not a goal but
only a way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise.-"
(GM 2.16)
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Nie~zschegoes on to outline the two assumptions which underlie
this reading: firstly, that society marked not a gradual
evolution but a complete break, a leap; ~econdly, that society,.
is from the start, but also throughout, an ract of violence. The
state Nietzsche claims arises not out of a contract but by the
conquering of one group by another, stronger group. And these
masters, unharmed by society, their wildness and freedom
unchecked do not experience the bad conscience though they are
its source (GM 2.17).
In section 18, Nietzsche tells us that this instinct for freedom
is nothing other than the will to power. The bad conscience is
thus the will to power denied outward expression and turned
inwards.
The bad conscience, the will to power turned against itself, is,
Nietzsche would have it, the real basis of all selflessness and
explains the joy of selflessness, self-denial - it is the joy of
cruelty turned on oneself (.GM 2.18).
Religion, too, Nietzsche claims, can be traced back to the
debtor-creditor relation. The present generation is indebted to
its ancestors for the formation of the tribe and the sacrifices
they made in order for this to happen. The ancestors must be
repaid with sacrifice, obedience, festivities. As the tribe
increases in power the debt to the ancestors becomes greater, the
ancestors themselves seem ever larger and more fearful until they
turn into gods. This movement reaches its apex in the Christian
God - the God who cannot be repaid because he sacrificed himself.
It is no coincidence, then, that as Christianity declines so too
does the feeling of guilt, the sense of the unpaid debt.
Ultimately Nietzsche sees in atheism "a kind of second innocence"
(GM 2.20).
What has happened, Nietzsche tells us, is that man - driven by
his bad conscience - has seized upon the religious explanation
to make his sUffering worse to drive his torment to new heights,
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to reject himself still further - all his nature, all his
naturalness. The will to power denied its true expression
becomes a will to be found unworthy, a will to failure, a will
i
to poison itself and all it is denied. ;.
"Oh this insane, pathetic beast - man! What ideas he
has, what unnaturalness, what paroxysms of nonsense,
what bestiality of thought erupts as soon as he is
prevented just a little from being a beast in deed!"
(GM 2.22)
The bad conscience, then, is a second source of nihilism. By
repressing the will to power man cripples his own creative
capacity. But at the same time, bad conscience brings with it
new possibilities.
Danto, who despite criticisms levelled at him persists in
translating the German as "bad consciousness", argues that bad
conscience develops out of a situation in which man has to
repress and contain his instincts and does so through finding
mental ways of releasing his instincts. Newman takes a similar
view:
"It is thus that, for Nietzsche, the inner life of
consciousness, originally weak and insignificant,
first became important for him." (1982 p 211)
And not just sUbjectively important but instrumentally so for
man's new inner life ultimately endows him with new powers:
"Through releasing his assertive drives in a
controlled and systematic, instead of in a random and
haphazard, fashion, he began to transform his will to
conquer the world outside of him into a will to
i ·" .
describe and to understand it, and to control his own
life within it by making rational, scientific
predictions concerning it." (Newman, 1982 pp 211-2)
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"Christian morality and its metaphysics of tae soul
are now affirmed as the sole representatives of truth,
order, preservation, and survival; while the will to
power is denied, as representing only untruth, chaos,
death, and destruction. The revaluation of the
natural order is complete." (Newman, 1982 p 214)
with the result, Newman argues, that modern man is caught in a
tension between consciousness and his drives which cannot be
fully expressed or sublimated by it. Nietzsche views these
interpretations developed by the bad conscience as being at the
core of modern nihilism. So it might be argued that overcoming
ressentiment leaves open the way for new values, overcoming bad
conscience leaves open the way for new interpretations.
Nietzsche believes that these new values and interpretations must
be shaped by a new ideal and so in the final essay he sets about
analysing the dominant ideal of Western history.
4.3 THE ASCETIC IDEAL
As stated in the previous chapter, in On the Genealogy of Morals
Nietzsche brings together religion and philosophy into a unity
which he calls the Ascetic Ideal. In the third and final essay,
"What is the Meaning of Ascetic Ideals?" Nietzsche analyses this
Ideal at work and links it to the genesis of nihilism.
As Magnus points out the story Nietzsche tells not only in On the
Genealogy of Morals but throughout his work depends on our
accepting Nietzsche's two crucial assumptions: first, that
morality, religion and philosophy intersect in a way that enables
us to see them as some sort of unity,
"as expressing a single ascetic ideal motivated by the
will to power" (1983 p 305)
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and second,
"that of all the complex historical factorr .. that
have shaped western civilization and charhcter, none
are as important in telling us how we became who
we are." (1983 p 305)
Nietzsche begins by showing that ascetic ideals (poverty,
chastity and humility) have many different meanings and argues
that this variety of significances must have its own
significance:
"That the ascetic ideal has meant so many things to
man, however, is an expression of the basic fact of
the human will, its horror vacui: it needs a goal -
and it will rather will nothingness than not will."
(GM 3.1)
The first sections of the essay are given to analyses of the
phenomenon of asceticism in two of Nietzsche's greatest
influences: Wagner (GM 3.2-4) and Schopenhauer (GM 3.6-7). And
from these Nietzsche draws general conclusions about the nature
of asceticism in the artist and the philosopher.
The artist's embodiment of asceticism Nietzsche thinks is
ultimately unimportant, the artist is too distanced from reality
for his values to be of interest. Moreover, artists' values are
never their own:
"They have at all times been valets of some morality,
philosophy, or religion ... They always need at the
very least protection, a prop, an established
authority: artists never stand apart; standing alone
is contrary to their deepest instincts." (GM 3.5)
The philosopher, on the other hand, does (even needs to) stand
alone and his independence depends on asceticism. With this in
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mind Nietzsche offers his answer to the question of what
asceticism means to the philosopher:
I
"[T]he philosopher sees in it an optimum condit~on for
the highest and boldest spirituality and smiles - he
does not deny 'existence,' he rather affirms his
existence and only his existence" (GM 3.7).
Asceticism is thus, for the philosopher, essentially interested
and selfish; a release from all that binds him to the animal
world, freeing him, his time and energy, for his all-consuming
task. For the philosopher the ideals of poverty, chastity and
humility are not virtues but conditions of existence (GM 3.8).
Nietzsche then looks back to the genealogical links between
philosophy and asceticism, finding a strong bond. In particular
Nietzsche argues that philosophy originally needed asceticism in
order to gain strength. In the first instance philosophy (in the
person surely of Socrates) stood against morality and society:
"Draw up a list of the various propensities and
virtues of the philosopher - his bent to doubt, his
bent to deny, his bent to suspend jUdgment ... , his
bent to analyze, his bent to investigate, seek, dare,
his bent to compare and balance, his will to
neutrality and objectivity, ... is it not clear that
for the longest time all of them contravened the basic
demands of morality and conscience" (GM 3.9).
And standing against society and its values in this way, the
earliest philosophers were either feared or despised (GM 3.10).
Only by invoking fear in others could philosophers ensure for
themselves the space they needed, all the more so since they must
have feared and resisted "the philosopher in them" (GM 3.10):
"[T]o begin with, the philosophic spirit always had to
use as a mask and cocoon the previously established
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types of the contemplative man - priest, sorcerer,
soothsayer, and in any case a religious type - in
order to be able to exist at all: the ascetic ideal
i •
for a long time served the philosppher as a form ln
which to appear, as a precondition of existence - he
had to represent it so as to be able to be a
philosopher; he had to believe in it in order to be
able to represent it." (GM 3.10)
So for the philosopher, asceticism is a mask necessary to invoke
fear in others and thereby to make possible his life.
For the religious type, the priest, on the other hand asceticism
is no mask but a real end:
"The ascetic priest possessed in this ideal not only
his faith but also his will, his power, his interest.
His right to exist stands or falls with that ideal"
(GM 3.11).
It is with the priest that we really get to grips with the
meaning of asceticism. Asceticism for the priest works in terms
of a value system which places value in a different world, a
different life from this one; asceticism, as a denial of this
world, offers a bridge to the other. This form of valuation has
been the most prevalent throughout human existence:
"So monstrous a mode of valuation stands inscribed in
the history of mankind not as an exception and
curiosity, but as one of the most widespread and
enduring of all phenomena. Read from a distant star,
the majuscule script of our earthly existence would
perhaps lead to the conclusion that the earth was the
distinctively ascetic planet, a nook of disgruntled,
arrogant, and offensive creatures filled with a
profound disgust at themselves, at the earth, at all
life, who inflict as much pain on themselves as they
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possibly can out of pleasure in inflicting pain -
which is probably their only pleasure." (GM 3.11)
I
Why is it so universal a phenomenon? ~
"It must be a necessity of the first order that again
and again promotes the growth and prosperity of this
life-inimical species - it must indeed be in the
interest of life itself that such a self-contradictory
type does not die out." (GM 3.11)
From a physiological perspective Nietzsche argues it is not
possible for life to turn against life, and so he concludes there
must be another explanation for asceticism - the contradiction
can only be apparent. According to his reading asceticism
actually works to preserve life, it is a struggle not against
life but against this life, with its sickness and degeneracy, and
hence against death (GM 3.13).
The nihilism at the heart of asceticism is powered by nausea and
pity at man and his sickness, and such pity serves to protect the
weak and sick while attempting to convince the strong that their
strength is itself unhealthy (GM 3.14).
The priest protects the sick herd not only against the masters
but also against itself. He "alters the direction of
ressentiment" (GM 3 .15), the need to allocate blame for sUffering
by convincing them that they themselves are to blame (GM 3.15).
By giving meaning to sUffering the priest relieves the suffering




its basis in physiological weakness and
seeks to overcome by first of all
~, ',
"If possible, will and desire are abolished
altogether; all that produces affects and 'blood' is
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avoided . . . , no love; no hate; indifference; no
revenge; no wealth; no work; one begs; if
possible, no women, or as little as possible" (GM
l
3.17). ~
That this has the affect of bringing renewed joy for life is
attested to by holy men and saints of all religions. They
experience it as access to the truth and goodness as such;
Nietzsche, though, offers a different interpretation:
"[T]he hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of
deepest sleep, in short absence of sUffering
sufferers and those profoundly depressed will count
this as the supreme good, as the value of values;
they are bound to accord it a positive value, to
experience it as the positive as such. (According to
the same logic of feeling, all pessimistic religions
call nothingness God.)" (GM 3.17)
The second method of treatment employed by the priest is
mechanical activity, which seeks to keep the sick so busy, their
minds so focused, that they do not have the time and energy to
dwell on their suffering. A third is the use of petty pleasure,
most often the pleasure of giving pleasure to others, which gives
release to the will to power in carefully managed and modified
doses, so that it does not find more painful and dangerous
outlets. This third treatment leads to the formation of the sick
into a herd, a community of sUfferers, which relieves the
sUffering of the individual by focusing his attention on another
(GM 3.18).
Besides these means, which Nietzsche labels his" innocent" means,
the priest also employs "guilty" means, through which he attempts




"To wrench the human soul from its moorings, to
immerse it in terrors, ice, flames, displeasure,




Although such a course is prescribed in good faith by the priest
it serves in the end only to ma~e the sick sicker for they must
pay for what they have done. Examples of this type of means
include exploiting the sense of guilt - turning man's sUffering
back against himself, so that he sees himself and not society as
the cause, turning the sufferer into the "sinner" who must then
be punished through the inflicting of pain (on the self); such
pain works to make life interesting and therefore once again
livable (GM 3.20).
Given that its effects are deleterious, why has it thrived, and
how?
"What is the meaning of the power
monstrous nature of its power? •
other 'one goal'?" (GM 3.23)
of this ideal, the
. Where is the
Nietzsche answers the second question first. He looks then at
the possible contenders for this role, principally science.
Science appears to be opposed to religion but Nietzsche rejects
it as an alternative:
"Science today has absolutely no belief in itself, let
alone an ideal above it - and where it still inspires
passion, love, ardor, and sUffering at all, it is not
the opposite of the ascetic ideal but rather the
latest and noblest form of it." (GM 3.23)
In this critique of science Nietzsche includes "the last idealist
left among philosophers and scholars" (GM 3~ 24), the free
spirits; these, too, he disqualifies since they still believe
(have faith) in truth (GM 3.24). He compares this with the
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Assassins' motto: "Nothing is true, everything is permitted."
(GM 3.24). The belief in truth, Nietzsche says is nothing more
than an incarnation of the ascetic ideal:
i
~r
"[I]t is the faith in
absolute value of truth,
this ideal alone (it
ideal)." (GM 3.24)
a metaphysical value, the
sanctioned and guaranteed by
stands or falls with this
But truth is questionable for Nietzsche:
"From the moment faith in the God of the ascetic ideal
is denied, a new problem arises: that of the value of
truth.
liThe will to truth requires a critique - let us thus
define our own task - the value of truth must for once
be experimentally called into question." (GM 3.24)
Having rejected science and philosophy as creators of liberating
new ideals Nietzsche turns to art. Art was, of course,
Nietzsche's own first solution to the problem of meaning - in The
Birth of Tragedy he wrote "it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon
that existence and the world are eternally justified." (BT 5).
Art does not lay claim to truth in the same way that philosophy
and religion dOi it embraces appearance and lie. It may seem,
therefore, that here we have an opposing ideal. But Nietzsche
no longer holds out such a hope for art, having come to believe
that art is parasitic on values and ideals rather than a creator
of them (GM 5, GM 25).
He concludes that:
"I I] n the most spiritual sphere, too, the ascetic
ideal has at present only one kind of ~rea l enemy
capable of harming it: the comedians of this ideal -
for they arouse mistrust of it." (GM 3.27)
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In the final section (section 28) Nietzsche at last offers his
answer to the question of the meaning of the ascetic ideal. It
has been an attempt to give meaning to life:
IIApart from the ascetic ideal, man, the human animal,
had no meaning so far. His existence on earth
contained no goal; 'why man at all?' - was a question
wi thout an answer; the will for man and earth was
lacking; behind every great human destiny there
sounded as a refrain a yet greater 'in vain!' This is
precisely what the ascetic ideal means: that
something was lacking, that man was surrounded by a
fearful void - he did not know how to justify, to
account for, to affirm himself; he suffered from the
problem of his meaning. He also suffered otherwise,
he was in the main a sickly animal: but his problem
was not sUffering itself, but that there was no answer
to the crying question, 'why do I suffer?'" (GM 3.28)
It is not the sUffering man fears but the meaninglessness of it -
the ascetic ideal gives meaning to man's sUffering and in so
doing helps him to live: lithe will itself was saved. 11 (GM 3.28),
for:
11 . man would rather will nothingness than not
will." (GM 3.28)
It is perhaps surprising that in this text Nietzsche's vision
seems to fail him. strong argues that at the end of the
genealogy Nietzsche leaves a void, he offers no constructive
alternative (1975 p 251).
I do not think this is so. Nietzsche explicitly stated in the
original edition that the book should be read in the light of
Beyond Good and Evil and he also stated that the latter was to
be read in the light of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Thus, we might
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surmise that Nietzsche felt no need to reiterate ideals and ideas
that he had already developed.
,
According to Ansell-Pearson (1991a) Nietzsche finds his answer
in Zarathustra.
"Nietzsche's final message seems to be that there is
no alternative to the ascetic ideal other than a
parodic overcoming of it." (Ansell-Pearson, 1994 p
146)
But this I would argue is only half true. The ideals that
Nietzsche developed in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and in Beyond Good
and Evil were not themselves parodic. And while Nietzsche speaks
of the comedic response to the ascetic ideal he says not that it
is a replacement, nor that it is the only response, only that it
is the only current enemy of the ideal. Nietzsche is never comic
for long, it is always the tragic which attracts him (after all
he calls himself a "tragic philosopher"). Nietzsche does not,
I would argue, abandon his vision of the future in On the
Genealogy of Morals but rather takes it as read.
That said, I would agree with White that Nietzsche, well aware
of the role of chance in history, offers two visions of the
future - one of the continued triumph of the slave, one of the
sovereign individual - and we are thereby forced to choose (1988
pp 694-5).
4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
While On the Genealogy of Morals does not offer a further
elucidation of Nietzsche's proposed solution to nihilism it does
support his vision by offering an aetiology of the problem.
Although On the Genealogy of Morals is about the past, it is a
history offered with an eye to the future. In the course of the
three essays Nietzsche locates three sources of nihilism, three
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factors which the Superman, now conceived as the sovereign
individual must overcome - ressentiment, bad conscience and the
ascetic ideal. The genealogy itself can be read as an attempt
to Qvercome these factors by showing their natural roots and
offering the vision of alternative moral codes, alternative ways
of interpreting the world and (though not, as we have said,
spelled out) alternative ideals based in the repressed, though
not lost, aspects of western culture and history.
Throughout the three essays he presents us with a picture of
ourselves as crippled, in counterpoint to the extreme health
characteristic of Nietzsche's ideal of the future. But perhaps
he sets up too strong a dichotomy, perhaps we are not as
crippled, and perhaps the vision he offers is not as healthy, as
he would have us believe. The next chapter will explore these
possibilities through a critical examination of Nietzsche's
vision.
NOTES
1. Newman (1991) makes the point that in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra Nietzsche repudiates both the market place of
ideas and the essay form, yet in On the Genealogy of Morals
he brings three essays to the market place of ideas.
Newman argues from this that Nietzsche can be seen still to
be seeking the disciples that Zarathustra never found.
2. Interestingly Danto pointed out the role of religion in
this defeat in his Nietzsche as philosopher (1965). But he
too thinks there is an incoherency here:
"[I]t is virtually inconsistent to say of x and y that






·A N D MORALITY
In the preceding chapters it was argued that Nietzsche can be
read as responding to a perceived crisis in modernity - a crisis
of values, truth and agency which he labels nihilism. He offers
a vision of a future beyond the crisis - a vision which rests on
the ideal of healthy and strong individuals who are able to shape
themselves, to act and create both values and interpretations of
the world in the face of the death of God. Far from being the
solipsistic ideal that it appears to be in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, Nietzsche indicates in Beyond Good and Evil that it
might somehow serve to justify and redeem the whole of ·Western
history and culture - if society is, in the first instance,
sacrificed to the development of such individuals, through an era
of great politics in which the demands of social justice are
sUbjugated to the demands of culture.
In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche attempts to convince us
of both the plausibility and possibility of a rejuvenated Western
culture by analysing those factors that he believes to be the
source of the modern malaise - the values of slave morality with
their basis in ressentiment; the interpretative framework of bad
conscience and the ideal of asceticism. In the course of
analysing these he also shows that they are only one way of
experiencing and making sense of the world, that Western culture
contains within itself other possibilities, which have been
repressed, and which can serve as the basis of a future
liberation.
In this chapter I will explore Nietzsche's solution to the
problem of nihilism both in terms of its ideal of the individual
(5.2) and politics (5.3). In both cases it will be argued that
Nietzsche's proposals are ultimately unfeasible and unattractive.
In 5.4 I argue that Nietzsche's solution is matched by his
misconception of the problem - I will suggest that modernity is
not characterized by a crisis of nihilism. Before moving on to
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this discussion I want to clarify Nietzsche's position on
morality (5.1).
5.1 MORALITY
Nietzsche called himself an immoralist and /critics have often
read that to mean that Nietzsche rejects all morality. The most
influential contemporary instance of such an interpretation is
that of MacIntyre. In his book After Virtue he reads Nietzsche's
claim to be that:
"[AJ 11 rational vindications of morality manifestly
fail and that therefore belief in the tenets of
morality needs to be explained in terms of a set of
rationalizations which conceal the fundamentally non-
rational phenomena of the will." (MacIntyre, 1985 p
117)
From the discussion of
Nietzsche does believe
manifestation of will.
Beyond Good and Evil it is evident that
morality to be ultimately irrational, a
But since he takes all values and all
interpretations, including his own, to be at bottom irrational
manifestations of will, the issue of rationality cannot be at the
basis of Nietzsche's critique of morality. Rather, as I have
argued in the previous chapter, he is concerned with the effects
of morality - nihilism and the crippling of creativity.
"Morality as benevolence on demand breeds self-
condemnation for those who fall short and a
depreciation of the impulses to self-fulLilment, seen
as so ma~y obstacles raised lby egoism to our meeting
the standard. Nietzsche has explored this with
sufficient force to make embroidery otiose. And
indeed, Nietzsche's challenge is based on a deep
insight. If morality can only be powered negatively,
where there can be no such thing as beneficence
powered by an affirmation of the recipient as a being
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of value, then pity is destructive to the giver and
degrading . to the receiver , and the ethic of
benevolence may indeed be indefensible. Nietzsche's
challenge is on the deepest level, because he is
looking precisely for what can release such an
affirmation of being. His unsettling conclusion is
that it is the ethic of benevolence which stands in
the way of it." (Taylor, 1992a p 516)
I would agree with Taylor here. Nietzsche does believes that
morality functions only ' negatively; but when he speaks of
morality in these terms he is referring to an ethics of
benevolence or in his own terms "slave morality".
Bergmann explains this using a distinction, which he thinks is
already implicit in Nietzsche' s work, ·between the content and the
modality of a code. He sees Nietzsche's attack being directed
at a certain modality, one which uses
"the apparatus of agency, selfhood, . freedom,
responsibility, blame, and guilt" (1988 p 34).
that we might call any code using this modality a
Bergmann goes on to suggest that looking at





"On one side, it establishes that Nietzsche did not
only attack Christian morality but all morality 'as
such. r But very much more impo:r:tant is the other
side: n~~ely, that other values, or ways of encoding
values, are vigorously split off from the modality
that makes them 'moral.'II (1988 p 36)
In fact, Bergmann argues that Nietzsche shows that morality,
understood in this sense, is inextricably linked to religious
commitment that notions like "guilt", "freedom", "responsibility"
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and "equality" are tied up in "the web of quite particular
stories and ideas" (1998 p 37) in which they originate.
"The claim is that the connection is conceptual, that
the full meaning of any of these terms . . . cannot be
captured or restated if one separates them off the
belief in God. strictly speaking they are part ofa
theological language which cannot be secularized!"
(1988 p 38)
So, on Bergmann's account Nietzsche attempts to rescue values
from nihilism by jettisoning the moral code which is anyway
liable to collapse and which might otherwise drag all values down
with it.
I believe Bergmann's interpretation of Nietzsche's critique of
morality is sUbstantially correct. It was argued in chapter one
that a significant aspect of the crisis of nihilism is, for
Nietzsche, the fact that the dominant Platonic-Christian world
view is collapsing and threatens to leave a valueless void, not
because its values are the only ones, but because its absolutist
claims have been accepted.
Nietzsche is thus concerned to show that the collapse of our
moral code does not necessarily produce such a void, that there
are other ways of valuing that can take its place. And,
furthermore, in On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche is concerned
to show that these other values are present in Western culture
though they are repressed.
One such repressed code is that of virtue and it is to this code
which Nietzsche turns . Though MacIntyre, through his
irrationalist reading of Nietzsche, is led to conclude that we
have a single choice - Aristotle or Nietzsche - other critics
have been more struck by the parallels between these two
thinkers. Solomon (1985), for instance, points to these
parallels arguing that both favour excellence over commonality,
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practice over reason and that in this they stand in sharp
contrast to someone like Kant. 1
Nietzsche's adoption of a virtue code is not without its problems
though. In the first place, human nature is not merely given on
Nietzsche's account. Instead the virtuous individual takes what
is given (his drives) and creates himself through a process of
experimentation:
"Nietzsche, like Aristotle, believes that our tables
of what is good should conform to what we essentially
are ... Where Nietzsche and Aristotle differ is that
Nietzsche believes that we don't yet know what our
nature is." (Kerckhove, 1994 p 157)
Secondly, Nietzsche's individual is decontextualized in that
either he is asocial as is Zarathustraor he finds his place in
a form of society not yet in existence (the pan-European
aristocracy of Beyond Good and Evil).
"There is no . context within which the new
virtues we are to 'create' are to be virtues, for a
virtue without a practice is of no more value than a
word without a language, a gesture without a context."
(Solomon, 1985 p 255)
"without a presupposed
possible. within an





The problem o~ how any code can have a hold without a social
context and within only an experimental individual situation is
put most forcibly by Stern.
"[I]t is obvious that every decision must be preceded
by a moment of indecision: such a moment may OCcur in
the course of all sorts of practical choices and
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scientific experiments, but can it occur in ethics?
No man, other than the lunatic or criminal, is ever in
a moral vacuum~ And if he were, what could possibly
cause him to emerge from it? Not the old values, for
they are to be rejected (this is to be a radical 're-
valuation'), nor yet the new ones, for on these he has
not yet decided" (1979 p 137).
There is a gap in Nietzsche' s thought, it seems between the
crisis-ridden present and the redeemed future. There is a void
which leaves the question of how we get from here to there
unexplained and perhaps inexplicable. The Genealogy is the first
step towards this, explaining how the resources we draw up on in
the transition are latently present, but an explanation of the
mechanics of the process is lacking. We will encounter this gap
again in · our discussion of Nietzsche's political vision, but
first I will turn to a discussion of Nietzsche's individual.
5.2 THE INDIVIDUAL
In this section I want to investigate the ideal of the individual
which Nietz5che offers. He characterises this type variously as
the Superman (Thus SpokeZarathustra), the attempter (Beyond Good
and Evil) · and the sovereign individual (On the Genealogy of
Morals) but in each case he attributes to this type a range of
features which he takes to be expressions of psychological health
- creativity, laughter, playfulness, responsibility. To these
he adds another - solitude. The Nietzschean individual both
creates and justifies himself.
Given that Nietzsche's model individual is solitary commentators
have been prone to interpret Nietzsche as neglecting, even
ignoring, the socia1 2 • This sort of reading can be traced in
Anglo-Saxon philosophy to Kaufmann's rehabilitative work but it
finds particularly strong expression in Stern:
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"[A] pervasive limitation of Nietzsche's thinking ..
. is his consistent neglect of, and his indiscriminate
bias against, what I shall call the sphere of
association." (1978 p 116)
"Between the two poles of individual psychology and
cosmic or millennial speculation . . . there seems to
be a void; or rather, not a void but the curiously
unreal picture of a society which is both rigid and
provisional, and which (he avers) must be totally
transcended." (1978 p 120)
It should be unnecessary, at this stage, to refute the idea that
there is a social vacuum in Nietzsche's thought. The social
sphere is present in all three of the works we have discussed.
Moreover, it is not just the past and present that have a social
content, but Nietzsche's vision of the future too. Nietzsche is
not concerned merely with the individual but with the type of
society that would best enhance the possibilities of the
individual.
But readings such as stern's are not, I believe, altogether
wrong. Nietzsche does tend to pit the individual against society
and social morality:
"Authenticity involves originality, it demands a
revolt against convention.... Morality as normally
understood obviously involves crushing much that is
elemental and instinctive in us, many of our deepest
and most powerful desires. So there develops a branch
of the s~arch for authenticity that pits it against
the moral. Nietzsche, who seeks a kind of self-making
in the register of the aesthetic, sees this as quite
incompatible with the traditional Christian-inspired
ethic of benevolence." (1992b pp 65-6)
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Nietzsche does seem to suppose that the authentic self, the fully
individuated individual can only attain this state through
opposition to society and its mores. And by opposing the
individual and society in this way he comes to view society in
negative terms. Society, like morality, is seen as that which
would shape man into its own image, crush his deepest drives and
most individual aspects, mould him into conformity.
" [T] he tendency to equate 'social man' with
'unauthentic man' is highly misleading. . Any
society will put pressure on the individuals who are
born into it to think and behave in certain ways, but
this need not be only the conversion of individuals to
social purposes; it is also, in very many cases, an
expression of the society's desire to see those
individuals survive and grow, according to the best
experience the society has." (Williams, 1965 pp 103-4)
The picture of a society which does not merely cripple but also
nurtures and in which the individual may be integrated and yet
authentically himself is, I believe, one Nietzsche both rejects
and yearns for. This yearning is evident in Nietzsche' s
aristocratic vision, for this is a society which is intended to
meet the (strong, creative) individual's needs. But at the same
time Nietzsche cannot quite believe in the possibility of
peaceful coexistence between society and individual and so this
society has to be made sub jeot; to the individual will, shaped and
moulded to fit him. The Nietzschean individual is wholly self-
sUfficient, he stands alone and has need of society only in so
far as it makes this possible.
"The idea that there might be a form of ethical
creativity that is in some sense collective and social
and not just the fiat of an individual will is not one
that Nietzsche can be said to have entertained in any
meaningful way. As a result, by overtaxing the
individual will and by construing the social side in
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terms of a contrast between the passive compliance of
the herd and the arbitrary commands of an aristocratic
elite, he disjoins the individual and social
components within morality in a way that can only be
detrimental to both. 1I (Olafson, 1991 p 572)
What is missing from Nietzsche's understanding is the way in
which the self is not an individual creation, but a dialogical
construction. This absence is most evident if we look at his
conception not of society but of interpersonal relationships.
Here, T believe, we find the real lacuna in Nietzsche's work, one
which has been neglected both by those who see Nietzsche's vision
as lacking any social understanding and by those who have argued
that Nietzsche's thought is importantly social - there is in
Nietzsche's work little engagement with, and almost no positive
conception of, interpersonal relationships.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra for instance, the title character is
alone not just at the end of the tale but is isolated throughout.
His most serious and sustained human relationships are with his
disciples and the higher men but we do not encounter the
disciples as individuals and the higher men remain at the level
of caricature. In both cases Zarathustra is the imparter of
wisdom gained on an individual quest rather than an equal engaged
in a shared adventure. The hero seems unable to find anyone he
might consider an equal and any encounter that might hold such
potential (such as that with the hermit at the beginning of the
book) is abruptly cut short. His most meaningful relationships
are with his snake and eagle! Is Zarathustra really a model of
psychological health, someone so spiritually _advanced that his
equal genuine~y does not exist? Or is he rather a case study of
alienation, unwilling and perhaps incapable of genuinely sharing
his life and participating in the lives of others?
In Beyond Good and Evil the overcoming of all bonds to other
people is advocated as necessary to the development of the self
(BGE 26, 27, 29). Where Nietzsche allows some positive element
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to friendship (BGE 27) it is in disturbingly instrumental terms -
the friendship is justified if it spurs one on to greater heights
otherwise it must be left behind for it stands in the way of
one's own development.
On the Genealogy of Morals explores two possible self-other
relationships - the master-slave relation of the first essay and
the debtor-creditor relation of the second. Neither of these
involves equality and the first involves only enmity and contest.
The second, which does hold possibilities of equality (debts
after all can be repaid), is barely explored as a relationship
at all. Where the relationship among the masters, another
potentially equal relationship, is discussed it is characterized
in terms of respect and gratitude but also of suspicion and
jealousy and again the possibilities are left unexplored.
Nietzsche's supposedly supremely healthy individual begins to
look on closer examination psychologically disturbed. Nietzsche
seems unable to conceive of equal and positive relationship s 3 .
All relationships it seems are antagonistic; and anything that
is not wholly centred on the self, he implies, diminishes the
self. As Houlgate puts it:
"I am not convinced
spiri t ever lets go
transforms himself
that Nietzsche thinks the free
of his own will completely or
into a genuinely open and
responsive self." (1991 p 133)
Diverse critics have picked up on the idea that Nietzsche
ultimately fails to affirm the less than p~rfect members of
society. The acceptance of their eternal recurrence was
Zarathustra's final test and he passed that test. Nietzsche
seems unable to do so.
"Nietzsche's own 'metaphysic' is a kind of heroic
historicism, envisaging a development of the race
toward a higher general fo~m of human being, and so of
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human society, since this change of being can clearly
be the property only of a few. This evolution is to
be a 'transvaluation of all values', involving a
destruction of 'herding-animal morality', democracy
('the autonomous herd'), the religion of 'mutual
sympathy' with its 'compassion for all that feels and
suffers', and of soft effeminate sentiments 'under the
spell of which Europe seems threatened by a new
Buddhism'. . Man must learn to see the future of
humanity as 'his will'. (Beyond Good and Evil 202-3.)
The hubris and sheer hatred expressed in these pages
· i s remarkable." (Murdoch, 1993 p 182)
Schutte argues that Nietzsche fails in this affirmation because
he cannot escape from the dualism of good and evil and merely
replaces it with a new dualism of strength and weakness.
"There is an irresistible tendency on Nietzsche' s part
to deny the value of human life as such and to accept
it as valuable only if it is perfect, noble, or
strong. The dualism between good and evil is
maintained as a measure of human worth. The fact that
the dualism remains, however, means that the broader
project of the affirmation of life in its totality is
blocked." (Schutte, 1984 p 189)
However I would argue that it is not just the weak that Nietzsche
fails to affirm but any other human being. By neglecting and
even rejecting any positive conception of the Other and the
self's relation to it, Nietzsche relegates his individual to a
sphere of sel~-obsessed alienation rather than, as he supposes,
of self-sufficiency.
Moreover, it is this distorted picture of the self which shapes
Nietzsche's politics. His aristocratism, Schutte suggests
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"represents an attempt to generate in society at large
an ethical and political structure which would simply
duplicate the distorted experiences of a highly
isci lated and socially alienated individual." (1983 p
152)
5.3 NIETZSCHE'S POLITICS
If Nietzsche' s vision of the individual is ultimately
unattractive, his politics is obviously so. In this section I
will look at two strategies for dealing with Nietzsche's politics
- a line of argument that attacks its assumptions and another
that shows it to be unfeasible.
Most of us would want to reject the politics of Nietzsche's
vision, not because it is illiberal or inegalitarian but because
of the sUffering it potentially involves for the weaker members
of society. But on what grounds might we do so? A purely moral
argument is not appropriate because Nietzsche recognizes that his
vision is incompatible with the demands of social morality. We
could certainly argue that social justice, equality, benevolence
are important values to us and therefore that we would rather
retain them than move towards what Warren calls Nietzsche's
"cultural-aesthetic fascism" (1988 p 66) but that does not gain
us any ground. It merely exposes, Nietzsche would argue, our own
enthralment to slave morality, our inability to overcome
ressentiment and bad conscience, our own weakne~s.
However, as Schutte argues, Nietzsche's critical impetus often
fails him when it comes to his own ideals - he does not sUbject
his own ideal ,.to rigorous criticism and so we need to perform
this task for him:
"We need to raise questions as to how his political
views apply to our present and future well-being. In
keeping with this goal of the investigation, it is
better to reject the assumption that Nietzsche is an
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undisputed authority on the political future of human
beings." (1983 p 139)
And in pursuing this investigation a purely moral opposition is
only one of the options open to us. Another strategy would be
to question the assumptions underlying Nietzsche's .political
thought. This is the approach taken by Warren (1988) who
identifies three assumptions: first, that all society is
necessarily class-based; second, that human nature is to be
understood biologically; and third, that the modern crisis of
nihilism is, unlike original nihilism, not politically grounded
(Warren, 1988 pp 226-7).
with regard to the first assumption, we might note that
Nietzsche's conception of society is from the first class-based.
In On the Genealogy of Morals for instance, Nietzsche assumes
that there are two groups in any society - the nobles and the
base. He can conceive in that first essay of only two types of
society, the worldly aristocracy and the priestly aristocracy.
Now this assumption that all society is class-based is clearly
unwarranted, one need only point to the Khoisan of our own
country to establish this4 •
However, the fact that not all societies have been class-based
does not preclude the possibility that a healthy future society
with the sort of strong culture which Nietzsche envisions might
necessarily be class-based. Indeed, part of Nietzsche's argument
is that the creation of culture requires leisure, that the
creative agent must be freed from the necessities of productive
labour and the banal tasks of everyday life. This may well have
been the case in the past, and in Nietzsche's own time. However
as Bernstein (1987) argues, twentieth-century advances in
technology have led to a position in which labour and leisure are
no longer incompatible. The first assumption that Nietzsche
makes does seem then to be refutable.
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The second assumption cuts to the heart of Nietzsche's political
thought. We saw in our discussion of Beyond Good and Evil that
in that text Nietzsche is reductive in his analysis of people,
that he sees them only in terms of weakness and strength, and
these only in physiological terms. Though the physiological
element is less dominant in On the Genealogy of Morals it is
still clearly present. Danto says of this aspect of Nietzsche's
thought:
"The physiologization of moral concepts, the proposal
that in the end moral differences must be
physiological differences, or that a certain
physiognomic paradigm must be a paradigm of health,
all other variants being sick, are among his most
reckless and dangerous conjectures." (1988 p 20)5
without rehearsing all the debates for and against biological
determinism6 let it suffice to say that there is no firm
evidence to support Nietzsche's view that our character is set
by physiology. And he himself does not adduce any; appealing
instead to what Schutte calls a "quasi-metaphysical"
justification in terms of necessity and destiny (1983 p 147).
Further, and more tellingly, even if we were to accept
Nietzsche's physiological dualism we might agree with Bernstein
(1987) that his argument that inequality is natural does not of
itself lead to an anti-democratic position.
The third assumption Warren identifies in Nietzsche's work is
that modern nihil.ism is not politically conditioned. Warren
argues that this assumption is based in Nietzsche's rather naive
understanding of the actual workings of modern society. In
particular, Warren argues, he failed to see how modern
institutions such as bureaucracies and markets work to render
people powerless (1988 P 234). Smoot (1981) makes a similar
point saying that Nietzsche ignores social and economic factors
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in his critique of modernity and his genealogy of it, preferring
to concentrate on the psychological and cultural factors.
By failing to see the political and economic factors at work in
modernity and in the crisis of nihilism, Warren argues, Nietzsche
leaves out of the reckoning the way in which modern institutions
- despite their apparent enhancement of individual autonomy -
actually serve to render individuals powerless. Nietzsche can
therefore only explain people's passivity in terms of their
weakness (Warren, 1988 p234). Again, we find an important gap
in Nietzsche's thought, one which not only leads him to
misinterpret the present, but also lends to his vision of the
future a curiously unreal quality. His discussion .of the future
society tends to remain at a high level of generality with the
actual i ns t i t ut i ona l ordering and functioning, the day-to-day
mechanics, left completely unconsidered.
Warren argues that it is these assumptions - that the present
crisis is not political or economic, that man and his values can
be understood physiologically, and that society is necessarily
class-based - supplemented by an illegitimate overextension of
the concept of the will to power which underpin Nietzsche's
politics.
In his discussion of the overextension of the will to power
Warren (1988 pp 227-237) argues firstly that when Nietzsche uses
the will to power in a political context he uses it
metaphysically and that such a usage is therefore sUbject to
Nietzsche's own criticisms of metaphysics. Secondly,Nietzsche
consistently explains society in the teL~S in which he
understands t~~ individual which is if not just simply wrong, at
least deeply problematic. Thirdly, this extension of the will
to power loses the evaluative aspect of the concept and we are
left with a might is right philosophy that stands in contrast to
his own critical and evaluative stance towards societies.
169
Warren believes if we drop both the assumptions and this
political conception of the will to power we can reconstitute a
liberal Nietzscheanism which, he further argues, is more in line
with the rest of Nietzsche's thought (1988 pp 246-248).
Warren's attempt to reconstitute Nietzsche as a liberal has been
SUbject to a great deal of criticism. Detwiler, for instance,
argues against Warren's contention that Nietzsche's conception
of the will to power is in conflict with his politics. Warren
argues that the will to power is motivated by self-constitution
not domination. But, says Detwiler, on his reading self-
constitution involves domination of one passion by another. In
other words, Detwiler rejects Warren's belief that the political
conception is different in kind from his ordinary use of the
concept (1990 pp 160-1). Similarly Parens argues that Nietzsche
uses the same metaphysics of will to power in the critique of
Christian metaphysics as in his politics (~991 p 170). Parens
thinks that it is thus a genuine problem as to whether one can
buy Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics without having to buy his
politics (1991 p 178).
But even if Warren were correct his rejection of Nietzsche' s
assumptions would only constitute a thorough~going critique of
Nietzsche's politics if it is assumed that these stand as
premises from which he infers a particular political vision. But
the relation between Nietzsche's political thought and his
philosophy is not so straightforward.
As Love (1986) points out Nietzsche's politics may not be
separable from his assumptions, nor his asaumpt.Lons from his
philosophy. Moreover, the flow may be from politics to
philosophy (rather than is as supposed from philosophy to
politics) - that is, it may be that Nietzsche's political
commitments are prior to, rather than outgrowths of, his
philosophy - or the two may be symbiotic7 •
170
We need, therefore, to supplement the strategy of undermining
Nietzsche's assumptions with a second strategy - one which shows
his political vision to be unworkable. This is the approach
Ansell-Pearson takes. His argument centres on the issue of
legitimacy, which, he argues, Nietzsche ignores and without which
he can neither persuade us to adopt his politics, nor maintain
it without recourse to force .
Nietzsche legitimates his politics in two ways. The first is an
appeal to naturalism, but:
"It is precisely this kind of justification - the
noble lie disguised as a natural law - which is now no
longer credible in the modern age of nihilism."
(Ansell-Pearson, 1994 p 41)
The second is the appeal to culture, but again:
"[T]he great problem arises, a ·problem faced head on
by Zarathustra, of how an aristocratic politics can
appeal to human beings living in a non-aristocratic
age and social world, and entice them to transfigure
themselves and become overhuman." (1994 p 154)
I think Ansell-Pearson is probably overly optimistic in his
belief that Nietzsche's aristocratic politics cannot appeal to
people living in a democratic age. I am not as convinced as
Ansell-Pearson appears to be that all people are freedom-loving,
democratic, egalitarians at heart. All sorts of authoritarian,
fascist and even totalitarian political groups have their
adherents. If there were really no danger of people being
inspired by a Nietzschean politics it would be of little
interest. But the opposite is the case - if as highly complex
and intelligent a thinker as Nietzsche believes that aristocracy
is a solution to the problems of modernity we have little reason
to hope that other people won't.
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But does Nietzsche's politics really have the potential to
resolve the crisis of modernity? Let us look again at
Nietzsche's analysis of how we came to be in such a fix. In
chapter one it was shown that Nietzsche sees the present crisis
as having its roots in a much earlier crisis. This original
nihilism was the result of an oppressive political system in
which the lower orders were powerless to change their condition
through action and so resorted to a cultural revaluation. This
cultural revaluation has ultimately led, Nietzsche claims, to a
situation in which everyone is unable to act, to exercise their
power.
His solution is to order society so that the few are released but
the many are not. Why should he imagine that this will resolve
rather than exacerbate the crisis? How can he imagine that his
new aristocracy will not lead to precisely the same problem as
the original caste system which gave rise to the crisis in the
first place? (Ansell-Pearson, 1994 pp 41-2; Connolly, 1988 pp
159-60).
Perhaps because Nietzsche, in the first place, deems the weaker
members of society incapable of action; a view which is tied to
his assumption that people's passivity in the face of the present
crisis is not politically-shaped but in some sense physiological.
Secondly, though, Nietzsche may suppose that the cultural gurus
of the new aristocracy will be able .to forge a system of meaning
which will justify both the weak and the strong, both action and
inaction. If this is Nietzsche's supposition, however, it
remains merely a hope and, given that Nietzsche sees the needs
of strong and weak as inimical and opposed, probably a vain one.
"In Nietzsche's vision we do not find any redemption
at all, but only the eternal return of the struggle
between the will to power of the strong and the weak,
of masters and slaves, of the justice that claims to
be beyond resentment, and of the resentment that
masquerades as justice." (Ansell-Pearson, 1991a p 230)
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with the result that
"By failing to address the question of legitimacy on
the level of social justice . . . it is difficult to
see how aristocratic rule as conceived by Nietzsche
could be maintained except through ruthless forms of
political control." (Ansell-Pearson, 1994 p 155)
The politics that Nietzsche advocates, thus, lacks the
wherewithal to sustain itself. The failure of Nietzsche's
politics also strikes the final blow to the Nietzschean
individual, for the politics provide the context within which his
practice might make sense, his virtues attain meaning. without
this structure the individual remains an eccentric, isolated and
alienated.
5.4 BEYOND NIHILISM AND CRISIS
In the previous two sections I have attempted to show that
Nietzsche's vision of a future beyond nihilism is doomed to
failure; that in both its subjective and its social aspects it
is neither attractive nor feasible. I will now suggest that
Nietzsche's failure was inevitable because he misconstrued the
problem.
Nietzsche offers us a stark choice between the demands of social
morality and those of culture, between an ideal of the good
(slave) man as moral and an ideal of the good (noble) man as
creative. It is in posing this choice that Nietzsche, perhaps,
first goes wrong. It is almost inconceivable that the same
Nietzsche who teaches that nothing is simple - that the world is
a dynamic process of becoming, that the self is mUltiplicity and
conflict - imagines that we have a stark choice, that there is
a simple either-or solution to a problem of the magnitude of
nihilism.
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Nietzsche's view of modernity is informed by his understanding
of the ancient Greek world. He believes that in the pre-Socratic
era Greek culture was characterized by a unity in which all
aspects of life were integrated with each other . . Socrates marked
a turning point:
"What was lost, for Nietzsche, and thereafter never
recovered, was healthy philosophy, philosophy
integrated with its culture and expressing the same
world view." (Lesser, 1987 p 30)
That modernity lacks not just a "healthy philosophy" but such an
integrated and unified world-view is undeniable, as .i s fact that
many feel the absence of such a world-view to be a loss.
certainly this is the way that Nietzsche experienced it.
Modernity is marked by competing values and interpretations,
dispersal and dissonance. However, we can only characterize that
situation as a crisis if we believe it is both intolerable and
resolvable. At times Nietzsche seems to accept the complexity
and dissonance of the modern situation, for instance in what
Ansell-Pearson calls his:
"less well-known 'politics of survival', which
consists not in legislating new values and law-tables
for man, but in playing in parodic and ironic fashion
with the ideals of humanity. Here Nietzsche does not
foresee a simple solution or end to nihilism, but
devises strategies for its endurance." (1994 pp 147-8)
More often,th~ugh, he seeks a world in which unity is restored.
Perhaps, he sometimes suggests, we can only create this unity
within ourselves, for we too are sUbject to competition (among
the drives), dispersal and dissonance. Perhaps, he sometimes
suggests, it would be enough to create out of this internal chaos
an integrated personality, to make of ourselves a work of art.
But just as often he hopes that in creating the conditions under
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which this sort of self-creation is possible we also create the
conditions under which a larger-scale integration can occur, in
which all of European diversity can be united into a great
culture.
Nietzsche's characterization of the modern situation as suffering
a crisis of nihilism implies that we have a single monolithic
problem with which to contend, that this problem is open to
solution and that an equally monolithic solution is feasible.
It may well be that each of these corollaries is false. It may
well be the case we are simply faced with competing (and perhaps
even irreconcilable) demands and that the only response open to
us is to muddle along as best we can using all resources at our
disposal, creativity and reason and social concern.
Nietzsche, however, implies otherwise: if the demands are
competing then we must make a choice one way or the other. If
it emerges that they are irreconcilable then we must jettison
some of them (those of social justice) in favour of others (the
demands of authentic self-expression and cultural creativity).
In doing so, Nietzsche believes we solve the problem. Are we
not, however, simply repressing it?
"In his thinking on the nature of the political,
Nietzsche shares the delusion which has · served to
inspire the politics of the modern age, namely, the
belief that it is possible to gain control of the
historical process and to sUbject it to the mastery of
the human will." (Ansell-Pearson, 1991a p 223)
In this belief Nietzsche is possibly more a man of his age than
he would ever admit. But where Nietzsche differs from most other
thinkers is in his belief that in order to solve the crisis we
must first live it:
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"Nietzsche is nothing if not extreme and his vision of
the nature of modernity is terrifying in the extreme .
One must throw one's lot in with modernity, with its
Enlightenment and its nihilism which are the two sides
of the same coin. And with this one might thereby be
participating in the bringing about of a terrible
catastrophe: the total collapse of the fabric of its
values. There is something more terrifying in such a
vision, it seems to me, than in the traditional
pessimist's vision of modernity as hurtling towards
disaster. There, one can at least dig in one's heels.
Even if this has absolutely no effect there is the
consolation that one did not participate in nor affirm
this catastrophe. But for Nietzsche, the only hope
for avoiding the catastrophe, for turning its reactive
collapse into an active re-valuation, is to will it."
(Redding, 1993 p 220)
So, for Nietzsche, nihilism is not just something to be solved
but to be experienced, to be lived and lived through
"Nihilism is needed to clear the way for creativity,
to make it plain that the world is without
significance or form." (Danto, 1965 p 228)
And in order to bring about a resolution more quickly Nietzsche
attempts to hasten the crisis:
"The second [no-saying] half of the calling .
engages on the terrain of previous and current values,
and attempts to institute a state of crisis and
decision." (Caygill, 1991 p 222)
Berman (1983) argues that what separates nineteenth century
critics of modernity like Nietzsche (and Marx 8 ) from
contemporary critics is the former's belief in people's capacity
to understand and fight the ills of their society and times.
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This is interestingly illustrated by a contemporary thinker who
is sympathetic to Nietzsche. Rorty accepts Nietzsche' s dichotomy
between the creative individual and sociaLmorality but for Rorty
this dualism results only in the belief that we must give up the
search for a theory which combines self-realization and social
justice since they involve incommensurable languages:
"[T]here is no way to bring self-creation together
with justice at the level of theory. The vocabulary
of self-creation is necessarily private, unshared,
unsuited to argument. The vocabulary of justice is
necessarily pUblic and shared, a medium for
argumentative exchange." (1989 p xiv)
On Rorty's reading we are not faced with a critical choice. The
two discourses are not in any way opposed, and we live with both.
"Both are right, but there is no way to make both
speak a single language." (Rorty, 1989 p xv)
He sees Nietzsche and other "ironist theorists" as the final step
on the way to our recognition of the incommensurability of pubLi,c
and private discourse. They attempted a synthesis of the two
through narrative instead of metaphysics but they failed (Rorty,
1989 p 120) and Rorty argues that we should now give up that
quest altogether.
Ansell-Pearson says of Rorty's position:
"Missing . . . is any recognition of the anxiety which
informed .~ietzsche's choice of art contra politics..
. . Rorty seems fairly sanguine about the fact that,
in a secular age, there can be no appeal to objective,
transhistorical criteria (no appeal to criteria at
all) in giving legitimacy to one's most cherished
ideals and deeply held beliefs." (Ansell-Pearson, 1994
p 170)
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perhaps,though, anxiety is inappropriate. In any case we need
not be as sanguine as Rorty to believe that there is no way back
to the simplicity of a single world view, a fully integrated
culture; to reject, that is, the notion of crisis which informs
Nietzsche's work.
5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Nehamas (1985) says of Nietzsche's morality that it has been
charged with four faUlts - banality, vagueness, inconsistency and
incoherence. The same charges might be levelled at Nietzsche's
solution to nihilism.
The political aspect of Nietzsche's vision is particularly open
to the charge of banality. His highly conservative, and perhaps
even reactionary, vision is not powered by a particularly deep
understanding of socio-economic institutions and does not offer
us any new and interesting political concepts.
"Viewed through his politics, Nietzsche's philosophy
becomes crude and uninteresting." (Warren, 1988 p 208)
Nietzsche's vision is vague in both its individual and social
moments. This is not necessarily bad. The fact that the ideal
of the Superman is left open-ended allows for it to incorporate
many different species of ideal, allows it to speak to many very
different sorts of people. When this vagueness attaches to the
political solution, however, the dangers are much greater. By
leaving open the actual content of an aristocratic society beyond
morality, by not actually working through the-institutional and
economic func~~oning of such a society, Nietzsche again is able
to appeal to people of all sorts of persuasion.
"By leaving the content of his revolutionary doctrine
undefined, except as a stirring appeal to Dionysian
intoxication, ' Nietzsche is able to recruit disciples
from the entire diapason of antiliberal sentiment,
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left as well as right. There are incentives for all
to regard themselves as constituting the highest
rank." (Rosen, 1989 p 207)
And the most obvious case of a group being inspired by
Nietzschean ideas is the Nazis. While there are many ways in
which Nietzsche's work runs counter to the ideology of National
socialism, the very vagueness of his solution allows for this
sort of appropriation of it.
Nietzsche's vision is incoherent in that it does not seem that
it will solve the problem of nihilism and may well result in a
new crisis. And finally, an element of inconsistency attaches
to the sort of ideal society that Nietzsche espouses. Nietzsche
consistently argues throughout his work that the world is a world
of becoming, that we must embrace the dynamic nature of life and
world and resist stasis. The process of self-creation through
self-overcoming is a beautiful expression of this, but the
aristocratic society Nietzsche envisages would be much more rigid
than, for instance, liberal democracy; does it not then
contradict one of the most basic tenets of Nietzsche's thought?
Nietzsche's visions of individual and society are deeply
problematic. The Nietzschean individual, supposedly a model of
psychological integration, looks, on closer examination, more
like a model of psychological disintegration. His social order
is intended to resolve the crisis of nihilism but is likely to
lead to a new crisis.
Three lacunae underlie Nietzsche's failed vision - his failure
to appreciate ,t he dialogical nature of self-creation; his lack
of political and economic understanding; and his inability to
answer the question of how we are to get to the future from the
present.
It is hardly surpr i s i nq , though, that Nietzsche fails in his




He sees a crisis where there is only complexity and
And so he sees a clear-cut solution where there is none.
It might seem, then, that Nietzsche's work, though interesting,
has nothing of substance to offer. I would argue that the
contrary is true. Once Nietzsche~s ideas are freed of the need
he imposes on them to change the entire course of human history,
once his vision no longer has to redeem all of the past, they
become open to exploration, adaptation and appropriation.
NOTES
1. Warnock, too, sees a connection between Nietzsche' sand
Aristotle's ideal of excellence and suggests that both
advocate ideals which are antagonistic to the demands of
morality. For Warnock the crucial tension between the two
perspectives lies in the notion of equality at the heart of
morality, which the Nietzschean view rejects. And he ,
thus, endorses Nietzsche's own view that his perspective is
not a moral one but "an ideal of conduct and character of
a quite different kind." (1967 p 51)
2. See, for example, Roberts (1988).
3. Interesting attempts to construct a more positive notion of
self and other out of Nietzsche's work include Diprose
(1993) and Vasseleu (1993).
4. I do not intend to imply that the Khoisan represent some
sort of ideal society or that their social structures are
completely egalitarian, merely that whatever stratification
exists in this, and similar, societies is not a matter of
class.
5. Compare this to his earlier attempt to underplay this
aspect of Nietzsche's thought:
"[T]he truly incoherent element in Nietzsche's thought
is his speaking as though an objectively better type
of being can be talked of, whereas it is wrong to take
normative criteria as having the least bearing on the
way things are to be jUdged in reality. This is an
unpleasantly tangled pocket in his system, and an
aberration from the overwhelmingly dominant direction
of his thought. But I see no way of explaining it
away." (Danto, 1965 p 187)
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6. The arguments against biological determinism are not all
moral. Two of the more hard-hitting critiques are Gould
(1981) and Kitcher (1985).
7. Weiss (1993) argues to the contrary that from a postmodern
perspective we can reject the assumption of "hermeneutic
holism" the notion that Nietzsche's politics and
philosophy form an unbreakable unity.
a.The relation between Nietzsche's work and that of Marx is
explored by Love (1986), who believes they offer competing
and incompatible solutions to the problem of nihilism, and
Caygill (1991) who believes they can be reconciled.
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CONCLUSION
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This thesis has explored three of Nietzsche's major works ~ Thus
Spoke Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, and On the Genealogy of
Morals - in terms of Nietzsche's conception of nihilism and his
attempt to overcome it.
In chapter one it was argued that Nietzsche views modernity as
being characterized by nihilism and in a state of crisis. He
associates this nihilism with the dominant Platonic-Christian
world view; the state of crisis with its collapse, "the death
of God". The Platonic-Christian world view, Nietzsche argues,
attempted to secure both truth and value by placing these in a
transcendent realm; and the loss of faith in metaphysics,
therefore, seems to place truth and value in jeopardy.
This situation is potentially disastrous, for as the old ideals,
interpretations and values lose their hold they threaten to leave
a void (Nietzsche's "abyss"). It is also potentially liberating,
though, for if the old world view can be stripped of its
absolutist pretensions then the vacuum can be filled with
competing ideals, new values and interpretations.
Nietzsche views himself as a man of destiny, the first to see
this crisis. His response to it is to abandon ~he quest for
truth, to embrace instead notions of interpretation and
perspective, while at the same time attempting to secure a more
immanent basis for value.
Nietzsche is concerned to secure value not for its own sake but
because it is the foundation of action. Nihilism is above all,
it was argued, a crisis of agency. This crisis of agency has its
roots in a much earlier era of political oppression and slavery
and the Platonic-Christian world view arose, Nietzsche argues,
out of the attempts by the oppressed class to justify and give
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meaning to their sUffering, in a context in which any solution
through political action was closed to them. However, since this
reinterpretation of the world did not resolve the original crisis
but merely repressed it, the net effect as it gained dominance
was to deprive everyone of the possibility of agency. As the
world view collapses, Nietzsche believes, the possibility of
agency becomes real once more, provided we can overcome the
crisis.
Chapter two focused on Nietzsche's first attempt to describe a
vision of something beyond nihilism in Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
The solution that ·Nietzsche offers in this book is one of
individual salvation and it is elucidated in terms of a trio of
ideas - the Superman, the will to power and eternal recurrence.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, I argued, charts the journey of its
protagonist's development from the teacher of the ideal of the
Superman to an incarnation of that ideal. The Superman engages
in a process of continual self-overcoming, driven by the will to
power, in which he creates a unity out of his competing drives.
In order to engage in this process, however, he must first free
himself of his past, find some way to overcome resentment and
vengefulness towards his own personal history; and, Nietzsche
offers the experience of the eternal recurrence as the means to
effect this. Once the past has been successfully appropriated
by means of this experience, he argues, the individual achieves
an attitude of affirmation towards life, of amor fati. It is
this attitude which characterizes the Superman and enables him
to treat life joyfully: singing, dancing, playing and laughing;
and thereby becoming the sort of individual who can live beyond
nihilism, who can create his own meaning and values.
The ideal of the Superman that Zarathustra becomes is solitary
and asocial. It is an individual overcoming of nihilism. The
problem of nihilism, though, is a social problem. And an
individual solution is therefore insufficient. In chapter three
it was shown that in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche, realizing
this, offers a more socially and politically inclusive attempt
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at a solution. In this book Nietzsche tenders a more
physiologically-based understanding of people, interpretations
and values. He dissects the ideals of the philosopher and saint,
which inform the Platonic-Christian world view, as well as their
accompanying moral values. He proceeds by casting suspicion on
these ideals and values, and their claims to truth: rather than
offering any knock-down argument against them, he reinterprets
them as physiologically-based expressions of the will to power
of the weak. In contrast he offers an ideal which embraces the
interpretative nature of the philosophical enterprise and the
will to power, an ideal he suggests which is also physiologically
-based, but this time an expression of strength. Having set up
these opposing ideals, Nietzsche offers a vision of the sort of
society which would lie beyond the nihilism of the present and
encourage the expression of strength. The political vision he
offers is one of an aristocracy which lies beyond, and outside
of, social morality. He suggests that this sort of social
organisation is necessary for the production of strong
individuals, who, it is intimated, might provide a revitalisation
of cul t.ure , a new revaluation of values to counter that of
Socrates and Christ.
The method of genealogy used in On the Genealogy of Morals, which
was the subject of chapter four, can be seen, it was argued, as
the social analogue of the eternal recurrence. It, too, is
intended to appropriate the past in order to free the future for
action, but on a much broader scale. In this work Nietzsche
locates nihilism in the values of ressentiment associated with
slave morality, the interpretations of bad conscience and the
ideals of asceticism. It is these which have dominated the West
through the past millennia; but, Nietzsche argues, repressed
within Western culture are other possibilities - the values of
a noble, or master, morality; the interpretations of good
conscience and the new ideal which he has developed. It is these
latent potentialities which make possible the overcoming of
nihilism.
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In chapter five Nietzsche's vision of the future was subjected
to critical evaluation. It was argued that Nietzsche's vision
of both individual and society are unattractive and unfeasible.
The Nietzschean individual, isolated or in a struggle for
supremacy, is less a model of psychological health and well-being
than a case study in alienation. The aristocratic society which
Nietzsche envisages, besides being unattractive in its lack of
any social morality (and therefore of controls ori behaviour) is
also unfeasible in that it may lack any basis for legitimation
bar . naked power, and therefore seems sure to recreate the crisis
it was intended to overcome.
It was further argued that this lack of a workable and attractive
vision of the future is based on a misinterpretation of the
present. I suggested that while modernity does indeed lack the
sort of unity which, in Nietzsche's view, characterized the pre-
modern period, the dissonance and divergence of values,
interpretations · and ideals with which late modernity is
associated are something we have to accept and work with rather
than a crisis to be overcome through rather simplistic choices
and solutions.
NIETZSCHE BEYOND NIHILISM
In arguing that Nietzsche fails as a visionary I do not wish to
deny his stature as a philosopher . In both roles Nietzsche is
inspiring. We do not, cannot, merely read him in a detached
manner. He takes our ideas, our values, our ideals and twists,
moulds, shakes them, sometimes even tears them apart, until we
feel disoriented and giddy. He assaults our senses with his
imagery, our reason with his polemics. He seems to know us
backwards and forwards, yet he always remains elusive.
In trying to capture his thought and sUbject it to criticism it
tends to become a collection of trite ideas. We suspect that
this triteness is our own, and in many ways we are correct, for
in interpretation we flatten out the contours of his thought,
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turn in his many voices into a monophone. Perhaps, then, we
should not seek to interpret and criticise his work; perhaps,
instead, we should experience his artistry and join his
celebration. That seems to me, however, a most dangerous course.
It is important, I believe, to find some critical distance
towards Nietzsche's works; to treat his ideas and values with
the same suspicion that he levels at those of modernity. We,
too, must learn to say no as well as yes. I have argued .t ha t we
should say no to Nietzsche in his visionary role. In what
follows I shall look at some of the ways in which we might say
yes to Nietzsche the philosopher and critic.
If Nietzsche's work had no other value, he would remain crucially
important for his challenge to modernity. He ruthlessly dissects
the values, ideals and interpretations which have shaped the
modern experience and announces that they are now worthless or
ruinous. If we agree with him then we are challenged to produce
new values, interpretations and ideals. If we disagree with him,
on the other hand, we are challenged to defend them against a
most radical onslaught.
I do not believe, though, that this is the only vaiue of
Nietzsche's work. Although I have argued that Nietzsche
incorrectly ascribes to modernity a situation of crisis, he does,
nevertheless, respond in his work to a very real situation. The
Christian world view no longer has a secure hegemony, and the
lessening of its hold over Western culture has resulted in the
loss of old certitudes of truth and value.
Nietzsche, who might be characterized as the first post-Christian
philosopher, presents us with one man's attempt to come to terms
with the implications of an atheistic and relativistic world.
He offers a way of philosophizing which, while recognizing (and
even embracing) relativism is not reduced to either an "anything
goes" vacuousness, or a withdrawal from the task of making
sUbstantive claims and jUdgements. Instead, Nietzsche's ideal
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is of an experimental philosophy in which philosophers recognize
the perspectival nature of their claims and value judgements and
yet continue to make them.
In his attempts to find a way of accomplishing this Nietzsche
considerably broadens our conception of what it is to
philosophize, and of what a philosophical text looks like. Thus
,Spok e Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of
Morals are each different in form from each other, and with the
possible exception of The Genealogy from most other philosophical
works. Nietzsche consistently tests and breaks down the
boundaries of philosophy.
He does this not only in the formal qualities of his work but
also in its content. For Nietzsche philosophy is not an arcane
academic discipline but an engagement with all of the world and
life. The concern with life is never far from the centre of
Nietzsche's thinking. The question of how we do and should live,
and not merely how we do and should theorize, is at the core of
Nietzsche's philosophy. In this Nietzsche speaks to all of us.
Despite his protestations that he writes for only the very few,
and his fears that he would find no audience, Nietzsche may well
be the most popular and widely-read philosop~er of the twentieth-
century. The irony of this would probably appeal to him.
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